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WORLD WAR II: THE POST-MORTEM BEGINS

I

THERE is something about "grim-visaged war" which brings out the literary in men. At least our Civil War and then World War I produced a flood of official records, semi-official records, biographies, and memoirs and apologias from statesmen and generals. All of these have been important in enabling us to understand past events a little more clearly and even to learn a few lessons.

World War II has already had more words written about it than any other war. It was a well-reported conflict. The cable and the radio were supplemented by the globe-girdling airplane in enabling war correspondents to file their observations promptly from every battlefront. The exigencies of war, including the shortage of paper, did not prevent publishers from printing innumerable books about particular and general events while the war was still in progress. We have already had reports of individual engagements, the comments of correspondents, and official and semi-official histories. Films have reinforced the written word. No one need envy the historian who attempts to do more than record the obvious about this war. His task is so overwhelming that it may indeed baffle his most energetic and determined efforts.

It is too early to expect the leading participants themselves to record their respective rôles in World War II. Nor is there any way of predicting the extent to which statesmen and gen-

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erals will be moved this time to commit themselves to print. There are already rumors that Winston Churchill and Viscount Montgomery are writing books. On March 18, 1943 Mr. Churchill was asked in the House of Commons whether he was "compiling notes in his spare time for the great benefit of us all in the future." The Prime Minister's reply on that occasion was enigmatic: "My time is wholly given to the state."

Three recent books are of a very different character from the official and unofficial publications to date. While none of the authors is a top political or military figure, each served an important American general in World War II. These books are: *My Three Years with Eisenhower,* the personal diary of General Eisenhower's Naval Aide and confidant, Captain Harry C. Butcher; *Top Secret,* by Ralph Ingersoll who worked first on General Devers' staff in England and later on General Bradley's staff; and *Wrath in Burma* by Fred Eldridge who was one of the faithful band of officers serving with General Stilwell from 1942 to 1944 in the China-Burma-India Theater.[1] All three authors had been newspapermen; all three had an inside opportunity to observe the workings of our high commands in wartime; all three have published their own interpretation of the events they witnessed and the things they heard.

Butcher's diary almost deserves inclusion in the list of official war publications. This day-by-day record of events and observations was kept with General Eisenhower's knowledge and as a part of the author's official duties. As it stands it is a long, rambling and disconnected account of military operations under the command of General Eisenhower from 1942 to 1945. Many of the entries are not only personal but even trivial. The author has made no effort to record more than what he heard or saw. He feels no obligation to explain in more detail some

[1] *My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR,* by Harry C. Butcher. New York, Simon & Shuster, 1946. 911 pp. $5.00.

Top Secret, by Ralph Ingersoll. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946. x, 373 pp. $3.00.

Wrath in Burma: The Uncensored Story of General Stilwell and International Maneuvers in the Far East, by Fred Eldridge. New York, Doubleday & Co., 1946. 320 pp. $3.00.

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of the important events of the time. For example, the reader will not find any account in Butcher's diary of the decisions or the planning which preceded the landings at Salerno. The diary has been carefully edited within the War Department so that it is impossible to know what items may have been deleted for various reasons; but it contains much new information about the war. Certainly its reading is essential as an antidote to Ingersoll's more bombastic account.

When Ingersoll wrote *Top Secret* he was mad—mad at the British, mad especially at Field Marshal Montgomery, and mad incidentally at General Eisenhower. He has a simple thesis to present: British strategy in World War II was constantly motivated by a concern for what would best serve the longe-range interests of the British Empire. He does not bother to speculate whether we were similarly motivated. Nor does he object so much to the political considerations which influenced British strategy as he does to the ways in which the British tried to win the Americans to their position. After the invasion of Normandy the differences between British and American strategy are personalized by Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley, respectively the Commanding Generals of the 21st and the 12th Army Group. In Ingersoll's eyes it was General Bradley who won the war in France and in Germany by his own brilliant strategy. No one else gets much credit.

Completing the trilogy, Eldridge tells the story of international jockeying in India and Burma which complicated General Stilwell's mission of making the Chinese effective participants in World War II. Here again the British even more than Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang government are the objects of Eldridge's attack. Like Ingersoll, Eldridge is mad, but he is somewhat less consumed by his emotion. *Wrath in Burma* at least reminds us that World War II was really a global war, and that the conflict in Asia was simultaneous with the war against the Axis in Europe. In the absence of a book giving us the "inside story" of General MacArthur's and Admiral Nimitz' commands, Eldridge is a good reminder of military issues in the Far East.

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All three books provide us with a framework for understanding the basic strategy of World War II. More than this, they forecast for us now the principal controversies which will undoubtedly occupy scholars, journalists, soldiers and politicans for many years to come.

II

World War II is not the first war to provoke controversy. General Pershing in his two volumes published in 1931 had a great deal to say about his battle to organize a separate American army assigned its own sector of the Western Front. He was determined that American forces should not come under the tactical direction of British or French armies in the field. In the end he recognized the need for a supreme commander directing all the forces and interposed no particular objection to Marshal Foch's designation. He said almost nothing about his relations with the War Department during the war. It was only when General March published his own memoir that we learned firsthand of the violent controversy between March and Pershing about who was superior in the military hierarchy, the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Force. Marshal Foch himself has told us something of the negotiations which preceded the Allied decision to create a supreme commander on the Western Front and of the difficulties he encountered in making that rôle something more than a negotiator among equals. Clemenceau has given us a vivid account of his relations with Foch and of his general attitude toward officers which led him to conclude that "wars are too important to be left to soldiers." It was Lloyd George, however, who revealed the full extent of civilian-military conflict in World War I with his vigorous denunciation of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, and the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Sir Douglas Haig. Duff Cooper's later effort to cleanse the mire from Earl Haig was unimpressive. No doubt the British government entered World War II with a bad taste still in its mouth.

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The controversies of World War II begin where those of World War I left off. But in considerable part they contradict that old chestnut about history repeating itself. There is nothing in these three accounts of World War II—in Butcher, Ingersoll, or Eldridge—which suggests any fundamental disagreement between the professional soldier and the political head of his state in World War II. No problem of civilian versus military control of strategy is reflected in the commands about which these authors have written.

In a lengthy review of the war to the House of Commons on September 28, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill announced that Mr. Roosevelt and he had adopted the policy of making no changes in the Chiefs of Staff charged with the conduct of the war. He added that "in this war there has been none of those differences between professional and political elements as were such a large feature of the last war. We have worked together in perfect harmony." While we lack such a testimonial from President Roosevelt, the facts speak for themselves. From all three of these books it is clear that General Marshall was probably the most influential single individual in fixing American, and hence American-British, strategy in World War II. Ingersoll tells us, without indicating the source of his information, that President Roosevelt would not tolerate any criticism of General Marshall, General Arnold, or Admiral King.

The principal controversies in World War II apparently centered on basic differences in strategy between the Americans and the British which had nothing to do with the civilian or military status of the participants. Rather, they reflected differences in national objectives and attitudes. These conflicts deserve extended comment. But here we should note Ingersoll's gossip that the British constantly tried to persuade President Roosevelt to dismiss Admiral King whom they regarded as uncoöperative. Indeed, Eldridge reminds us that the Pacific was definitely an American ocean in our eyes and that Admirals King and Nimitz wanted no British vessels fooling around there. He says this attitude was partly explained on purely military grounds—the British fleet was obsolete by American standards.

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Undoubtedly it was also a political fact that this country intended to retake the Philippines and other Pacific islands without benefit of the British. Only toward the end did we finally agree to accept a token British fleet in the Pacific. Ingersoll also would make the matter of nightime saturation bombing versus daylight precision bombing a British-American conflict in which President Roosevelt upheld General Arnold. Yet Ingersoll's conclusion that General Marshall "often got pushed around" by the British is no place borne out by the record. The exact reverse seems evident. One might say that General Marshall handled the British with more tact. Eldridge tells us that General Marshall once warned General Stilwell that it was absolutely necessary to get along better with the British because in spite of everything "the British are our most reliable allies."

III

Probably the single most important decision in World War II was that which held the Axis in Europe to be the greater menace and so directed Allied military effort to be concentrated there first. The present three books give us no additional information about the reason for this particular decision. We do learn from Butcher that General Eisenhower could never forget that there was war also in the Pacific. He was constantly concerned lest differences of opinion between the British and Americans in Europe might induce the American Chiefs of Staff to switch our military might to the Pacific. And from Eisenhower's headquarters in Algiers it sometimes looked as if American political pressure might force a switch in major effort to the Pacific. Under date of July 27, 1943, for instance, Butcher tells us that Secretary Stimson expressed the opinion that the American people seemed to favor an all-out fight against Japan after the Mediterranean was cleared. On January 26, 1945, Butcher had a long conversation with Harry Hopkins. On this occasion Hopkins told Butcher that the big issue at the Malta conference would be the Pacific versus the European war. General Marshall was determined to complete the war against Germany first, but Admiral King was now battling for more re-

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sources in the Pacific. But no orders reached Eisenhower afterwards to reduce his force or modify his goal.

Eldridge confirms this basic strategy in his story of the Stilwell mission. The War Department was determined to maintain the Chinese as a threat to the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland. This made General MacArthur's job that much less difficult. At the same time Stilwell understood that no combat forces would be available to him. Indeed, the Americans apparently made it clear from the outset that no American combat forces would be assigned to Asia to help the British win back their lost empire. Apart from the 10th and 14th Air Forces, the only American combat force General Stilwell ever had was one special regiment which came to be known as Merrill's Marauders. The United States assigned supply and service troops to build the Ledo Road and to handle supplies for Chinese troops. Otherwise land fighting was left to the British and Chinese. Stilwell understood the limitations of his assignment and never complained about his meager resources.

There is no evidence that the British dissented from this major strategy. None of the controversies which arose ever involved a proposed shift of preponderant Allied strength from Europe to the Pacific. On this major decision then there was apparently unanimity between the two countries. This is a fact to which all three authors might well have given more stress.

It was within the general limits of Allied strategy that most of the debate occurred. From Butcher we learn that when General Eisenhower arrived in London on June 24, 1942, he immediately began a series of conferences about military strategy. Early in July Eisenhower informed Marshall that the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff had decided that a cross-Channel operation could not be successfully executed in 1942. One reason given was the lack of sufficient landing craft. Another was the fear that existing forces were inadequate to hold a beachhead once it was seized. The British Chiefs of Staff are said to have been worried because this decision was "letting General Marshall down", an indication that General Marshall was the person backing this action. We are told that

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one reason for American insistence upon a cross-Channel invasion was a desire to keep Russia in the war.

On July 24, 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting in London, with General Marshall and Admiral King present, decided upon the invasion of North Africa, subject to the approval of the President and the Prime Minister. Butcher's account suggests that the primary purpose of the new action was to prevent German seizure of the Suez Canal and a possible march into the Middle East for an eventual junction with the Japanese. The new operation then was intended to strengthen the tottering British defense in Egypt. General Eisenhower is recorded at this time as fearing that the new effort might be a sideshow which would interfere seriously with execution of the major plan—the invasion of Europe across the English Channel. The United States interposed no objection to the North African invasion.

The story of that operation need not be retold here. Butcher does provide us with some new information about the "Darlan Deal". Apparently Robert Murphy in Algiers was in touch with Darlan before the actual invasion. Under date of October 17, 1942, Butcher reports a series of messages from Murphy indicating that Admiral Darlan would probably cast his lot with the Allies. Representatives of Darlan told Murphy that the Vichy Government had already learned from German and Japanese sources that the United States planned military operations against Dakar or Casablanca or both. The Axis Powers urged French resistance and even threatened to occupy French North Africa. Darlan was reported as willing to join the Allies with the French fleet if he would be recognized as Commander-in-Chief of the French Armed Forces and if he could be assured of American material and economic aid. Murphy at this time recommended that Darlan be encouraged to work with the Allies and to coöperate with Giraud, who already had been decided upon as the central French figure in the Allied North African invasion. Butcher also reveals that Darlan was expected to come to Algiers. This would seem to indicate that his presence there on November 8, 1942 was something less than a coincidence.

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Giraud at Gibraltar certainly made anything but a favorable impression upon Eisenhower. The French general insisted upon becoming Allied Commander-in-Chief and talked at length about prestige and his family. About the time Giraud was ready to depart from Gibraltar, Eisenhower learned that Darlan in Algiers was willing to negotiate. In this situation Eisenhower had to make an immediate decision. He empowered his deputy, General Mark Clark, to negotiate for the cessation of all French resistance. On November 10 Darlan agreed to issue orders for all French forces on land, sea and air to cease fighting. Oran and Casablanca, however, seemed to have fallen without benefit of Darlan's order. But the Allies were still eager to get the French fleet at Toulon. In fact, Eisenhower had been told by Churchill to get the fleet no matter what he had to do. In Algiers on November 14, Eisenhower personally confirmed an agreement between Darlan and Giraud whereby Darlan was to become Governor of French North Africa, Giraud was to command a French Army, and Darlan would arrange the surrender of Dakar and try to get the French fleet to leave Toulon. Eisenhower asked both Darlan and Giraud to press an attack upon the Germans in Tunisia. This was the deal which caused such tremendous furor in the United States and Great Britain after it was announced. We learned that Roosevelt approved Eisenhower's agreement but asked that in the future he be consulted first.

It is obvious from Butcher's account, pieced together over various dates, that Eisenhower was motivated solely by military considerations. The Darlan deal gave the Allies Dakar without a battle and might have given them Tunis. But Allied propaganda had pictured Darlan as a pro-Axis puppet. American undercover negotiations could not be reported to the American public without informing the Axis of our intentions. As a result, public opinion was unprepared for any recognition of Darlan and was quick to denounce what appeared to be a political arrangement which undermined all French resistance groups. Eisenhower was unprepared for the storm of criticism he encountered. Both Marshall and he realized that only the

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successful conclusion of the Tunisian campaign in May 1943 succeeded in rehabilitating Eisenhower's reputation.

At Casablanca in January 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to set up an office in London actively to plan for a cross-Channel invasion. This was still intended to be the major Allied military undertaking in Europe. Then the British began to exert constant pressure for a change in strategy. Churchill favored the Mediterranean area. To Ingersoll this was " perfidious Albion " incarnate. Butcher is more matter of fact. He merely records all the numerous occasions when the Prime Minister endeavored to change the decision.

Butcher, Ingersoll and Eldridge each gives us some insight into the reasons motivating the British desire to conquer the Mediterranean area. According to Butcher, Secretary Stimson on July 27, 1943, in Algiers told Eisenhower that Churchill was " obsessed " with the idea of proving that an invasion of the continent by way of the Balkans was wise strategy. Mr. Stimson felt that the Prime Minister wanted to repair whatever damage history had cast upon the Dardanelles operation of World War I. Eldridge reports a conversation which Ambassador William Phillips had with Churchill before his departure to India as President Roosevelt's personal emissary. On this occasion Churchill is said to have told Phillips that France fell in World War II because she had been bled white in World War I. The Prime Minister was determined that this was not going to happen to Britain under his stewardship. He frankly admitted that he was determined to fight a " cheap " war. This incident suggests that the Prime Minister might have been especially concerned about the high casualties which would result from a war in France. For Ingersoll the desired strategy simply evidenced British determination to protect the empire and the corollary necessity of playing a dominant rôle in the Balkans. Ingersoll even suggests that the British feared possible Russian control of the Balkans if the western Allies did not succeed in freeing these countries first. One suspects that this is wisdom after the event. Whatever the reason, British opposition to the cross-Channel operation is beyond doubt.

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Butcher records that on May 28, 1943, Churchill arrived in Algiers for the ostensible purpose of convincing Eisenhower that the Allies had more to gain from an exploitation of their position in the Mediterranean than from a cross-Channel invasion. Yet Mr. Churchill was accompanied by General Marshall at the former's request. The Prime Minister did not conceal his purpose and was apparently willing to have General Marshall as the principal representative of the American point of view present. According to Butcher, Eisenhower was firmly convinced of the essential soundness of Marshall's strategy. Later, in talking to Secretary Stimson, Eisenhower was less positive. In commenting about the Italian campaign under date of September 16, 1943, Butcher notes that it had been complicated by the conflicting desires of the United States and Great Britain. The former did not want to become too largely involved in Italy at the expense of the cross-Channel operation. Neither Butcher nor Ingersoll presents a clear explanation why General Marshall favored the cross-Channel operation. Ingersoll does summarize the American position as he understood it. France was the territory held by the Germans nearest the United States. It thus provided the shortest supply route. The terrain in France offered the best possibilities for "blitz" warfare and mortal blows against Germany. In France our forces could bring more direct assistance to the Russians. Whether these were the controlling factors we shall not know until someone else enlightens us.

Ingersoll arrived in England in June 1943 as a member of General Devers' staff. The American headquarters was eagerly awaiting the presentation of the plan for OVERLORD—the code name for the cross-Channel invasion. This plan was being prepared under the supervision of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan and at this stage was apparently a 100 per cent British planning project. Ingersoll reports the consternation with which the American officers greeted the first draft of the plan when it was given them. In his eyes the many favorable conditions required for the operation became merely a British way of sabotaging the whole effort. General Devers'

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headquarters suggested numerous modifications in the original plan. He was not favorably disposed for one thing toward that part of the plan which called for an American Supreme Commander but for British commanders of the air, sea and ground forces. OVERLORD was indorsed in principle at Quebec in August 1943. Even after that, Ingersoll accuses the British of doctoring information and of making every other possible effort to abandon OVERLORD. For one thing, he says the British overestimated the strength of German fortifications along the Channel coast, since he believed that British intelligence was remarkably able and hence better informed.

On November 23, 1943, Harry Hopkins told Captain Butcher that the British had sought the Cairo conference that month because they wanted to reverse the Quebec decision on OVERLORD. This time the British apparently realized that the Russians must be won over to the idea that Allied military operations in the west should concentrate upon the Mediterranean. Hopkins suspected that the Russians and the British had already reached some tentative agreement or otherwise there would have been no reason for the Cairo conference. Apparently Hopkins' suspicions were unwarranted. That OVERLORD was up for review is certain. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff predicted that the Cairo conference would be the "hottest one yet." From Cairo Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff moved on to Teheran. Butcher learned most of his information about Teheran afterwards from Elliott Roosevelt. The Russians sided with the Americans in favor of OVERLORD. Stalin agreed that the Germans should be kept engaged in Italy all winter, but insisted upon a second front across the Channel by May 1944. We learn that in turn Stalin in Teheran announced that he was prepared to fight Japan when Germany was defeated. He even offered to curtail his plans for an offensive against Germany in order to attack Japan immediately. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill declined this offer since both wanted the Russians to press against Germany as strongly as possible. Stalin's opinion determined Allied strategy. The British finally acquiesced in OVERLORD.

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IV

Between the Quebec and Cairo conferences in 1943 there occurred a peculiar incident which is recorded by Butcher but not satisfactorily explained. Shortly after the Quebec conference, on September 25, Secretary Knox arrived in Algiers. He disclosed to Butcher that General Marshall had been named Supreme Commander for OVERLORD and that Eisenhower would probably return to Washington to become Chief of Staff. This information was confirmed when Ambassador Harriman, en route to Moscow, stopped off in North Africa. Harriman told Butcher that Secretary Stimson was insisting that Marshall go to England. Admiral King, on the other hand, was endeavoring to convince both Stimson and the President to keep Marshall in Washington. Harriman mentioned the considerable newspaper publicity in the United States about the possible shift and said that this might block the move. General Marshall was pictured as remaining completely aloof from the whole discussion.

On November 23 General Marshall and Admiral King visited General Eisenhower en route to the Cairo conference. Butcher records that as General Eisenhower left the room Admiral King walked to the door with him and said, "I hate to lose General Marshall as Chief of Staff, but my loss is consoled by the knowledge that I will have you to work with in this job." Marshall said nothing about the subject to Eisenhower. On this same day Butcher had a long conversation with Harry Hopkins. Hopkins said that it was definite that Marshall would be the Supreme Commander in England for OVERLORD. Butcher tells us that he argued against such a shift. He reasoned that Marshall had already displayed "remarkable acumen" in directing the strategy of the war and in dealing with Congress. It would take Eisenhower at least six months to become familiar with various aspects of the Chief of Staff's job. On the other hand, Marshall would require at least six months to become familiar with the needs of a joint Allied command. Hopkins seems to have made no reply. Under date of December 10, 1943, Butcher tells us that Eisenhower learned

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on December 7 in a radio message from Marshall that Eisenhower was to be Supreme Commander for OVERLORD. The President and his party arrived that same day in Tunisia. Hopkins told Butcher that the President "and others" thought Marshall had come to regard his job as Chief of Staff as more important to the war effort. For that reason he was remaining in that job. The additional explanation which Hopkins offered repeated the reasons Butcher had given earlier against such a change.

Obviously this is not the whole story. As late as December 6 Eisenhower was convinced that he was slated to return to Washington as Chief of Staff. Something happened at Cairo or Teheran which cancelled the plan to make Marshall the Commander-in-Chief, leaving Eisenhower as the logical alternative. Until someone else enlightens us, we can only speculate about the reasons for this decision. It may have been prompted largely by certain internal political considerations within the Army. Marshall may himself have come to realize that his rôle as Chief of Staff was more vital, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated resources among the various theaters throughout the world. It may have been that the British felt that Eisenhower was more acceptable to them than Marshall. In any event Eisenhower became the Supreme Commander for the cross-Channel invasion.

While this incident is not mentioned by Ingersoll, he does argue that Eisenhower was peculiarly acceptable to the British. The British regarded him as amenable to their desires. Ingersoll describes Eisenhower as a diplomat who took responsibility and as a soldier who minded his own business. In addition, Eisenhower enjoyed the full confidence of Marshall. Finally, Eisenhower was a firm believer in the joint American-British staff and in joint operations. All of this, in Ingersoll's eyes, simply made Eisenhower a "political general". Ingersoll speaks of Eisenhower as living in the "rarified atmosphere of high level international doings." One wonders exactly what Ingersoll thought the rôle of a Supreme Commander was.

Certainly it is clear from Butcher's day-to-day accounts that one of Eisenhower's continuing concerns was adjusting British

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and American points of view. Butcher makes no attempt to belittle or deny these differences. And certainly Eisenhower had no illusions about the difficulties in creating a common front even for military operations.

One of Eisenhower's great achievements was the creation of the joint staff where British and Americans worked together. Ingersoll questions this. He thinks the British members were primarily loyal to the British War Office rather than to the Supreme Commander. But how great Eisenhower's achievement actually was is indicated by Eldridge. When Lord Louis Mountbatten was sent to India after the 1943 Quebec conference to become Supreme Commander of Southeast Asia, he was instructed to set up a command similar to that of Eisenhower's in Africa. It is clear from Eldridge that he never succeeded in doing this. Butcher is not exaggerating when he calls Eisenhower's joint staff " a new type of Allied command." Whatever criticism may be leveled at this joint staff, or " SHAEF " as it came to be called, the fact remains that the British and Americans did coöperate effectively in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and northern Europe. Maybe Americans did not always like the decisions from SHAEF, but surely no one can suggest that we might have won the war faster without the British. It seems safe to predict that history will record the joint Allied command as one of Eisenhower's unique accomplishments.

Another one of Eisenhower's continuing headaches was newspaper attempts to split British-American coöperation. American commanders complained about the way the British Broadcasting Corporation news reports treated American Army activities. American correspondents played up the rôle of American troops and frequently drew unfavorable comparisons with British progress. Butcher tells repeatedly of press conferences in which Eisenhower endeavored to give full credit to the accomplishments of both.

Even Ingersoll, who at first seems to belittle Eisenhower's rôle, is later critical because Eisenhower made strategic and tactical decisions affecting ground operations along the German border. Certainly when he made these decisions Eisenhower was no " political general " or " chairman of the board ". And Eisenhower

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was not unaware of the criticisms which even American officers made of him in 1944 and 1945. Butcher records them. It is another indication of Eisenhower's quality as a man that he refused to let these criticisms affect his decisions.

V

Eisenhower arrived in London once again in January 1944 to become Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. Ingersoll has little to tell us about the final five months of preparation for OVERLORD. He does have an interesting story about landing craft which suggests that the American Navy or British planners or both failed to make adequate preparations for the invasion. From Butcher we learn that landing craft was one of Eisenhower's constant problems in launching OVERLORD. It seems evident that Eisenhower was largely responsible for enlarging the assault force in order to insure the success of the invasion.

Mr. Churchill continued his rôle of "kibitzer" on military strategy. It is clear from Butcher that the Prime Minister was primarily responsible for the Anzio beachhead operation of January 22, 1944. General Clark had favored some delay until the general Italian line had advanced farther. Eisenhower was concerned about the Anzio beachhead because it delayed the plans for an invasion of southern France. This invasion, under the code name ANVIL, wanders in and out of the pages of Butcher's diary from January to August 15, 1944. Originally this operation was timed to occur simultaneously with the Normandy invasion. It actually came more than two months later because of uncertainties about events on the Italian front and the absence of landing craft and necessary naval support. Churchill constantly urged Eisenhower to abandon ANVIL. Indeed Butcher tells us that on one occasion, in endeavoring to influence Eisenhower to give up the invasion of southern France, Churchill even threatened to go to the King and "lay down the mantle of my high office." The British Prime Minister wanted the troops for ANVIL used in a cross-Adriatic operation. Eisenhower was adamant. ANVIL was probably the most celebrated on-again off-again decision of World War

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II. When it finally occurred, the Germans were probably less surprised than Eisenhower.

VI

Once the Normandy invasion was under way, new differences were to plague Anglo-American coöperation. These differences partly concerned strategy and partly concerned command arrangements and personalities. Field Marshal Montgomery is the central personality in this story. It seems likely that for many years to come we shall hear a good deal about Montgomery and his ambitions. We can do no more here than mention the major points in the controversy as revealed by Butcher and Ingersoll.

As contemplated by the original OVERLORD plan, a British officer was named commander of the ground forces for the invasion operation. The participating American forces, then designated the First Army, were under the command of General Omar Bradley. Butcher indicates that Eisenhower never intended this to be more than an initial arrangement. As soon as the beachhead was expanded, a separate American command reporting directly to him was to come into existence.

Trouble with Montgomery arose within a week after D-Day. In his usual manner, Montgomery delayed his attack upon the Germans in order to make sure that he had plenty of supplies on hand and that his rear area was functioning satisfactorily. Eisenhower chafed at the delay. The major British attack did not occur until June 25, giving the Germans ten or twelve days to dig in and an opportunity to move two additional divisions against it. A full-scale attack on Caen was not launched by the British forces until July 18 with heavy air support. By noon the ground forces had advanced some seven miles. Then Montgomery stopped to make sure of his supplies. Eisenhower was angry. Butcher tells us that on July 19 Air Chief Marshal Tedder, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, informed Eisenhower that the British Chiefs of Staff were disappointed at Montgomery's slow progress and would support any recommendation Eisenhower wished to make about the British general. This was clearly an invitation to Eisenhower to relieve Mont-

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gomery from command. Eisenhower was reluctant to take so drastic a step. For one thing, he lacked a suitable replacement. He told Butcher one time that the British policy of giving publicity to only a few generals made it difficult to replace an unsatisfactory commander. On this occasion Eisenhower made a special visit to Montgomery and then reviewed his agreements in a long letter. Montgomery was to push forward. Air Chief Marshal Tedder approached the subject of Montgomery's relief again on July 25, but Eisenhower once more refused to take the step and had reason to believe that Churchill supported him in his decision.

During this same period Bradley's forces on the right of the line were pushing forward slowly but steadily through the hedgerow country. The Cotentin peninsula was sealed off and Cherbourg captured. Ingersoll's description of the battle of St.-Lô is extremely well done, and the engagement is rightly regarded as decisive. The stage was set for the break-through at Avranches which sent General Patton's Third Army galloping across France. It was the contrast at this very time which led to unfavorable comparisons. In Ingersoll's eyes the explanation is simple. Bradley was the outstanding strategist and leader of the American forces. With some reluctance Ingersoll has to admit that both Marshall and Eisenhower had recognized this ability and had promoted Bradley to this command over the heads of numerous senior officers, including General Patton.

The 12th Army Group under Bradley's command was officially created on August 1, 1944. It consisted at that time of the First Army under General Hodges and the Third Army under General Patton. From this time on Montgomery commanded only the 21st Army Group of British, Canadian and Polish forces. About the same time Eisenhower moved his headquarters into France. Active strategic direction of the ground battle now fell to Eisenhower. The actual public announcement of this change in command, however, was delayed for military reasons—the Germans well knew that Montgomery and Bradley fought different types of battles. But the delay

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had bad press repercussions in both England and the United States.

Ingersoll declares that the failure to close the Falaise Gap and so to trap the bulk of the German forces in northern France was entirely a failure of Montgomery's. He argues that the British did not move forward from the north but simply dug into their positions and fought defensively. The American Army had to do all the moving, while the Germans succeeded in extricating a sizable part of their force even though it had been decisively beaten. Butcher has nothing to say about the episode except to record Eisenhower's disappointment that the total bag of prisoners was not larger than it was.

Ingersoll's next criticism involves major strategy after the Allied forces had moved clear across France. There was now ample room for maneuver. But the Allied forces had outrun their supply facilities. Moreover, Cherbourg was the only port in Allied operation. Most of the supplies still were being landed across the beaches. In this situation Montgomery asked that all available supplies be allotted to his 21st Army Group in order that he might push across the Rhine in the north and break out onto the Hamburg Plain. Ingersoll declares that Eisenhower accepted this recommendation with the resulting airborne operation at Arnhem. Butcher denies this. He acknowledges under date of August 14 that Montgomery was asking for all available supplies. But he says that Eisenhower regarded Montgomery's proposal as impractical. For one thing, Eisenhower felt that such a narrow thrust forward would expose Montgomery's flank to effective attack by the Germans. If Montgomery got into difficulty, no other troops would be available to support him.

Butcher insists that Eisenhower's strategy was to move all of his forces against the Rhine as rapidly as possible while building up supplies and reserve forces behind them. He does admit that Eisenhower allocated the major portion of available supplies to Montgomery to help him reach the Rhine in the north. Ingersoll argues that if all the supplies had been given to Bradley, Patton's Third Army would have broken through Metz at once and have driven all the way to the Rhine without

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stopping. The British were eager to cross the Rhine first and capture northern Germany for political reasons. To Ingersoll the alternative invasion route into Germany, the Frankfort Gap, was preferable. While he admits that the terrain was more difficult, he argues that the Rhine here was only half as wide as farther north, that the valleys were unfortified, and that the Germans could be surprised. Ingersoll's principal criticism of Eisenhower really is that he backed neither Montgomery nor Bradley decisively. He has to admit that Bradley got some supplies. That Eisenhower may have been loath to put all his "eggs in one basket" never occurs to Ingersoll. In his eyes, either Bradley or Montgomery should have been given all available military might. It is true that the Arnhem operation failed to realize its objective and the Allies did not get across the Rhine in September.

According to Butcher, Eisenhower held a conference of his commanders in the field on September 22. Montgomery sent his Chief of Staff but clearly stated beforehand that he felt the tactical battle now required one ground commander on the spot and asked for the assignment. Again he also requested Eisenhower to halt the planned offensive by the 12th Army so that all supplies could be given the 21st Army Group. Eisenhower rejected these proposals. He did allot the major portion of the supplies to the 21st Army Group but insisted that Montgomery's first objective must be to clear the approaches to Antwerp which had been captured intact. The second objective was the Ruhr. Bradley was to continue his offensive operations on a limited scale.

Butcher then tells us that Eisenhower spent the last week in September visiting American commanders in order to impress upon them the importance of the task assigned to them. He gave definite instructions to Bradley at this time to thrust on toward Cologne as fast as his resources permitted. Bradley was also to watch for any favorable opportunity to cross the Rhine and was to attack the Ruhr from the south when his supply situation permitted.

By the end of November there was an all-out campaign in at least one London newspaper to make Montgomery Deputy

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Ground Commander under Eisenhower. At the same time occurred the famous exchange of correspondence between Eisenhower and Montgomery on November 28 and November 30 which is recorded in full by Butcher. Eisenhower again refused to change his strategic objectives—the smashing of the German Army and the capture of the Ruhr—or to alter his ground tactics—to get all of his forces up to the Rhine. He insisted that he wanted alternative possibilities of attack.

Ingersoll at this point levels one of his most severe charges at Montgomery. He claims that the Field Marshal deliberately failed to press the attack to clear the German forces from Walcheren Island. Antwerp could not be used as the major supply port until the Scheldt estuary was opened. Eisenhower then issued a second peremptory order. Walcheren was finally captured on November 9 and the first supply ships reached Antwerp on November 27, almost two months after its fall. After that Bradley began to receive the supplies he needed for his own armies. Butcher says nothing about this incident.

The von Rundstedt counteroffensive interrupted the debate about strategy and tactics. But the countermeasures again brought British-American differences. Ingersoll claims that Bradley immediately devised an effective plan for turning the German break-through into an Allied victory. He admits that the German drive had physically separated the First Army from the Third Army. But he insists that there continued to be effective radio communication between Bradley's and Hodges' headquarters. He claims that Eisenhower assigned Hodges' Army to Montgomery's tactical direction without consulting Bradley. This left Bradley with only the Third Army to retrieve the situation. Butcher's account indicates that Eisenhower and Bradley worked closely together in directing the tactics for eliminating the German salient by the middle of January. He does acknowledge that at the same time Field Marshal Montgomery was pressing Eisenhower once more to give him complete command of the ground forces.

The British press was now unanimous in insisting that Eisenhower needed a deputy commander. General Marshall radioed Eisenhower advising against any such arrangement and express-

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ing complete confidence in Eisenhower's leadership. We learn from Butcher that on January 9 the British Chiefs of Staff asked the American Joint Chiefs of Staff about the advisability of a single commander for ground operations. Marshall asked Eisenhower for his opinion. On January 10 Eisenhower in a long message to Marshall reviewed his strategy. He said that from the beginning all had agreed that the main invasion into Germany would occur on the north flank with thirty-five divisions. But he still expected that there would be other crossings of the Rhine and a subsidiary attack through the Frankfort Gap south of the Ruhr. He argued that a separate commander for ground operations would merely duplicate the personnel and communications of SHAEF. He said further that such an officer would have to have the power to allocate supplies. Such a ground commander would then largely displace Eisenhower's own authority. At the same time Eisenhower indicated his willingness to abide by any decision the Combined Chiefs of Staff wished to make. Under General Marshall's influence the Combined Chiefs of Staff rejected the British staff proposal.

Ingersoll relates another incident at this time which Butcher fails to mention. As the battle of the Ardennes came to an end Montgomery called in newspaper reporters and claimed primary responsibility for the victory. His statement was broadcast by the BBC and immediately aroused the ire not only of American troops but of General Bradley. Bradley then gave the press correspondents in 12th Army Group headquarters his own version of what happened. The facts were so obvious, Ingersoll claims, that Churchill apologized to Eisenhower for Montgomery's statement. Montgomery's bid for ground command was dead. At the same time Ingersoll claims that Bradley was now determined to follow his own strategic and tactical ideas without submitting them first to SHAEF. Ingersoll claims that henceforth Bradley fought the war on his own because he did not trust the British officers in Supreme Headquarters.

The rest of the story is quickly told. Bradley's forces succeeded in closing to the Rhine ahead of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. He captured the Remagen Bridge intact and developed a strong foothold across the river. Patton likewise

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got across the Rhine before Montgomery's full-scale effort on March 23. Again Ingersoll claims that Eisenhower failed to back either Montgomery or Bradley decisively. But he says this failure now played into Bradley's hands and provided him with the supplies necessary to exploit his intentions. He virtually implies that Bradley directly disobeyed Eisenhower's orders that the invasion of Germany through the Frankfort Gap was to be a secondary operation. The double envelopment of the Ruhr was primarily an American achievement which Ingersoll credits entirely to Bradley. Patton's Army now began to slash through all southern Germany while Montgomery's forces made only slow progress across the Hamburg Plain. Whether Bradley could have achieved his victory in the absence of Montgomery's strong force to the north is a question Ingersoll never mentions. But in any event, the German defeat was at hand.

At this point Ingersoll makes his most amazing revelation, not bothering to clarify an apparent contradiction with his claim that Bradley fought " on his own ". He says that as the war came to an end Eisenhower dispatched a radio message to the War Department in Washington denouncing Montgomery for insubordination and for a failure to gain his assigned objectives. At the same time Eisenhower is supposed to have accused Churchill of direct communication with Montgomery and of constant interference with his command. Ingersoll adds that in another radio message Eisenhower gave complete credit for the Allied victory to General Bradley. Then Ingersoll says that the final strategic plan for Bradley's advance to the Elbe went to Washington for approval. The British wanted Bradley's forces moved to the north to enable Montgomery to force his way into Berlin. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted Bradley's proposal and turned down the British recommendation. Bradley was determined to defeat the German Army, while the British wanted to get to Berlin ahead of the Russians. Churchill made a personal appeal to Roosevelt, and Roosevelt said no. Ingersoll says that when Roosevelt died there was " very bad blood " between him and Churchill.

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In any event, the Russians took Berlin, the American forces ended all possibility of the German " redoubt ", and Field Marshal Montgomery was left sitting on the Hamburg Plain.

Perhaps we shall never know exactly what happened in the closing days of World War II. Perhaps American generals were too much motivated by purely military considerations—the defeat of the enemy—and too little concerned with political factors—the power and prestige of the western Allies in Europe. Or perhaps more accurately we should say that our generals were freed of political considerations since the United States had no definite political ambitions in Europe.

Whatever the truth, the Allied forces in the west held together at least until the victory was won.

VII

Eldridge's story about China-Burma-India, while peculiar to the locale, is again an account of American-British differences. We are told that the British objected to having Chinese troops thrashing around inside their Empire. The fact that Chiang Kai-shek and Madame paid a courtesy call upon Nehru in 1942 did not help any. The British did not care for Stilwell's comments about the defense of Burma. Nor did they care too much about his ideas on the reconquest of that country.

According to Eldridge, the British constantly opposed the construction of the Ledo Road, although much of this opposition was behind the scenes. He claims the British did not want the road because they were afraid of the Chinese and because the road might threaten the great shipping monopolies between India and Burma. As an alternative to Stilwell's plans for the Ledo Road, the British favored a direct invasion of Rangoon, fully knowing, Eldridge insists, that the resources for such an operation would not be available for years. And Stilwell encountered the customary difficulty in obtaining adequate British recognition of what the Chinese and American troops were accomplishing in the jungle. There is no need here to review the various events which preceded the Chinese offensive under Stilwell's direction which began in December 1943. Eldridge gives the impression that the reconquest of Burma was solely the re-

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sult of the pressures and maneuvering of Stilwell. British action in the Arakan and in the Mogaung Valley as well as in repulsing the Japanese invasion of Manipur State was of secondary importance.

Stilwell's rôle was further complicated by his difficulties with Chennault of the 14th Air Force. Stilwell wanted a land route into China; Chennault was positive he could defeat the Japanese with air power alone if only he were given all available supplies.

Just as the fall of Burma was imminent, Stilwell was recalled in October 1944. Eldridge gives us very little explanation of what happened. The high politics of Chungking are inadequately recounted, probably since Eldridge and his fellow officers under Stilwell spent all of their time in India and Burma. The only explanation we are offered is that Stilwell's recall was the price Chiang Kai-shek exacted for acceding to American pressure for a settlement with the Communist forces in China. But why had the Generalissimo taken such a dislike to Stilwell? We are not told.

Perhaps Eldridge's book is important mainly in expressing American disillusionment with Chinese officialdom and American dislike of British colonial policies and administration. And it reinforces a prevailing impression that American generals in World War II were a surprisingly able and conscientious lot.

VIII

None of the authors—Butcher, Ingersoll, or Eldridge—gives very much attention to the problems of supply which played so vital a part in American military success in World War II. Butcher mentions Eisenhower's supply worries from time to time, but tells us nothing about what he did to solve them. Nor do many of the major supply problems which plagued Eisenhower's headquarters appear in Butcher's more than 800 pages. Ingersoll gives a few well-deserved tributes to supply troops and their accomplishments. He is surprisingly tolerant of supply failings. Apart from acknowledging that Stilwell's whole purpose in Burma and India was to reopen a supply route to China, Eldridge tells us very little about the engineering accomplishments which produced the Ledo Road or the supply

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efforts that went into equipping the Chinese forces as well as the 14th Air Force.

It is not enough simply to observe that there were supply difficulties plaguing our military commanders. True, this may be as much as the public at large cares to know. Supply is not an exciting story—not nearly as exciting as what Montgomery did or did not do. But our military students for a number of years can profitably devote much of their time to a study of the logistical lessons of World War II.

IX

It is impossible here to review the many other questions which all three books raise about World War II. Eisenhower had his difficulties with the Air Forces, although his personal relations with General Spaatz seem to have been exceedingly close and friendly. Indeed, from Butcher's account it is apparent that the British were more responsible for establishing an air command outside of Eisenhower's jurisdiction than was General Arnold. There is an interesting account also of a controversy between Eisenhower and the British War Cabinet on the bombing of railway centers in France. In the end the support of President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff enabled Eisenhower to win his point and to direct the systematic destruction of French communications in advance of D-Day.

There is more we would like to know also about the Italian surrender of 1943. Butcher tells us that it was Badoglio himself who advised against the dropping of an airborne division near Rome. We are left to assume that the head of the Italian government was thus admitting that no Italian troops could be expected to oppose the Germans and that such an operation might prove a total loss.

Such small bits of information about de Gaulle as Butcher gives suggest that Roosevelt for some reason had taken a strong personal dislike to the French general and that this factor alone greatly complicated our political relations in North Africa and later in France.

There are many "if's" about the war which no doubt will afford ample cause for protracted fruitless speculation. Could

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the Allied forces invading North Africa in November 1942 have gotten to Tunis in time to prevent the German occupation of that protectorate? What might have been the subsequent course of military events if this had happened? Could the Allied forces have made greater progress in Italy in spite of OVERLORD? Could Burma have been defended in 1942 under more aggressive leadership? If the outcome of the battle of Falaise Gap had been different, and if the supply problems had been overcome, could the Allied forces have crossed the Rhine in the autumn of 1944? If they had, would the war have been shortened any? This kind of questioning could go on indefinitely.

It is impossible to mention all of the interesting little side lights to be gleaned from Butcher's diary especially—side lights on the rôle of the King, Churchill's attitude about diaries and history, Marshall's technique in dealing with members of Congress, Roosevelt's observation on the difficulties of handling the press and his fatalism about his own job, Roosevelt's attitude about America's post-war occupation commitments in Europe, a British Air Marshal's willingness to admit his mistake in forecasting the results of the airborne operation on D-Day, the kind of planning which war requires, and Churchill's last-minute request to shift the invasion of southern France to the Britanny Peninsula.

Some events of great importance, moreover, receive little, if any, attention. Butcher alone mentions the VT-fuse, without giving any of the fascinating story about how it came to be used in Europe. Virtually nothing is said about the rôle of radar. And such controversies as the American versus the German tank do not appear at all. Nor do we learn anything about the reasons why Allied intelligence failed to forecast the von Rundstedt counteroffensive in December 1944. Perhaps all these are too much the concern of the military alone.

Nothing said here or in any of the three books is intended to belittle Russia's rôle in the war. Certainly Americans and British both can afford to admit that Russia's was probably the greatest contribution of all in defeating Germany.

Butcher, Ingersoll and Eldridge deal for the most part with the problems of American-British coöperation after Pearl Har-

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bor. Maybe they have dealt too much with them. These differences make exciting reading, as the foregoing account may reveal. There is no reason why we should not admit that there were differences of opinion and different objectives.

At the same time we should not overlook two basic facts. First, America and Britain were able to work together to the end as allies. Differences were submerged or compromised for a common end. That too should be news. Without the United States it is doubtful whether the British could have obtained a better outcome to World War II than an uneasy stalemate. Without the active assistance of the British, the United States could never have achieved the victory in so short a period of time at so little cost. And we do not need to be complacent while at the same time remembering that the outcome of the war was the complete destruction of German and Japanese military might.

JOHN D. MILLETT

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MARXISM IN THE U.S.S.R.—THE RECENT REVIVAL

AT various periods in the history of the Soviet state the trend of Marxist teaching and its intensity have varied considerably. The period of War Communism during the Civil War of 1918-1920 was succeeded by the relaxed era of the New Economic Policy, which in turn was followed by the strain of the First Five-Year Plan. The rise of Hitler and the Japanese threat led to the period of the United Front of Marxist-capitalist collaboration, which, after Munich, gave way to a time of intensified Soviet hostility to the capitalist world. After the German attack on the Soviet Union there was a *rapprochement* between the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-American Powers, and a consequent decline in emphasis on Marxist ideology. As World War II drew to its victorious close, however, there appeared evidence that the Soviet authorities were once more laying emphasis on the study of Marxism. The extent, purpose and content of the renewed Marxist study, and its significance, form the subject of this discussion.

Even during periods when the relations of the U.S.S.R. with the capitalist world were not especially strained, the Communist Party never repudiated the doctrine as voiced by Stalin that, although it was possible to build socialism in one country, the final victory of socialism would not be ensured until the U.S.S.R. had been relieved of the threat of capitalist encirclement. Only the victory of the working class in a number of the leading capitalist countries would secure the socialist state from the danger of intervention and the attempted restoration of capitalism. While this doctrine was formulated in 1925, it remained current after that. In 1938 Stalin wrote that it would be stupid to close one's eyes to the fact of capitalist encirclement and to think that external enemies such as the Fascist Powers would not make an attack on the U.S.S.R. Thus the

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theory of capitalist encirclement was not out of date. "I myself would very much wish that it were out of date, and that there no longer were in the world such hostile facts as capitalist encirclement, the danger of an armed attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, and so on. But, unfortunately, these hostile things still continue to exist." [1]

After the conference at Munich, which the Soviets regarded as an invitation to Hitler to push eastward against the U.S.S.R., Soviet writers reiterated the theory of capitalist encirclement. It was now noteworthy that they no longer singled out the Fascist Powers, but regarded all capitalists as foes.[2] Indeed, on occasion the press of the U.S.S.R. charged that the capitalists of Britain and France were the worst enemies of the Soviet Union. Thus an editorial in *Pravda* in March 1941 stated that Stalin had foreseen the dangers of capitalist encirclement, and had avoided the pitfalls. "The basic plans of the kindlers of war were constructed on the premise of dragging the Soviet Union into the war, to get the U.S.S.R. to fight in the interests of Anglo-French capitalists." [3] Stalin, however, had foreseen this scheme, and had emphasized the need for keeping out of the war.

In general, however, in the months before the German attack on the U.S.S.R. the Soviet attitude was "a plague on both your houses." It was frequently pointed out that "the Soviet Union alone. . .stands—an impregnable rock—amid the insanity of imperialistic slaughter." [4] Editorial writers of the U.S.S.R. proclaimed that the world was divided into two parts: the capitalist part was engulfed in the raging imperialist war, while in the Soviet part constructive, creative work was rapidly progressing. "All efforts to drag the U.S.S.R. into the chain of imperialistic intrigues, to bring us into indirect dependence on the politics of one belligerent side or the other have collapsed." [5]

[1] *Problemy Ekonomiki (Problems of Economics)*, No. 1, 1938, pp. 6-7.

[2] *Ibid.*, No. 8, 1940, pp. 146-47.

[3] March 3, 1941.

[4] *Bolshevik*, No. 7-8, April 1941, p. 103.

[5] *Bolshevik*, No. 10, May 1941, pp. 1-2.

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After the Germans attacked in June 1941, for several months the Soviet press was devoid of Marxist theory, and, indeed, most of the militant terminology of Marxism was absent. All attention was concentrated on the life-and-death struggle. When theoretical matters came up for consideration, in August 1941, Marxist phraseology was used to praise the socialist development of the Soviet state, and to explain that Germany was, not socialist, but an imperialist, predatory Power, dominated by bankers, industrialists and landowners.[6] While little was said about the United States and Great Britain, they were no longer denounced as hostile capitalist states. Instead, Soviet commentators began to state that the peoples of these lands were supporting the U.S.S.R. in its struggle, and that the fascist elements there, on which Hitler had counted, were not powerful. The more Hitler ridiculed Roosevelt, the more Roosevelt grew in political stature. "The struggle against a common enemy has brought all the democratic, peace-loving nations closer together, and has created conditions favorable to joint action."[7]

The limited application of Marxist theory continued throughout most of the war. Elaborate analyses of the Hitler régime and of the development of Germany in the preceding centuries declared that a combination of the brutal Prussian aristocracy with a bourgeoisie eager for world markets had produced a capitalist state predatory beyond all others. Among the clique of Germans guilty of war crimes should be included "those who from behind the scenes inspired the Hitlerite band, who financed Hitler, pushed him on to start the war—all these Kirdorffs, Feglers, Krupps, and the like."[8]

Another field in which the Marxist approach was consistently used was in discussing Russia's past, both under the Tsars and under the Soviet régime. A history of Ivan the Terrible, pub-

[6] *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 1941, pp. 9-10; No. 17, September 1941, pp. 5-14; No. 24, December 1941, pp. 7-13.

[7] *Bolshevik*, No. 17, September 1941, pp. 5-14; No. 10-11, June 1942, pp. 63-67; No. 9, May 1942, p. 37; No. 24, December 1941, p. 6.

[8] *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* (*Under the Banner of Marxism*), No. 4-5, 1943, p. 32; *Bolshevik*, No. 11-12, June 1943, pp. 39-52.

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lished in 1944, was a blend of patriotic appreciation of his work with a purely Marxist analysis of the economic and class forces present in his reign.[9] Discussions of the work of the nineteenth-century thinkers Plekhanov and Pisarev were also thoroughly imbued with the Marxist outlook. A review of a history of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R. roundly condemned the pre-revolutionary capitalist régime in Russia, and the "foreign imperialists" with whom it was in harmony; and an article entitled "Significance and Place of the October Socialist Revolution in the History of our Country" declared: "The working masses and the leading figures all over the world accept our people's revolution as the beginning of a new era in the history of mankind, an era of its liberation from the dark forces of reaction and oppression." [10]

Another topic on which Marxist writers in the U.S.S.R. delighted to dwell was the success of the Soviet system. A characteristic article, "The Victorious Banner of the Great Lenin", preached that the doctrine of Leninism and Stalinism was responsible for the successes of the U.S.S.R., as it had brought about rapid industrialization of the country and the development of collective agriculture, with the concomitant wiping out of the kulak class.[11] An editorial in *Bolshevik,* Communist Party organ, declared: "The Soviet Socialist state is a living personification of the great ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. The military and political achievements of our state in themselves bear witness to the strength, the invincibility of the ideas of Marxism and Leninism." [12] A ceremonial speech by Alexandrov, Chief of the Propaganda Department of the Red Army, made the typical claim that only the Soviet system—with its collective agriculture and state-owned industry, its freedom from exploitation, its nationality policy of fraternal equality of peoples, and its great Communist Party—only this system

[9] Vipper, R. YU, *Ivan Grozny* (*Ivan the Terrible*) (Moscow, 1944).

[10] *Sputnik Agitatora* (*Agitator's Guidebook*), No. 10, May 1943, pp. 32-34. *Pod Znamenem Marksizma,* No. 3, 1943, pp. 31-42; No. 1-2, 1943; p. 108. *Bolshevik,* No. 19-20, October 1944, p. 11.

[11] *Bolshevik,* No. 2, January 1942, p. 2.

[12] No. 16, August 1944, p. 6.

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was capable of withstanding the full German onslaught and driving back the foe, and at the same time growing continually stronger.[13]

These expressions of the Marxist viewpoint, however, contained no expressions of hatred of *all* capitalists, as in days of old; in fact they were careful to condemn only the "predatory plutocrats" of Germany and other fascist countries. Only one exception to this statement has been observed. An article in 1942 on "Hitlerite Imperialism" contained the following passage:

> Among the reactionary representatives of finance capital, which with great sums of money helped the Hitlerite band to attain governmental power, in the same rank with German industrial barons of the type of Thyssen, Kirdorff, and Krupp, appear such colorful figures of the international financial and speculative world as the head of the now bankrupt Swedish match concern, Ivar Kreuger, the head of the Anglo-Netherlands oil concern Royal Dutch, Henry Deterding, and the representative of the heavy industry of Lorraine, one of the most reactionary tycoons of France, de Wendel, and others.[14]

Even this statement, however, was careful to list international capitalists who were either dead or in the Axis camp. No attacks were made on present-day American or British capitalists, and these two countries were termed democratic rather than capitalist. Stalin himself, in his speech on November 6, 1941, stated that, while the Anglo-American Powers were capitalist states, they were democratic countries with parliaments, trade unions, and the elementary political freedoms, and hence far different from the bandit imperialistic régime of Hitler's Germany.[15]

Thus Soviet pronouncements of this period no longer breathed the fear that capitalism by its very form meant encirclement and attack. In like fashion, the study of the old-style revolutionary Marxist works was largely in abeyance. The

[13] *Bolshevik*, No. 1, January 1945, pp. 33-36.

[14] *Bolshevik*, No. 6, March 1942, p. 42.

[15] *Soviet War Documents* (Washington, D. C., 1943), p. 14.

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political propaganda which Communist agitators were urged to intensify consisted largely of appeals to increase the output of war supplies, to fight the enemy to the death, and to hate him with all one's soul. The leading textbook for agitators was a compilation of Stalin's wartime speeches and messages, filled with martial appeals and hatred of the Germans, but entirely free from the revolutionary ideas of the pre-war period. International Marxism of the earlier period was notable by its absence.

One of the first signs of a revival of emphasis on the study of Marxist doctrine was an article on "Certain Questions of the Teaching of Political Economy", which appeared in one of the leading Marxist theoretical journals in the summer of 1943. This article stated that political economy was again to be taught in all higher educational institutions, as it was a very necessary part of the training of students. The conditions of war demanded that "our personnel should come forth fully equipped with Marxist-Leninist theory, which provides us with clarity of purpose, unshakable belief in the victory of our just cause, and understanding of the laws of social development, including deep comprehension of the laws of war, its course and tendencies"; hence the importance of political economy, which, according to Lenin, formed a very important part of Marxist-Leninist theory.[16]

This article then went on to reaffirm the fundamental premises of Marxist thought: the gradual rise of capitalism, its development through the stage of industrial capitalism into the monopolistic stage, which occurs on the very eve of the socialist revolution of the proletariat. Due attention was to be paid to Lenin's teaching about the uneven development of capitalism, and the enormously significant theory of imperialism, as developed by Lenin and Stalin. While it was emphasized that imperialist capitalism was the last stage, it was, however, stressed that even this decadent institution still retained enough vitality to continue to grow. This article, marking a revival of interest in theoretical Marxism, was a new development during the war period. Another indication of the intensified interest in Marx-

[16] *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, No. 7-8, 1943, p. 56.

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ist indoctrination was given in 1943 by the accounts of the special courses set up in the various provinces of the U.S.S.R., and in the *raions* (counties), to train new members of the Communist Party in the history of the Party, history of the U.S.S.R., war problems, international relations, economic geography, and the like. Among the books to be read were the *Short History of the Communist Party*, Stalin's book of wartime messages, his *Questions of Leninism*, and the works of Lenin.[17]

The keynote for a revival of the study of Marxism was struck by an editorial in *Bolshevik* in May 1944, under the title, "Concerning the Marxist-Leninist Education of the Personnel of the Soviet Intelligentsia". Its theme was that the Communist Party owed its successful leadership in the war to its thorough grounding in Marxist theory. Unfortunately the pressing demands of the war had led to a marked decline in this study, and a preoccupation with current practical problems. Newspapers and especially journals had ceased to print articles on theoretical questions, and public lectures rarely touched on these topics. In several provinces eighty per cent and more of the lectures given in 1943 dealt with purely current practical matters. It was strongly urged that the Communist Party organizations and propaganda departments should intensify their work to educate the Party personnel along theoretical lines, chiefly through the study of " the classic works of Marxist-Leninist theory." [18]

A later editorial hammered the lesson home. It referred to a number of decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (to be discussed subsequently) which would strengthen greatly the theoretical and political work of the Party, and intensify the study of Marxist-Leninist theory by the Party members. The various Communist Party groups were enjoined to take up the study of Marxism with respect to theory. No more should theoretical weakness or backwardness be tolerated. Party members must be capable of interpreting present-day problems in the light of Marxist science, the correctness of

[17] *Partiinoye Stroitelstvo* (Party Construction), No. 5-6, March 1943; No. 17-18, September 1943, pp. 16-18.

[18] *Bolshevik*, No. 9, May 1944, pp. 1-8.

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which was demonstrated by the war. Communist Party workers must digest the lessons of the war and move forward to understand the new problems that will arise.[19]

Another indication of the increasing emphasis on the study of orthodox Marxism was given in an article on the *Short Course in the History of the Communist Party*, which was termed " a mighty ideological tool of Bolshevism ". This book, which contains the basic ideas of Marxist theory, was written in 1937. In addition to a detailed study of the history of the Communist Party, it includes such doctrines as the necessity of working for the victory of the proletariat, and the inevitability of capitalist encirclement of the U.S.S.R., a threat which could be broken only by proletarian revolutions in the leading capitalist countries. The article in question praised this work, and urged all Communists to study it and master its theories.[20]

In line with these injunctions, a network of special institutions was created to promote the study of theoretical Marxism. Early in 1944 it was announced that the Central Committee of the Communist Party had ordered the Communist Party in the Byelorussian (White Russian) Republic and in the Republic of Tataria to establish a series of special schools and courses to give training in Marxism. They were to organize on the republican and provincial level for the training of secretaries of the *raion* (county) Party organizations, and for propagandists, with one-year courses. Similar schools, with six-month courses, were to function in each *raion* for the chairmen of the smaller Party organizations and other responsible functionaries of the Party. In addition, private study of " the history and theory of the Bolshevist Party " was to be undertaken by Party members generally, and lectures on Marxist-Leninist theory were to be organized for every enterprise and every village.[21] Both before and after these decrees, a number of articles in Soviet journals made it evident that schools and courses of this nature were being established in all parts of the U.S.S.R. Special reading

[19] *Bolshevik*, No. 17-18, September 1944, pp. 1-9.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-17.

[21] *Propagandist*, No. 15-16, August 1944.

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rooms and study-centers called Party cabinets were set up, and Marxist indoctrination was pushed with vigor.[22]

In addition to these *ad hoc* courses, much emphasis was placed on the proper political indoctrination of the students of the colleges and universities. An article in May 1944 urged the improvement of Marxist-Leninist teaching among the staffs and the students of the higher educational institutions. A year later this campaign was still in progress. It was announced that special courses would be given in the Moscow State University to the best students from the history and economics faculties, who were to be trained to teach the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and political economy in the upper schools.[23]

Great importance was also attached to the "Evening Universities of Marxism-Leninism". These institutions had flourished before the war, but in 1941 ceased operations until their revival in 1943. In 1944 it was announced that there were more than sixty of them in the U.S.S.R. The Moscow University of Marxism-Leninism had 1,660 students enrolled in November 1944, in its faculties of history, philosophy and economics. The course, which lasted for a year, consisted of 240 hours of work.[24]

There is reason to believe, however, that the study of Marxism in these institutions included a great deal that is not overtly revolutionary. The course of the history faculty at the Moscow institution, for example, consisted of 86 hours on the history of the U.S.S.R., 104 hours on the history of the Communist Party, and 28 hours on Stalin's book, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, which deals only with patriotic topics. Even the history of the Communist Party deals mostly with the internal aspects of its development. In addition, there were 22 hours of lectures on wartime foreign policy. In general, the description of the course of study and the subjects stressed strongly indicated that the chief purpose of this specialized

[22] *Propagandist*, No. 7-8, April 1944, pp. 6-12; No. 10, May 1944, pp. 2-6; No. 17, September 1944, pp. 1-6.

[23] *Propagandist*, No. 9, May 1944, pp. 35-40; *Moskovski Bolshevik*, May 29, 1945.

[24] *Propagandist*, No. 22, November 1944.

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study was to serve ends of internal policy rather than the spread of revolutionary propaganda abroad.[25]

One of the most frequent explanations for urging greater study of Marxist theory was that this revival was merely an attempt to restore the previous level of theoretical knowledge rather than a drive for indoctrination greater than ever before. It was stressed that during the course of the war the Communist Party not only lost a large proportion of its original members as a result of enemy action, but also acquired a vast number of new ones, admitted into the Party on the basis of their loyalty to the Soviet cause and their general ability and leadership in the war effort rather than because of knowledge of Marxist principles. Hence strenuous efforts were necessary to bring the Party membership, which now numbers 5,700,000, up to the ideological level of the pre-war Party.[26]

Another reason to which considerable importance was given was the need to restore the proper indoctrination among the population of the districts liberated from the Germans. The following typical passage illustrated the problems that had to be coped with:

> During the occupation, the German invaders tried by every method to poison the consciousness of Soviet men and women and to confuse them. . . .
>
> It is the duty of Party organizations to stimulate tirelessly the political activity of the workers, to increase their traditional alertness, and to uncover and uproot the subversive activity of enemy agents, as well as the lying and mischievous rumors spread by the latter. Particular attention must be paid to the question of implanting in the population a socialist attitude toward labor and public property, strengthening state discipline, and overcoming the private-property, anti-collective-farm, and anti-state tendencies planted by the German occupants.[27]

Still another reason given for the necessity to study Marxist theory lay in the mistakes recently uncovered in certain quar-

[25] *Propagandist*, No. 22, November 1944; No. 23-24, December 1944.

[26] *Izvestiya*, October 26, 1944; *Bolshevik*, No. 9, May 1944.

[27] *Pravda*, October 17, 1944.

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ters. One such error, against which sharp polemics were written, consisted in the glorification of Idigei, one of the leaders of the Mongol Golden Horde in the Middle Ages, in the new national culture of the Tatar Republic of the Volga. The Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a stringent decree pointing out that Idigei had led onslaughts against the Russian people, and had been essentially a reactionary figure, unfit to be a national hero.[28] Similarly, when the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences published the third volume of its *History of Philosophy* containing favorable mention of Hegel's dialectical method, this created much commotion, as it was held that Hegel was completely reactionary, and had furnished ammunition to the imperialist German bourgeoisie. Only sound indoctrination with Marxist theory, it was held, could eliminate such dangerous deviations from correct thinking.[29]

Finally, Marxist theory was essential because it had proved itself a trustworthy guide in the past, and would again demonstrate its worth in the future.

> Our Party is theoretically equipped and united as no other party on earth because in its activity it leans on the Marxist-Leninist theory and masters the knowledge of the laws of social development. The duty of the Party and Soviet personnel of our many millions of intelligentsia is unceasingly to study the theory of Marx and Lenin, remembering that it gives the Party the ability to orient itself in any circumstance, to foresee the course of events, to understand the inner connections of current developments, and to recognize not only how and whither events are now developing, but also how and whither they must develop in the future.
>
> Guided by the Marxist-Leninist theory, the Party of Bolsheviks has constructed socialism. Guided by this theory, our Party is surmounting all obstacles in the path of full victory over the German fascist invaders.[30]

While investigation of the reasons advanced for the increased attention to Marxist theory reveals many statements indicating

[28] *Bolshevik*, No. 19-20, October 1944, p. 57.

[29] *Propagandist*, No. 15-16, August 1944.

[30] *Bolshevik*, No. 1, January 1945, p. 10.

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that its purpose was to aid in solving domestic problems, and little or nothing in the way of statements of intention to push a revolutionary program abroad, consideration of the texts selected for study shows, of course, that most of them cover both the domestic and the international aspects of Marxism—which two aspects of this unitary doctrine can scarcely be separated. The "classics of Marxism" recommended for study included the works of Marx and Engels, as well as the writings of Lenin, among them his *Imperialism*, stating that capitalism leads to imperialism and imperialism leads to war. The *Short History of the Communist Party*, with its bitter condemnation of the bourgeoisie of the capitalist states, and its doctrine of the "capitalist encirclement" of the U.S.S.R., was also a basic text for study. On the other hand, most of the *Short History* deals with the growth of the Russian Communist Party and its part in Russian affairs, and contains only a limited discussion of the international rôle of communism. Likewise Stalin's *Questions of Leninism* concentrates chiefly on internal questions in the U.S.S.R. As for Stalin's wartime book, of which 74,500,000 copies had been distributed by May 1944,[31] it is entirely free from propaganda against capitalism in general and merely contains patriotic appeals against the "Hitlerite bandits", and the like. Thus, depending on the direction in which emphasis is exerted, the "classics of Marxism" studied in 1944 could be used either to whip up interest in world revolutionary policies, or chiefly to concentrate attention on the pressing internal affairs of the U.S.S.R.

It can be definitely stated that in the Soviet press the emphasis was overwhelmingly on domestic matters. During the war not merely the daily press but also the theoretical organs of the Communist Party were free from any mention of the possibility of struggle against international capitalism, or the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of all countries against their bourgeois oppressors. Soviet citizens of all walks of life were exhorted to throw themselves into winning the war and rebuilding their country, secure in the knowledge that the peace-loving democratic peoples of the earth were working together in a just

[31] *Bolshevik*, No. 9, May 1944.

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cause. As indicated above, in 1941 Stalin had stated that, although the United States and Great Britain were capitalist countries, they had democratic institutions, and hence were not predatory imperialist states as was Germany under Hitler. Similarly, in February 1945 the famous Soviet publicist David Zaslavsky stated that the Crimea Conference had declared for the democratization of all Europe. He went on to say:

> Democracy is variable in its forms. England represents democracy in one of its historic types. The United States is another type and the U.S.S.R. yet another. After the elimination of the last traces of fascism and Nazism the people of liberated Europe will have the possibility of creating democratic institutions according to their own choice. They can take as an example any form of democracy that has been shaped by history.[32]

To many these kind words for British and American democracy might seem meaningless, as they remembered that some of the standard Marxist works contain the doctrine of capitalist encirclement and world revolution, and they regard Soviet policy in some of the occupied countries as not in keeping with democracy. It is, however, perhaps not amiss at this juncture to point to the fact that Soviet theorists of late have emphasized strongly that Marxism is not a collection of hard and fast dogmas. Rather it is a method of reaching the truth, and what holds good under one set of circumstances need not be regarded as valid under changed conditions. As a leading Soviet theorist pointed out, Lenin in his early works stated: "We do not at all regard the theory of Marx as something legal and inviolable; we are, on the contrary, convinced that it has merely laid the cornerstone of that science which Socialists should advance in all directions, if they do not want to be left behind by life." [33] Similarly, in 1945, an editorial in *Bolshevik* stated:

> Marx and Engels, the foundation-layers of Marxism, looked on their theory not as a dogma, but as a guide to action. They considered that their teaching must at all times develop, perfect itself, enrich itself with new experience, that individual theories

[32] Soviet domestic radio broadcast, February 18, 1945.

[33] *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, No. 4-5, 1943, p. 13.

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> and deductions would have to give place to new deductions and theories, as the new historical situation demands.
>
> Exactly thus did our great Lenin. . . regard Marxist doctrine.[34]

The Soviets have never specifically repudiated the doctrine of world revolution. Moreover, in February 1946 Stalin stated: "Our Marxists declare that the capitalist system of economy conceals elements of crisis and war. . . ." Molotov reminded the people of the U.S.S.R. that they should always bear in mind that, while there is now no danger that foreign Powers would intervene in the affairs of the U.S.S.R. as they did in 1918 and 1919, " reactionary forces in the capitalist countries are still alive." Likewise, L. M. Kaganovich declared that, although the capitalist encirclement is no longer what it was in 1941, " we must always remember that our country exists within a capitalist encirclement." [35] On the other hand, David Zaslavsky, noted Soviet commentator, in an article in the popular Soviet weekly *Ogonek*, made the following statement: " The old bourgeois democracy and the new Soviet democracy proved they could work together against a common enemy. Who believes that, given good will, they cannot work together in peacetime against new reactionary aggression? Nobody believes this in the Soviet Union. . . ." [36] And Stalin, after his remarks cited above, went on to refer to " the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain, and other freedom-loving countries " which had routed the Axis forces.

Here, then, are two contradictory ideas: the Marxist view of imperialism, war and capitalist encirclement, and a professed belief that the coalition of the democratic Powers can continue to work together. Perhaps the reason for the contradiction lies in the possibility that the Soviet leaders may conceivably feel that these Marxist doctrines may lose their validity under changed conditions.

Moreover, it is of some comfort to know that Soviet thinkers do not regard war as a desirable thing. They have only

[34] No. 1, January 1945, p. 2.

[35] *New York Times*, February 10, 1946.

[36] *Ibid.*, March 9, 1946.

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scathing words for the views of Hegel that wars preserve the moral health of nations, for Moltke's statement: "Eternal peace is a dream, and far from one of the most beautiful—war is a world order created by God." [37] Indeed, it seems safe to say that the revived study of Marxism in the U.S.S.R. does not mean that the Soviets are inculcating a spirit of military adventure in the name of world revolution. The overwhelming bulk of the evidence seems to indicate that the study of Marxism goes hand in hand with the intention to avoid war, while building the power of the Soviet state and extending its influence abroad.

It would be foolish, however, to hold that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned its Marxist ideology. If anything, the Soviets regard Marxism as having proved its validity during the war, and hence they adhere to it more strongly than ever. Moreover, in spite of their great preoccupation with the domestic scene, it seems quite probable that they expect and hope for the success of their principles in other lands. On the other hand, in view of the greatly changed world situation it seems reasonable to expect that Soviet policy based on Marxist foundations will not necessarily be what it was before the Russo-German war. Indeed, a recent address by Alexandrov, Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, on the occasion of the twenty-second anniversary of Lenin's death, suggests that a new formula defining the relationship of the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world is in process of preparation. In part Alexandrov said:

> At present, one can say that although the Socialist State has no full guarantee against armed attack from without, the Patriotic War has shown that the second attempt of international reaction to smash the Republic of Soviets from outside with military force, to force our people to digress from the socialist path of development, has also ended in an unparalleled defeat of the reactionary forces.
>
> Consequently, the prospects of development of our society from socialism to communism have now become still greater—not only from the viewpoint of internal but also of external conditions.

[37] *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, No. 4-5, 1944, p. 11.

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> All this shows that the Soviet country is a growing, rising power, and is capable of offering a rebuff to any enemy.[38]

This pronouncement, like other evidence presented above, seems to indicate that the leaders of the Soviet Union, while feeling that the capitalist world is still unfriendly, believe that the U.S.S.R. is in no immediate danger of attack by the democratic-capitalist countries. Apparently, judged by their actions, they also believe that a considerable expansion of Soviet power and influence on the one hand, and some expansion of American power and influence on the other, can be carried forward without war (at least for some time to come), in spite of ideological differences.

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[38] *Information Bulletin*, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, D. C., January 26, 1946.

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TECHNOLOGY AND RACE IN MEXICO *

MEXICO is a nation of villages. The official record for 1939 cites over 100,000 of them. We know that they are small, isolated and poor. But what do we mean by poverty and isolation? How wide is the cultural gap between the Indian and the rest of the rural population, and how can it be described? Some things there are in poverty, isolation and cultural variation between the races in Mexico that are not subject to measurement. All that relates to the conceptual universe men live in—their values, their ethical biases, their notions of right and wrong, their artistic sense, their ideas of the good life, their notions of evil, their special sense of design, beauty and art—all this is beyond the skill of the statistician, and beyond wholesale enumeration. A wide area of human competencies, possessions and beliefs lies beyond the easy reach of the sociologist and economist. But there remain numerous observable and countable " things " which can be used to give substance to the definition of " poverty ", " isolation ", and cultural differentiation in rural Mexico. That is what we shall try to do in the pages that follow, without overburdening the reader with too many figures.

It is difficult, however, to answer simple questions about the number of doctors or the kind of tools the villages have without some specific counting. In the attempt to secure some sense of the structure and pattern of the rural community, the author had the coöperation of the Mexican Department of Education and of the Federal Census Office (*Estadistica Nacional*) and with their help secured a description in considerable detail of 3,611 rural villages, representing every state and territory,

* This article is a chapter in a forthcoming book on Mexico and the United States, in the American Foreign Policy Library, edited by Sumner Welles.

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and one half of all the counties (*municipios*) of Mexico. Before being sent out, the questionnaire was gone over and coded by the Census Office and when the returns came in they were tabulated and checked by that office. It required over two years to complete the job.

These 3,611 villages had a population of 1,877,313, or 17 per cent of the total rural population of Mexico in 1930. As they stand, these villages are not typical in two important respects. They are larger, having an average of 520 people per village, whereas for the country it is much closer to 300. We are, therefore, describing communities that have greater material resources. They are also unusual in that all of these communities have the services of a teacher. Most of the Mexican villages have no teacher and no school. These communities are, therefore, closer to the larger world, are more in contact with it, are nearer to the urban centers, and have a greater measure of identity with modern Mexico. They are the richer and more "modern" rural towns in the country.

This study was commenced in 1931 and completed in 1933; but the rural picture drawn here is substantially unchanged, has remained so for the last century, and will, in the nature of the case, change but slowly in the future. Rural ways and traditions yield very slowly. What we have is a description of the Mexico the Revolution was fought to improve and modernize; how great and how difficult the task the reader will discover for himself.

One other thing ought perhaps to be added; this study will not and cannot give the subtle variations in Mexico from village to village, from racial group to racial group. Each Mexican community has a personality of its own, and only a great artist could do proper justice to it.

The Mexican census of 1930 abandoned the effort to count the Indians of Mexico, and confined itself to enumerating the number of people who spoke Indian languages. In this study each teacher was asked to state whether the population of his village was predominantly Indian or mestizo or white. No teacher in a Miji, Zapotec, or Maya community could possibly

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miss the point. It is therefore of considerable interest to see the result of this report on the 3,611 villages, and, it ought to be repeated, these are the larger communities of Mexico. The returns may be compared with the census figures for 1921. The following table shows that in 1931, on the basis of the personal testimony of the resident teachers, 36.2 per cent of the communities were Indian.

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION

Race	1921 Census Per Cent of Population	Villages in 1931 Number	Per Cent
Mestizo (Mixed)	59.33	2,035	56.3
Indian	29.16	1,306	36.2
White	9.80	270	7.5
Others	1.71	...	..
	100.00	3,611	100.00

If we remember that the census figures refer to the total population and the questionnaire to the rural villages, the slightly higher proportion of Indian communities is not surprising.

When we turn from race to language, our villages show 77.1 per cent of the villages as Spanish-speaking, and 22.9 per cent speaking Indian languages. That is considerably higher than the record shown by the census of 1930, but the census figures are in all likelihood an understatement.[1]

Looked at geographically, the 3,611 villages here confirm the general impression from other sources of the predominantly mestizo character of the northern and the strong Indian element in the southern part of the country. Northern states like Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas gave 1.3 and 3.1 per cent Indian villages, respectively, while in Yucatan the Indian villages ran

[1] Robert Redfield, "The Indian in Mexico", from *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March 1940, p. 134. "The tendency is to record as Spanish-speaking many persons who do not have effective control of the language. The census [1930] reports, for example, that 47 percent of the Tarahumara speak also Spanish. Dr. Wendell C. Bennett, who has studied these Indians, gives his impression that not more than 10 percent of the mountain Tarahumara (the largest group) can speak Spanish."

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as high as 93.2, and in Oaxaca 77.3 per cent. Our material also confirms the general impression that the "white" communities in Mexico are chiefly located in the north. Of the 270 villages classed as white out of the 3,611, two northern states, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, had 101 and six northern states had 160.

The contrasts between north and south may be seen from the following comparison. Nuevo Leon, a northern state with 150 villages, in our study has 58 "white", whereas Puebla, a central state with 301 villages represented, shows only 3 such villages. The picture is clear. The north is white and mestizo, the central and southern part of the country is mestizo and Indian.

This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of the Mexican land problem, and we do not therefore wish to burden the reader with much material bearing upon that issue. But on one point we pause because it illumines the communal character of the Mexican rural village. It is to be recalled that this information was gathered in 1931 when comparatively few villages had benefited from the agrarian program, and only 866 out of the 3,611 in our sample had received land. And yet in answer to the question—"Do the pastures and forest lands belong to the community in general?"—2,101 or 58.2 per cent reported in the affirmative. Well over one half of even the larger villages had retained this traditional use of woodlots and pastures.

It is interesting to observe that the teachers report that in one half (49.3 per cent) of the villages the land was equitably divided. If this means anything at all, it means that at least 50 per cent of the communities in Mexico (the larger communities) have retained some of their communal holdings, and this is certainly true in such states as Oaxaca, Puebla and Guerrero. But here it is in the mountains and not in the plains that the villages survived.

Equally revealing is the fact that only a few of the villages report the population renting lands from their neighbors or from the plantations. On the plantations in 1931, almost every worker was both a renter (cropper) and wage laborer,

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generally occupying both relationships at the same time. The worker would be a cropper in raising corn and beans, and a wageworker for such crops as wheat, barley, coffee and *pulque*. That is, he was likely to be a share cropper while working on subsistence crops, and a wageworker on the cash crop. Twelve and four-tenths per cent of the villages contained people who rented lands from their neighbors. Only a very small number, a little less than six per cent (5.9), are given as renters on plantations.

The rental systems reveal how small a part money plays in the village economy. Only 18 per cent of the villages, 649 out of 3,611, pay cash for their land. The Mexican renter is known widely as an *aparcero*, or renter on shares, usually by halves. The contracts differ greatly and depend on the relative contribution made by the landowner and the cropper—especially whether the landowner provides, in addition to the land, animals, seed and tools. Nearly 40 per cent of the villages report "halves", only 6.8 per cent report "thirds", and 3.6 report "fourths". Money rentals are, therefore, much less general than crop-sharing systems; and rental by "halves", the *mediero*, is by far the most widely spread practice in land rentals in the villages. The ordinary share cropper who has to depend upon his patch of corn for an income for the year must raise double what he requires for his own needs, one half for himself, the other for the landowner.

While these figures make it clear that only a small number of the people living in villages rent lands from their neighbors and still fewer from the neighboring plantations, they show what one expects: that a considerable number of them go outside of their villages during certain seasons of the year and seek employment in other places. There are many mountain communities where it is customary for a proportion of the male population, occasionally with their wives and children, to depart for lower altitudes and seek work as laborers. The coffee plantations, the sugar plantations, the mines depend to a large extent upon this migratory labor that comes down from the mountains. The Yaqui Indians in Sonora and the Chamulas in Chiapas are famous as laborers in these regions. Nearly 41 per cent of the

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villages report migration to labor on plantations, 1,478 out of 3,611. Less than one fifth report migration of laborers to the mines (18.6 per cent of the total) and fewer than one fourth, chiefly in the north, report migration to foreign parts, that is, mainly the United States.

Rural wages in Mexico have had a tendency to remain stationary. For a hundred years and more, the nominal wage (*dos o tres reales*), 25 or 37½ centavos, constituted the prevailing daily wage in large sections of the country. This wage in certain areas still continued in 1931. In an attempt to survey the wages situation, we secured and tabulated answers to two questions bearing on wage payments. One dealt with the maximum daily wage in the community, the other with the minimum daily wage. As was to be expected, many communities had but one wage which served as a maximum as well as a minimum. In others there was a clear distinction between the two. Ninety per cent of all the villages answered the question pertaining to the maximum wage.

MAXIMUM DAILY WAGES IN 3,250 VILLAGES, 1931

Wages in pesos	Number	Per Cent
Less than 1	2,819	84
1 to 1.50	289	11
Over 1.50	142	5
	3,250	100

The maximum daily wage for the greater part of the country and 84 per cent of the villages reporting was one peso or less, usually less. Eleven per cent reported between one peso and a peso and a half, and only some five per cent of the communities reported wages above that, most of these being mining communities or communities on the American border, particularly in Lower California. At the most generous estimate, therefore, one peso, or less than fifty cents in American money, was the standard maximum wage that rural labor received in Mexico.

The minimum wage was reported for 3,054 villages. As we said before, the wages of a hundred years ago still persist. Of these villages, 23 report a minimum wage of 10 centavos a day,

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7 report 15 centavos a day, 33 report 20 centavos a day, and 353 or 11.6 per cent of the total report 25 centavos a day. More than a third of the villages report 50 centavos a day. Taking all of the villages that report 50 centavos or less per day as the minimum wage, we have 1,973 or 64.6 per cent of the total villages reporting. The next important group is that reporting 80 centavos, 481 villages or 15.7 per cent. An almost equal number, 15.9 per cent, report a minimum of 1 peso or more. These are the same villages that report a maximum of 1 peso or more. The maximum wage, therefore, for the rural laborer tends to be 1 peso or more, and the minimum, 50 centavos or less. This wage, in 1931, was an advance of about a third over the standard wage before 1910, but the decline in the value of the peso had practically wiped out the gain that the changed wage represented.

MINIMUM DAILY WAGES OF 3,054 VILLAGES, 1931

Cents	Number	Per Cent
10-50	1,973	65
51-80	594	19
Over 80	487	16
	3,054	100

One of the great complaints before the Revolution was that wages were not paid in money but in kind. In fact, the system of *tienda de raya* (plantation store) with token coins was so widespread as to be almost universal. One of the first decrees issued by Carranza, after settling in Vera Cruz in the early part of 1914, was the abolition of the *tienda de raya*. This abolition was later incorporated into the Constitution of 1917; it has also been repeated in every state and federal labor law issued since. It is worthy of note, therefore, that the *tienda de raya* still persisted as means of compensation for the workers of villages large enough and progressive enough to have federal schools. At least fifty villages whose residents worked on a plantation reported the continuance of a *tienda de raya*. Equally objectionable was the payment of wages in kind; but in 1931, more than twenty years after the Revolution began, the villages

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here under discussion reported the following details of the kind of wages received by their inhabitants:

SYSTEMS OF PAYMENT

Method of Payment	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Total
In Money	3,064	85
In Money and in Kind	547	15
	3,611	100

Mexican agriculture is still in many places a hoe agriculture. The greater part of the Mexican crop is raised with primitive tools. These tools are often hand tools, or wooden plows drawn by oxen. In these circumstances each family could till but a small acreage. If we classify our 3,611 villages according to the average number of acres tilled by an individual peasant (including his family), we find that 20 per cent report one hectare (2.47 acres) as the average area tilled. Another 20 per cent report two hectares, while 14 per cent report three hectares. That is, 55.6 per cent, or well over half, of all the larger villages report three hectares or less as the average area tilled by each individual farmer. Only 16.2 per cent report a tillage of six hectares.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF HECTARES CULTIVATED

Hectares	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Total
1	743	20.6
2	736	20.4
3	526	14.6
4	404	11.2
5	345	9.5
6	584	16.2
Not given	273	7.5
	3,611	100.0

The tilling of these small fields still depends upon direct human energy. In many places the use of the plow—even a wooden plow—is not customary. In part this may be attrib-

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uted to the nature of the terrain; it may be very rocky, as in Yucatan, it may be so steep, as in parts of Guerrero, that a plow is difficult if not impossible to manage, or, as is the case along the coasts, the heavy forests make it easier to burn down the trees and to plant between the stumps with the use of a pointed stick. That is, "fire agriculture" is still prevalent in many parts of the country. All of these factors, and many others, tend to explain why the use of modern tools in the agriculture of Mexico has been so limited.

Of our 3,611 communities, more than 96 per cent have no tractors. What is true of tractors is true of cultivators and of planting, threshing and shelling machines. Only 5.8 per cent of the communities have sowing machines, only 7.9 per cent use cultivators, only 4 villages out of every hundred have a threshing machine, and only 9.5 out of a hundred have shelling machines, this somewhat larger percentage being accounted for by the fact that corn (*maiz*) is grown everywhere. In recent years there has been an obvious increase in the use of steel plows, and 45.7 per cent of the communities report their use, while the wooden plow with one handle, drawn by oxen, is reported for 70 per cent of the villages. There are many communities using both wooden and iron plows, but 30 per cent use no plows at all. The following table gives a summary of the distribution of agricultural implements in the communities under discussion:

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS IN 3,611 VILLAGES

Villages Having No	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Tractors	3,484	96.5
Planting Machines	3,303	94.2
Cultivators	3,323	92.1
Threshing Machines	3,465	96.0
Shelling Machines	3,267	90.5
Steel Plows	1,962	54.3
Wooden Plows	1,070	29.6

What proportions of the villages in Mexico lack certain kinds of domestic animals? For the 3,611 villages, 5.4 out of every hundred have no cows, 13.5 have no oxen, 7.3 have no horses,

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26.4 have no mules, 10.7 have no burros, nearly one third or 31.0 have no goats, 38.1 out of every hundred have no sheep. When it comes to pigs and chickens, the number of the villages that have them rises markedly. All but 2.1 out of every hundred of the villages have pigs and all but 1.1 out of a hundred have chickens. Taking the villages separately and by areas, we find marked differences: differences between villages that are Indian and non-Indian, differences between those that have *ejidos* and those that have not, and especially marked differences between regions. There are villages so poor that they have neither horses, nor mules, nor burros, nor cows, nor oxen. There are some that have considerable numbers of one and none of others. But it may be said that, on the average, meat and draft animals are to be found in most, even if not in all, of the villages of rural Mexico. The following table indicates the number and per cent of villages that lack certain kinds of animals.

SPECIFIED DOMESTIC ANIMALS IN 3,611 VLLAGES

Villages Having No	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Cows	196	5.4
Oxen	489	13.5
Horses	265	7.3
Mules	954	26.4
Burros	385	10.7
Goats	1,118	31.0
Sheep	1,377	38.1
Pigs	76	2.1
Chickens	38	1.1

This description of the rural Mexican community must, for the purposes of drawing the picture in fuller detail, be further itemized. Out of 3,611 villages, 765, or 21.2 per cent, are reported as still using barter, and only 260, or 7.2 per cent, have a local market. That means that 3,351 must market their goods and do their purchasing outside of their own borders. The distance between the town and the market is therefore an important consideration. Over 116 villages report that their nearest market is 80 kilometers distant, 237 villages are 20 kilo-

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meters from their market, and nearly 500 are 15 kilometers from their market town.

The following table shows the distribution of the 3,611 villages according to the distance from their nearest market:

	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Between 1 and 10 kilometers	1,984	54.9
From 11 to 40	938	26.0
From 41 to 80	308	8.5
Distance not given	121	3.4
Market in Village	260	7.2
	3,611	100.0

Of the villages under consideration, 1,964, or 54.4 per cent, had no stores (*tiendas*).

Furthermore, the Mexican village lacks easy communication. It generally has neither train nor automobile. It has neither telegraph nor telephone; it has no post office. In addition to having—as is frequently the case—a different language, it has, even where Spanish is a common bond, no means of keeping in touch with the world beyond its own borders. The people read no newspapers, and live dependent upon the stray rumors that come from irregular contacts, through visits to markets or from itinerant passers-by. But the mere fact that the 3,611 villages we are describing have a school gives them a contact with the world that smaller communities lack. The school community is in closer contact with the world abroad than the one that has no school. In spite of that, 93.1 per cent of all our villages have no train communication.

It has frequently been said that the Mexican railroads have not opened up the country, that they were built for communication with the outside world rather than to satisfy internal needs. Whatever the reasons that justified the construction of the railroads through the northern and less populated areas, it is obvious that the great majority of even the larger rural communities are not served by the existing railroads.

This lack of railroad contact is partially made up by other means of communication. Since 1924 a vigorous program of road building has been pushed by the federal and state govern-

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ments. That program, as measured by the school communities in 1931, has been successful to the extent of placing automobiles in 8.2 per cent of the school villages. In other words, 91.8 per cent of the communities under discussion are without automobiles. In part, this is an overstatement, as some 5 per cent more of the villages report bus travel. But anyone who knows Mexico knows that buses in Mexico travel almost where no roads exist. No driver from the United States would venture his bus on roads, at least during the rainy season, that are utilized in Mexico. But even so, over 86 per cent of all villages have neither bus nor automobile transportation. Over 28 per cent of the villages report the use of oxcarts as a means of carrying their products to market. A great majority of the villages (72 per cent) still depend upon mule and horse for their means of conveyance.

These figures are partially overlapping. A village that has a good road may still use the older and more traditional mode of transport, at least in part. The old method may seem less expensive, as no money value is placed upon time in the rural community. A man who has pottery to take to the market loads it on his little horse, burro, or mule, and leads it for days down mountain paths to the market, as has been the custom for centuries. He may continue doing that even if the tourist or outside merchant has found a way of reaching that particular village by automobile or by bus. With the use of the horse, burro and mule has gone the habit of carrying one's wares on one's shoulders. Anyone who has made the trip from Mexico City to Toluca over a new and excellent road will recall seeing numerous Indians plodding along with heavy loads on their backs, carrying pottery, baskets, blankets, all of the wares which they manufacture in their little villages. The road has only made travel a little more difficult because macadam roads are hard on one's feet, and because speeding automobiles are dangerous. Nearly one half of all the villages (45.8 per cent) report that the system of people carrying goods to the markets on their own backs is still the common practice.

Here we have a Mexico in which a few of the villages have trains, a few have automobiles, a few more are reached by buses,

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70 per cent enjoy the privilege of carrying their goods by cart, horse, mule and burro, and nearly one half still practice the pre-colonial system, reminiscent of the days when there were no draft animals in the country, of people carrying their burdens upon their backs, and doing ten, fifteen and twenty miles a day with them.

What is true of transportation methods is equally true of communication by telephone, telegraph and post office. These communities report that 11.6 per cent are served by telephones. But to some extent the telephones are directly a result of the activities of the schools. The schools have often been responsible for bringing telephones to communities. There are such regions as the Miji area in Oaxaca where through the coöperation of the federal school directors, Guliermo Bonilla and Colonel Martinez, telephones have been brought into the region, connected with the schools, the teachers acting as the telephone operators. Even so, more than 80 per cent of the rural villages are without telephone communication with the outside world. What is true of telephone communication is still more obvious with the telegraph. In spite of the fact that the schools have on their own initiative organized post offices, 80 per cent of even the larger communities have no postal connections. This gives us a picture of the isolation in statistical terms that confirms the impressions of travelers and observers in Mexico, and makes realistic the fact that all of the modern means of communication—train, automobile, telephone, telegraph and post office—are items of minor significance in the lives of the rural folk of Mexico.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION OF 3,611 COMMUNITIES

Villages Having No	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Trains	3,363	93.1
Automobiles	3,305	91.8
Buses	3,123	86.5
Oxcarts	2,585	71.6
Animals	996	27.6
Human Carriers	1,958	54.2
Telephones	3,192	88.4
Telegraph	3,451	95.8
Post Offices	2,923	80.9

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This general isolation physically is even more marked professionally. The following table gives the number of villages that had no doctor, lawyer, engineer, druggist, midwife, herb doctor, or priest. They all had teachers.

SPECIFIED PROFFESSIONALS IN 3,611 VILLAGES

Villages Having No	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Doctor	3,530	97.8
Lawyer	3,581	99.2
Engineer	3,570	98.9
Druggist	3,501	97.0
Midwife	3,011	85.4
Herb Doctor	2,622	72.6
Priest	3,384	93.7

Striking as is this lack of professional service in the rural community, it is even more surprising to find how poor the rural community is in terms of skilled artisans. The following table will tell its own story:

SKILLED ARTISANS IN 3,611 VILLAGES

Villages Having No	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Carpenter	1,845	49.9
Mason	1,892	52.4
Plumber	3,477	96.3
Horse Shoer	2,854	79.0
Tinsmith	3,254	90.1
Shoemaker	3,012	83.4
Harness Maker	3,241	89.7
Tanner	3,082	85.4
Tailor	3,224	89.3
Weaver	3,039	84.2
Potter	3,007	83.3

There is one item of modern equipment which most of the villages can almost always boast of, and that is the sewing machine. Of all the villages, 3,286, or 90.5 per cent, had one. It

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would be possible and interesting to follow this story in even greater detail and show the differences between various parts of Mexico, but space will not permit.

There is, however, one feature which must be included, and that is the difference between the Indian and the mestizo and white communities. It is an important fact that in all items here considered—in wages, distance from town, the amount of land an individual can work, the possession of tools, the presence of professionals or skilled artisans—the Indian communities are visibly poorer than the others. There is, in fact, a striking difference in cultural equipment and possessions between these two elements in the population that helps reveal the two Mexicos; and the record here is of things symbolic of the greater spiritual and moral difference that cannot be measured.

We may now compare the position of the Indian with that of the mestizo and white communities. While about the same proportions of Indian and mestizo communities report persons seeking work on neighboring plantations (40.7 per cent as against 41.1 per cent), as many as 25.9 per cent of the mestizo villages have residents seeking work in the mines, and only 5.7 per cent of the Indian villages. Even more notable is the Indian tendency to stay at home, only 5.2 per cent of the Indian villages reporting that their inhabitants migrate abroad, as against 33.7 per cent of the mestizo communities. This sharp divergence is reflected in the fact that many of the mestizo communities are located in the North.

Of the villages that report maximum wages of 1.25 pesos per day or over, only 8.7 per cent are Indian, 29.4 per cent mestizo. In the case of minimum wages of between 10 centavos and one peso, 2.0 per cent Indian as against .05 per cent mestizo report 10 centavos, 2.3 per cent Indian as against .4 per cent mestizo report 20 centavos. Exactly 20 per cent of the Indian villages report 25 centavos per day as against 6.8 per cent mestizo. All together, 77.4 per cent of the Indian communities report up to 50 centavos as against 57.3 per cent mestizo communities. When we come up to 80 centavos and one

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peso, then there is a sharp reversal. In the first case, the figures stand 9.4 per cent as against 19.4 per cent, and in the second, 7.9 per cent as against 20.5 per cent for Indian and mestizo. The over-all figures for wages between 50 centavos and one peso show 22.6 per cent for Indians and 47.7 per cent for mestizos.

This contrast in wages is substantiated by another revealing economic measurement: "How many hectares can one individual work with the customary tools used in your village?" With a tillage of one hectare, the villages are Indian, 30.8 per cent, mestizo, 14.8 per cent; two hectares, Indian, 26.7 per cent, mestizo, 16.8 per cent. When it comes to an acreage between four, five and six hectares, then one gets 22.5 per cent for Indian villages, and 45.1 per cent for mestizo communities.

Question 21 concerned itself with means of communication with the outside world, and the answers tend to show the same contrast between Indian and mestizo communities. In twice as many mestizo communities people carry their goods to market by train, in three times as many by auto and bus, and in twice as many by oxcarts (*carretas*), whereas in 66.5 per cent of the Indian villages, as against 34 per cent mestizo, people carry their goods on their own backs.

As in the factors discussed above, the relative position of the Indian communities remains inferior to that of the mestizo villages in the matter of tools. Mestizo communities have three times as many tractors (4.6 per cent as against 1.5 per cent), twice as many iron plows, three times as many cultivators, five times as many planters, three times as many threshing machines, and four times as many corn-huskers. In the distribution of animals there seems, for the towns under consideration, greater equality; but it still remains true that of all types of animals Indian communities report fewer than mestizo communities. Similar tendencies are evident in other comparisons. For example, more Indian than mestizo villages are farther than fifteen

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kilometers from the nearest market town, and more mestizo villages have local stores (*tiendas*). Only 37.4 per cent of the Indian villages have roads (*carreteras*) leading to them, as against 63.9 per cent mestizo villages.

In the distribution of professional services the contrast is sharp indeed. The rural districts in their entirety are poor in professional services, but poorest of all are the Indian communities. Only eight-tenths of one per cent report the presence of a doctor, five-tenths of one per cent a lawyer, three-tenths of one per cent an engineer. (The *ejido* must have provided even these, for the *ejido* communities report a higher percentage of professional services than the non-*ejido* communities.) We can draw the contrast in the following terms. There is one doctor to every 48,270 Indians, one lawyer to every 77,232, one engineer to every 77,232, one druggist to every 20,873, one priest to every 8,045. The mestizo communities are about four times as well off; they have one doctor to every 10,231 inhabitants, and so on down the line. A similar contrast can be drawn for skilled workers. There is one carpenter for every 422 Indians, one mason for every 307, one plumber for every 11,882, one shoemaker for every 2,060, one tailor for every 1,766. The mestizo communities show a higher percentage in all the skilled services, except in the case of weavers. The same holds true for the possession of sewing machines—82.5 per cent Indian villages as against 95 per cent mestizo; and for phonographs, 46.2 per cent Indian villages report possession as against 58.5 per cent mestizo communities.

The following table will summarize and illustrate the discussion:

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1,306 INDIAN VILLAGES COMPARED WITH 2,305 MESTIZO AND "WHITE" VILLAGES, ACCORDING TO SPECIFIED CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES

Villages Having No	Indian		Mestizo and "White"	
	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Workers on Haciendas	775	59.1	1,358	58.9
Workers in Mines	1,231	94.3	1,709	74.1
Workers Migrating out of the country	1,238	94.8	1,528	66.3
Train Connections	1,253	95.9	2,110	91.7
Automobiles	1,266	96.9	2,049	88.9
Oxcarts	1,077	82.5	1,508	65.4
Telephones	1,188	91.0	2,005	86.9
Telegraph	1,280	98.0	2,181	94.6
Post Offices	1,097	84.0	1,826	79.2
Tractors	1,286	98.5	2,198	95.4
Iron Plows	930	71.2	1,032	44.8
Planting Machines	1,284	98.3	2,119	91.9
Cultivators	1,262	96.6	2,064	89.5
Threshing Machines	1,287	98.5	2,178	94.5
Corn-huskers	1,265	96.9	2,002	86.9
Cows	129	9.9	67	2.9
Oxen	244	18.7	245	10.6
Horses	161	12.3	104	4.5
Mules	465	35.6	489	21.2
Burros	248	19.0	137	5.9
Goats	509	39.0	609	26.4
Sheep	526	40.3	851	36.9
Pigs	36	2.8	40	1.7
Chickens	18	1.4	20	0.9
Markets	1,204	92.2	2,147	93.1
Stores	804	61.6	1,176	51.0
Roads	818	62.6	867	36.1
Doctor	1,295	99.2	2,235	97.0
Lawyer	1,300	99.5	2,281	99.0
Engineer	1,302	99.7	2,268	98.4
Druggist	1,289	98.7	2,215	96.0
Midwife	1,133	86.8	1,878	81.5
Herb Doctor	965	73.9	1,657	71.9
Priest	1,239	94.9	2,145	93.1
Carpenter	707	54.9	1,059	45.9
Mason	749	57.4	1,143	49.5
Plumber	1,275	97.6	2,202	94.5
Horse Shoer	1,125	86.1	1,729	75.0

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1,306 INDIAN VILLAGES COMPARED WITH 2,305 MESTIZO AND "WHITE" VILLAGES, ACCORDING TO SPECIFIED CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES—*Continued*

Villages Having No	Indian		Mestizo and "White"	
	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages	Number of Villages	Per Cent of Villages
Tinsmith	1,226	93.9	2,028	88.0
Shoemaker	1,186	91.8	1,827	79.3
Harness Maker	1,230	94.2	2,011	87.2
Tanner	1,141	87.4	1,941	84.2
Tailor	1,190	91.1	2,034	88.2
Weaver	1,046	80.1	1,993	86.5
Potter	1,116	85.5	1,891	82.0
Sewing Machine	228	17.5	115	5.0
Phonograph	703	53.8	956	41.5
Villages in which the average family tillage does not exceed one hectare	402	30.8	341	14.8
Villages in which the average family tillage is six hectares	108	8.3	476	20.7
Villages in which the people customarily carry goods to market on their own backs	869	66.5	784	34.0

FRANK TANNENBAUM

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THE ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICA'S PACIFIC ISLANDS

THERE is common agreement that the United States not only will continue to be deeply and intimately involved in Pacific affairs in the future but also will acquire, as a by-product of the Second World War, responsibility for the administration of a large number of Pacific islands. This latter development raises in more acute form than ever before the questions of how our dependent territories should be administered and which government department should be assigned the task.

The islands involved are, first, our current possessions and, second, those Japanese and Japanese mandated islands which will come under our control in the future. At present, America's possessions in the Pacific are the Aleutian Islands in the north, an integral portion of the Territory of Alaska; the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Wake, Kure, Midway, Johnston, Sand, Kingman Reef and Palmyra in the central Pacific; and Eastern Samoa, Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Canton and Enderbury (the latter two being jointly controlled by Great Britain and the United States) in the south Pacific. The Territories of Alaska and Hawaii are under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior, as are the relatively unpopulated islands of Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Canton and Enderbury. All other United States islands in the Pacific have been assigned, by executive order, to the Secretary of the Navy for administrative purposes. Only Guam and American Samoa have, however, had sufficient populations to require the presence of administrative personnel.

It is not certain which Japanese islands will come under American control when the territorial settlement of the war in the Pacific is made. At the present time United States military forces are maintaining military government in all the out-

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lying Japanese islands except the Kuriles and Sakhalin, where the Russians are in command, and Formosa, which is under Chinese control. As between the Army and the Navy, General MacArthur's jurisdiction extends beyond the Japanese homeland islands to include a few of the most northern Ryukyu islands (south of Kyushu) and the Izu islands (south of the Tokyo region of Honshu). All other Japanese islands are administered by naval military government.

That Japan will be forced to relinquish her mandate over the German (and, earlier, Spanish) islands that she acquired during World War I is taken for granted. These islands loomed large in the fighting in the central Pacific—the Marshalls where we first set foot on Japanese territory with the capture of Kwajalein in February 1944, the Mariannas where the battles for Saipan and Tinian took place, and the Carolines, with Pelelieu, Ulithi, and the frequently bombed and raided strongholds of Truk, Ponape and Yap. No one suggests that Japan be permitted to retain them.

The mandated islands in question—the Marshalls, Mariannas and Carolines—stretch for twenty-five hundred miles across the central Pacific, almost from Hawaii to the Philippines, and for twelve hundred miles north and south—from the British Solomons up to within a thousand miles of Japan proper. Except for a few major islands in the Mariannas and Carolines, they comprise thousands of sparsely populated or unpopulated coral atolls or islands of minute size. The total native population of the Japanese mandated islands is approximately fifty thousand with only a few thousand Okinawans and Koreans and a tiny sprinkling of Chinese and other nationals. The pre-war Japanese population had exceeded the natives in number; but many were removed prior to our invasions, many more were war casualties, and most of the remainder have been returned either to Japan or Okinawa since the surrender of Japan.

In addition to the Japanese mandates, it is considered likely that Japan will be forced to surrender some of her outlying islands, such as those "taken by violence and greed", in the words of the Cairo Declaration. Formosa, taken from China in 1895, falls in this category, and will presumably revert to

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the Chinese. The Ryukyus, with the major island of Okinawa, might very well also be detached from Japan; but their political future is less clear than Formosa's. The Ryukyus were an independent nation for many centuries, falling under a loose Chinese control during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries and under equally loose Japanese protection during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. They were finally incorporated into the Japanese Empire in 1871. Their population, having both Chinese and Japanese characteristics, is around 500,000.

The only other Japanese islands that would possibly be assigned to the United States are the Izu, the Bonin and the Volcano islands. These lie between Tokyo Bay on the north and the northern Mariannas on the south, and have been populated almost exclusively by migrants from Japan proper—the Izus, close to Japan, for many centuries, and the Bonin and Volcano groups during the last seventy-five years. The latter groups constitute only a few minor islands and all civilians resident there were removed by Japan prior to our occupation.

It is considered unlikely that Japan will be forced to relinquish the Izu islands for they are in every respect a part of the Japanese homeland—and whether or not they relinquish to us the Bonin and Volcano islands is of no administrative significance since they are at present, and probably will remain, completely devoid of population. The same consideration applies to Marcus, a tiny island lying to the east of the Bonins.

For administrative purposes, therefore, it can reasonably be assumed that the United States will have some responsibility in the future for all the former Japanese mandated islands and for the Ryukyus. Added to our present Pacific possessions, they will present several difficult administrative problems.

In the first place, the administration of these islands will be materially affected by the requirements of the United Nations Charter. Chapter XI, which deals with administration only as it is affected by colonial policy, imposes upon all members of the United Nations the obligation to pursue a policy in all their dependencies that is liberal, far-seeing, and constructed primarily in terms of the interests and aspirations of the native peoples involved. While this chapter will not remake colonial

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governments in 1946, or maybe even in 1956, it is obviously a requirement of good practice and becomes a weapon, possibly a potent weapon, to force good colonial practices on backward colonial Powers. Specifically, members agree that the interests of the inhabitants are paramount and that the ruling Power is obligated to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants. To this end, members are required to respect local culture but at the same time to insure political, economic and educational advancement; to assure natives of just treatment and protection against abuses; to develop self-government; to coöperate with one another in securing social, economic and scientific advancement in dependent territories; to transmit full technical and statistical information to the United Nations regularly; and, in general, to follow a policy of good-neighborliness with respect to their dependent territories.

In addition to the general policy requirements incorporated in Chapter XI, the next two chapters of the Charter provide for the administration of certain territories in a status of "trusteeship". In contrast to the Mandates System of the League of Nations, the trusteeship system of UN is informal and flexible in two important respects. First, it does not require that any particular territories be made trust territories as was required of the former German and Turkish colonies after World War. I. Second, it provides that the terms on which the administering authority governs its trust territories will be a matter for individual agreement between UN and the member nation. It is implied, however, that the Trusteeship Council will be able to call for reports from the administering authority, to make periodic visits to trust territories, and to accept petitions from the inhabitants of such territories. Non-strategic trust territories would be under the General Council (and therefore under the Trusteeship Council) while strategic territories or strategic portions of territories would be under the Security Council.

Whether or not the United States should place such territories as are acquired from Japan in a status of trusteeship has been widely debated, with strong antagonism appearing in many quarters—civilian, Congressional and military. Nevertheless

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it seems highly unlikely that America will sell the UN short by refusing to coöperate with it in this matter. The Charter, which in the trusteeship chapters clearly reflects our official views, inferentially expects that all former mandated territories and all territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War will be designated as trust territories. This was reinforced by President Truman's statement to the press on January 15 of this year in which he made it clear that he intended that Japanese islands taken by the United States would be trust territories in the future. He added that he envisaged the United States as being the sole administering authority for all strategic islands, with nonstrategic areas possibly being administered collectively. Applied to the territories presumably designated for American control, this formula might place naval base areas as announced last September—Saipan, a portion of Okinawa, a portion of Palau, Truk, Eniwetok, Kwajalein and Majuro—as trust territories under the Security Council with the United States as the sole administrator; it might place other islands in the vicinity of these bases, such as the rest of the Marshalls, Carolines and Mariannas, as United States trust territories under the General Council; and it might provide for joint United States-Chinese administration of the remainder of the Ryukyu islands.

The final question regarding the creation of trust territories is: will the United States place its own island possessions in the Pacific under a trusteeship agreement? Members of the United Nations are invited to place their dependent (but non-mandated) territories under the trusteeship system but none has indicated an intention of doing so as yet. While it would be difficult to justify our keeping Guam out of the trusteeship system while placing Saipan under it, it is nonetheless unlikely that such trusteeship agreements will be decided upon in the near future.

The administrative picture in the Pacific therefore emerges as a very complicated one for America—with some islands as parts of organized territories under the Department of the Interior, some governed by the Interior Department, some governed jointly with Britain, some governed by the Navy, and

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some now under the Navy's military government but in the future to be governed under three different types of trusteeship arrangements. What is the best way to provide efficient administration for this heterogeneous patchwork of islands.

The most appealing solution to the logical administrative mind would be, of course, the creation of a Department (or administrative agency) for Dependent Peoples, and the transferal to that department of all the governmental functions relating to the administration of our territories and island possessions. It can be argued that this is what should be done at this time. It is generally agreed that this has not been done in the past partly because the extent of our offshore possessions has been too slight to merit it but mainly because the creation of a "colonial office" has always been thought by many liberals to have too imperialistic a ring. Liberal thought should by this time be sufficiently mature to realize that colonialism is not lessened by leaving the administration of dependent territories in the hands of various government agencies not designed for the work. If anything, the reverse is more likely to be true: that the concentration of the government's colonial activities in one department or agency would do much to make our colonial activities more carefully watched and therefore more representative of public opinion.

The creation of such a colonial department has much to commend it not only from a policy viewpoint but from an administrative viewpoint as well. It would be a large enough organization with a sufficient number of high posts to encourage good men to make a career of such work; it would tie together under one organization all our work with dependent peoples and thereby enable its employees to move readily from one type of work to another type in the same field, with the broadening of interest and viewpoint that results from such varied experience; it would enable the administration of, say, Guam to profit by the experience of Caribbean administrators in a way that has heretofore been impossible; and it would make possible a full-scale and professional approach to the administration of dependent territories.

Realism, however, forces one to admit that greater pressure than will now be exerted would be necessary to force such a

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reorganization. The Interior, Navy and War Departments, having acquired colonial administrative assignments either by intent or by default, will be no more willing to relinquish their work in this field than are other government departments willing to reduce their responsibilities. Interior is, in Interior's view, the governmental agency designed for the administration of dependent peoples. The Navy, in the naval view, is not only the traditional but the logical agency to administer Pacific island areas, and the Army, with its Philippine record and its Panama Canal Zone responsibilities, has developed a new interest in such matters, especially as it contemplates post-war air and military establishments in foreign areas. It would not be surprising if the State Department, with the placing of many American dependencies under trusteeships of the UN, were to fancy itself the proper agency for the administration of such territories. The tenacity of each department in retaining its established functions is such that far more pressure than can be anticipated would be required to secure a governmental reorganization of our colonial administration.

Not only would unification of the administration of all dependent territories be difficult to achieve, but it is doubtful if it would be the best administrative arrangement at this time. There is, in the first place, always the danger of a colonial office developing a vested interest in maintaining dependent peoples forever in a status of dependency.

Second, placing all control of dependent peoples under one unified head—either as a separate department, or as a division in an existing department—would insure the dominance of one approach toward dependent peoples. Had the United States government administered its dependent territories and peoples in the past in such a manner as to create a usable store of valuable experience, and had both the government and the people of this country given serious thought to the questions involved in colonial administrative policy, we might, with reason, argue that the time had now come to unify administration in one agency. This is not the case. The experience of the Navy is spread widely among naval officers and, in so far as it has been reduced to written form, among dusty naval archives. The same is

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true of the Army and of the Interior Department. Furthermore, aside from a few political scientists and anthropologists, no one has given serious attention to America's colonial policies. Rather than establish a new department and select a policy at the present, we might better make sure that the several agencies administering colonial territories both record and share their experience, so that general agreement, based on experience, will in time emerge.

Third, it would not be possible to unify all aspects of colonial administration. In the days before the United Nations this would have been more nearly possible, but even then Navy, War and Interior had necessarily to make use of specialists from Agriculture, Justice, Immigration, Treasury, Commerce and State from time to time. An outstanding example of this interdepartmental concern with dependent territories is shown in Alaska, where forty-two different governmental agencies perform governmental functions, with Interior serving largely as a coördinating supervisor.

On the assumption that all new territories acquired by the United States will be held as trust territories under the United Nations, it will be more important than ever that our administration be tied in closely with our general international policy. Unless the administration of all dependent territories is placed in the State Department, this major aspect of colonial policy would be outside the new unified organization. And, as always, the commercial activity of FEA, now divided between Commerce and RFC, and the agricultural activity of the Department of Agriculture, as well as many other separate activities, would continue to be outside the organization in any case. The creation of a " unified " department that does not unify all activities relating to the territories could do considerable harm by creating the illusion of unification without having unification in fact. Coördination might then be all the harder to achieve with important interested agencies of government being excluded in policy and administrative decisions.

It may well be that the type of administrative organization suggested later in this article will, by virtue of some years of successful operation, remove the present objections to a unified

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dependent territories department; but our concern now is to find the best solution for the present time.

In the absence of a unified colonial office, two major administrative problems are raised by our acquisition of new island possessions in the Pacific. First, to which existing departments or agencies should the new islands be assigned for administrative purposes, and, second, how can these separate agencies be coördinated so as to give us the advantages of a unified colonial office without its disadvantages?

On the first question, it must be recognized that it is not possible to set up hard and fast rules governing the assignment of new territories to existing departments. Although any division may seem purely arbitrary, nonetheless there are certain criteria which may conveniently be used in deciding which department should have responsibility for any given island or groups of islands.

First, no department should be diverted from its primary purpose by being required to assume major administrative responsibilities in the islands. Second, no department should send special administrative personnel into those islands where another agency already maintains representatives who could, without much reinforcement, handle many administrative functions satisfactorily. The same criteria apply to materials and facilities (for example, water and air transport) as to persons. Third, the existence of small civilian populations in areas of prime military importance creates a strong argument for assigning administrative responsibility to the dominant military service in the area. Fourth, where there are large numbers of civilians in areas of minor military significance, logically administration should be placed in the hands of a civilian department. Likewise, fifth, if the administering authority for UN is to be embodied in two nations in a joint trusteeship, the United States administering agency should not be military, on the well-established theory that this nation's foreign affairs are not handled by the military. Finally, any department possessing a store of knowledge and experience relating to civil administration of the area should, in so far as is otherwise desirable, be considered for further assignment in the areas of its experience.

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Applied to the islands in question—the Japanese-mandated islands and the Bonin-Volcano islands held by us partly on a regular trusteeship basis and partly on a security trusteeship basis, and the Ryukyu islands administered as a regular trust territory in conjunction with the Chinese—the division of administrative responsibility is easily determined. The Navy should be assigned the mandated islands and the Bonin-Volcano islands because of its pre-war experience in Guam and Samoa, because of its wartime and post-war experience in administering these particular islands, because our major Pacific bases will be in these islands, because naval personnel will be present on all major islands, because naval establishments, facilities and equipment will be at hand in the area, because the population is small and the military significance great, and because it will not be a major, distracting job for the Navy.

The administrative responsibility in the Ryukyus should, for equally numerous reasons, be assigned to the Interior Department. The civilian population is large, ten times as great as in the naval area; the military significance of the area is slight with only a minor base planned by the Navy in the area; the task of administration would divert any department not primarily concerned with this type of activity from its major work; a civilian agency should be selected to represent us in such a major and delicate undertaking as the administration of the Ryukyus in conjunction with the Chinese. Although naval personnel under army command has administered the Ryukyus since their occupation by American forces, the loss of this experience would be more than compensated by the foregoing advantages of civilian-department control.

Some commentators would assign America's administrative responsibility in the Ryukyus to the State Department on the theory that our activities in that area will be more diplomatic than administrative. While the administration of a joint trusteeship will doubtless call for great tact and no small amount of what may be called diplomacy, it is equally certain that the administrative work in connection with the trusteeship will be considerable. Interior is organized and prepared for this; State is not. Furthermore, there is little doubt but that

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the State Department can better perform its diplomatic functions if it does not, at the same time, become an operating colonial office as well. The Interior Department can, as will be described shortly, have State Department guidance on policy matters at all times.

Before leaving the question of departmental responsibility for our new Pacific islands, some attention should be given to the claim by the Army that it should share responsibility with the Navy for the administration of the small islands acquired from Japan. Both land and air forces will doubtless be based on some of the islands of the central and west Pacific: does this not establish a valid Army claim to at least a share in their government?

It does not require an extended analysis of the manner in which hundreds of widely scattered islands with small populations must necessarily be governed to make it evident that a division of the area between several agencies is administratively unthinkable. It is possible, though of doubtful wisdom, to Balkanize some areas of the world. That the former Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific cannot possibly be Balkanized by giving every agency that maintains personnel in the area government responsibilities follows from the form of governmental organization required for the area.

The only feasible governmental organization for such island groups is to locate a number of governmental centers on the major islands in the area, and to provide such government as is necessary for outlying islands on a visiting basis. Naval government for the twenty-eight Marshall Islands, for example, has been based largely on Kwajalein and Majuro—with three or four self-contained "teams" making monthly tours of the other islands to provide medical attention, conduct elections, deliver trade goods, pick up produce, and provide all the other functions of native administration. The same system obtains in the Caroline group, and to a lesser extent in the Mariannas.

Where does the Army or Air Force fit into this picture? Such garrison forces and air bases as are established in the Pacific will doubtless be located on the major islands in the area—on precisely those islands that are naval bases, have large populations, have

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comparatively large areas, and are the logical focal points of island administration. Will the Army govern half of Kwajalein atoll, and the Navy the other half? Or will the Army govern all, with the Navy maintaining responsibility for the outlying islands that will be administered by teams operating from Kwajalein? Will the natives under army control be governed by one set of administrative principles, and their cousins on nearby Allinganea be handled in another fashion?

It is hardly necessary to point out that one of the first principles of satisfactory colonial administration is that each cultural and ethnic region should be treated as a whole. To split the Marshall Islands (or the Palaus, or the Mariannas, or any of the several Caroline groups) among several administrations would do such violence to this principle as to insure an unsatisfactory administration. The movement of natives from island to island and even from group to group has always been on a surprisingly large scale and will doubtless be even more extensive in the future than it has been in the past. Wage scales, welfare facilities, educational opportunities, degree of recognition of native custom—all these matters cannot possibly be handled on an island-to-island basis without courting strong native discontent and its concomitant of world disapproval. It could even reasonably be argued that a mediocre policy, if applied consistently throughout the area, would be more satisfactory in all respects than a policy that varied from island to island and group to group.

Aside from this overriding consideration, there are other lesser reasons why a unified administration for any major area is desirable. Any one agency responsible for the whole area would feel a greater responsibility for providing a governmental service that would be a credit to it, than would a number of agencies with minor and scattered responsibilities. One reason why the pre-war naval governments of Guam and Samoa were less satisfactory than they could have been was that they were so insignificant that they could be easily slighted: they could never challenge the Navy to give them special thought, attention, or trained personnel. There is no reason to suppose that the Army,

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the Air Forces, or the Navy would do any better if they all had minor and scattered governmental responsibilities in the Pacific.

Also, the economies of a unified native administration are worth consideration. Several governmental agencies operating in the same region will have to duplicate personnel and facilities in all phases of native administration, including even chief offices in Washington. Furthermore, the existence of only 70,000 widely scattered natives limits the number of specialized administrative personnel that can be detailed to the area for governmental functions, so that any subdividing of the area would seriously interfere with the caliber of administration that could be provided.

The question then is not which islands should go to which agencies, but rather to which agency should be assigned administrative responsibility for all of the islands. Based on all relevant factors—defense responsibilities, past experience, current facilities and personnel—the case for Navy jurisdiction in the former Japanese mandated islands is clearly established.

Assuming, therefore, that the division of our Pacific island trust territories will be between the Interior and Navy Departments, that the Army will be an interested party in policy determination, and that the State and other departments will from time to time be seriously concerned both with policy and with administration, what reorganization of our existing pattern of colonial administration is required? First, let us consider the desiderata that any reorganization should seek to accomplish.

A. Administration of dependent territories and peoples should no longer be tucked away in the depth of departments where it is a minor function seldom worthy of the attention of top officials of the department and where it is hidden from the light of publicity and therefore of criticism.

B. Administration should not vary so widely from area to area as to constitute mistreatment for the peoples of a disregarded region. Records show that $117 a year was spent on the education of native Alaskans in a sample pre-war year, with only $6 for Guamanians. The fact that this discrepancy was more one of budgetary and accounting methods than of educa-

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tional opportunities does not alter the fact that both Navy and Interior determined their programs entirely irrespective of each other, with many wide (and frequently hidden) divergencies of treatment resulting.

C. Administrators determining policy for one area or people should be able to draw upon the thought and experience of administrators conversant with similar problems in other areas. Policy should of course not be the same in all areas, for the keynote of colonial administration must be the fitting of the administration into the framework of the local culture, but neither should policy be determined in a vacuum by people unfamiliar with American experience in other similar fields.

D. Particularly with the establishment of trusteeships administered by America, there must be a far closer integration of policy, of types of technical and statistical information collected, and of authority than has existed in the past.

E. Also, because we will be working closely with the United Nations in the administration of dependent areas, it becomes more and more important that general policy be determined, not by the Governor of Puerto Rico with such advice as he receives from the Secretary of the Interior, or by the Governor of Guam with such advice as he receives from the Secretary of the Navy, but by the United States government—which means the State Department acting on such directives as it receives from Congress and the President and on such advice as it receives from the administering agencies. It is necessary, therefore, for the State Department and Congress to enter the picture far more fully and officially than they have ever done in the past.

F. There should be, if not an organized system of interchange of personnel between administering agencies, at least a close relationship between the working levels of the various administering agencies in the Washington offices, with the possibility of interchange of ideas and even of personnel that such a close relationship would encourage.

G. It is important that the government of our outlying possessions be unified sufficiently to make possible and economical the institution of an adequate training program for administrative personnel.

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Several of the above criteria can be met only by bringing publicity and responsibility to the administration of the dependent areas. To a certain extent the submission of public reports to the United Nations will provide not only publicity of administrative practices and policies, but a sense of responsibility that such publicity generates. Perhaps more important in the case of the Pacific island areas suggested for naval administration would be the provision, by Congress, of certain basic governmental policies and practices, with full annual reports to that body. One reason for the Navy's lax government of Guam and Samoa before the war was Congressional unconcern. Since Congress never provided by law for the government of those areas, the Navy, acting on presidential executive orders, provided such government as it saw fit. As a result not only was the Naval Governor supreme in his powers, but many of his annual reports were never so much as printed. The quality of administration will therefore be greatly improved if Congress recognizes the salutary effect of making our new Pacific islands organized territories.

The task of establishing a working arrangement of various government departments in order to meet the other criteria listed above is made easier by reference to the manner in which the Army and the Navy, working with the State Department at all times and with other departments at particular times, handled civil affairs during the recent war. As is well known, some areas to be occupied by American or UN forces were designated as areas of primary Army responsibility while other areas were assigned to the Navy for civil administration during the period of occupation. As indicated earlier, the Japanese Pacific islands of main concern now were allocated to the Navy.

To organize the administration of occupied territory, the Navy established an Office of Occupied Areas in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which later became the Military Government Section, and is now the Office of Island Governments. In the same manner, the Army established a Civil Affairs Division of the War Department General Staff for operations and a Military Government Division in the Provost Marshal General's Office for training.

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As a first step in securing coöperation between the two services, the Navy's office was moved out of the Navy Department Building and established in the Pentagon, side by side with the Army's Civil Affairs Division. Not only did the two officers-in-charge come to know each other intimately, but the working members of their staffs were constantly thrown into close association with one another.

As a second step, there was created a policy-determining civil affairs organization composed of three officers of the Army (one being from the Air Corps) and three naval officers. These officers represented for each department the civil activity of the department, the international affairs activity of the department, and, generally, the logistics activity of each department. Being a strictly military organization, this Joint Civil Affairs Committee also operated in an advisory capacity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on civil affairs policy.

A third step toward coördination was achieved by the creation of the State-War-Navy Coördinating Committee, whose approval was necessary for all major civil affairs policies. SWNCC was composed of the Assistant Secretaries of the State, War and Navy Departments, and provided over-all control, first through its various subcommittees and finally through its own full committee, of civil affairs activity in areas of American responsibility. Whenever other governmental departments were concerned with a particular problem before the committee, a high officer of that department was added to the committee for the duration of that issue's discussion.

A normal outgrowth of this workable system would be an interdepartmental committee similar to JCAC for the purpose of determining administrative policy for *all* America's dependent territories. The departments represented on this committee would presumably be Interior, Navy and War, with other departments added for particular issues, Commerce and Treasury being likely possibilities. The representatives of the two service departments might well be the chief government officer, the chief international officer, and a high strategical officer.

A "Joint Dependent Territories Committee" would have the responsibility of reviewing and coördinating activites of

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each department having jurisdiction over dependent territories but would confine its control to matters of organization, day-by-day administration, and policies of native administration that would not have major national or international significance. Not only would this committee be a clearing house for an interchange of views but it would be a central office for the coördination of policy. It could organize a training program in native administration for personnel of all departments that would then be on a scale that no one department could afford; it could insure standardization of statistical data from each territory so that our reports to the UN would be consistent in both coverage and methods of computation; it could determine for all departments the interpretations to be given to instructions relative to native administration that come from the UN, Congress, or the higher policy committee mentioned in the next paragraph.

To determine higher policy, particularly as it relates to our relations with the UN and with other countries, there could be a development of the wartime SWNCC into a State-War-Navy-Interior Coördinating Committee, responsible directly to the President. Administrative policy would be cleared at the lower level, with national and international policy at the higher.

This State-War-Navy-Interior Coördinating Committee, composed of the Assistant Secretaries of each Department and assisted by the head of the dependent territories divisions, would doubtless continue in peacetime to handle many matters of high government policy that concern the military and international aspects of the country. There have been numerous suggestions that SWNCC continue to coördinate high policy, having demonstrated during the war the important gap in government that it could fill. With Interior added for all dependent territories questions it would have jurisdiction over all major policy matters relating to our dependent territories.

To complete this picture by adopting another wartime expedient that has worked well, it would be highly desirable for all offices dealing with the administration of dependent peoples to be housed together, on the theory that leading a horse to water makes drinking more likely than not. This would pull

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the Office of Island Governments out of the Navy Building but not out of the Navy Department; it would take the Division of Territories and Island Possessions and the Office of Indian Affairs out of the Interior Building but not out of the Interior Department; and it would involve whatever post-war dependent territories administrative organization there may be in the War Department in addition to the Panama Canal.

This proposal for encouraging voluminous contacts between various agencies concerned with the same type of activity—by enforcing physical proximity—is possible in this instance because the offices concerned are not integral parts of their respective agencies. The Office of Island Governments in the Navy Department, for example, is not concerned with those matters to which the Navy Department owes its existence, and, although it necessarily has extensive contacts with the Bureaus of Personnel, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery, as well as with the Civil Engineering Corps, such contacts can be, and are, handled by full- or part-time liaison officers. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Administration must be in the Navy Building but the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Island Governments need not be. The same applies to the dependent peoples offices in the Department of the Interior.

It has been assumed throughout this article that both the Navy Department and the Interior Department are capable of satisfactorily administering dependent territories. Since both departments have at times been the object of considerable criticism for their policies and administrations in our dependent territories and possessions, it is important to see if their records justify this assumption.

Interior, with its Indian Service and its Division of Territories and Island Possessions, has had responsibility for America's Indians, for the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, and for our possessions in the Caribbean region, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. It has certainly not been free from criticism. Puerto Rico is frequently cited as the outstanding reason why the United States is hypocritical in criticizing the British in India, the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, or the French in

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Indo-China. Even Secretary Ickes, shortly before his resignation, referred to the poor work of governing dependent territories that had been done by Interior.

Nevertheless, practically no one questions Interior's capabilities or jurisdiction in this field. Despite any weaknesses on its part, the fact remains that we will not get an improvement in our colonial administration by transferring responsibilities to another department, or by any sleight-of-hand reorganizations. We will get improvement by exposing our administrators' activities to publicity, by creating the pressure of an informed public, and by placing greater emphasis on, and allowing greater funds for, the work. Interior's record, on the whole, has certainly been good enough to justify an assignment of new and more extensive responsibilities.

Observers of the naval governments of Guam and Samoa prior to the war have more reason to doubt the wisdom of designating the Navy as administering authority for other Pacific islands. Because Congress had failed to provide governmental organization for the islands, the Naval Governor was supreme in his power to rule by edict and generally without publicity for his actions. It has frequently been charged that the training and philosophy of naval personnel is not such as to make for proper administration of civilian affairs and that the Navy has used assignment to Guam or Samoa as a mild form of punishment for erring officers, or as a dumping ground for incompetent personnel. These charges—the first generally taken by the nonmilitary public to be a fact and the second generally admitted by the Navy—would appear to afford sufficient grounds for removing all governing responsibility from the Navy's hands.

This pre-war judgment of the Navy as island administrator must, in all honesty, be altered by the wartime demonstration by the Navy of competence in this field. The record of naval military government in the Pacific islands from February 1944, when first established in the Marshall Islands, to the present cannot be written here, but a few salient and relevant points can be made. In the first place, officers selected for military government duty were selected carefully and on such grounds

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that they were, with few exceptions, liberal and enlightened administrators. Officers of this writer's acquaintance included a former Governor of Puerto Rico, a former Chairman of the President's Fair Labor Practices Committee, several city managers and assistant city managers, a handful of college deans and presidents, many capable people from federal, state and local governments, former welfare workers, a large number of college and university teachers, mainly those who specialized in politics, economics, sociology and anthropology, former State Department personnel, and a scattering of business men, lawyers, engineers, policemen, doctors, et cetera, mainly with experience in those areas planned for naval occupation. Although some misfits found their way into the program, there is no doubt that the Navy tried sincerely and well to get the best people available for military government. In the future the Navy must draw its island administrators largely from its roster of regular naval officers, but it seems most unlikely that its sound criteria for civil administrators will be materially changed from what they were during the war.

Second, officers selected for military government were given extensive training. The Naval School of Military Government at Columbia University was, for most classes, a nine-month course of study, not only of military government and of the area (and its language) to be occupied, but also of administration, anthropology, economics, sociology and world politics relating to the Pacific region. The shorter course of study, at the Princeton School of Military Government, was what is generally described as being more practical, but it nonetheless gave strong emphasis to international law, the best methods of dealing with native peoples, the legal and moral considerations involved in military government, and the welfare problems to be met. The present School of Naval Administration, now in session at Stanford University, is perhaps the best example of the Navy's emphasis on proper training for island administrators. With wartime problems no longer of concern and with reserve officers in military government being rapidly demobilized, the Navy has under training 150 officers for island administration in what is probably the first school of its kind in this country.

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The School, under a civilian director and with a staff composed partly of Stanford faculty and partly of military government officers returned from the Pacific, provides a five-month program of study of colonial administration pointed toward the Pacific islands. The chief instructor is America's foremost anthropologist of the Pacific island region, the director is a noted student of world affairs, and the other members of the staff of the School are of similar training and approach. If a five-month educational program can make good and sympathetic administrators out of a group of naval officers selected on the basis of their general competence and indicated aptitude, then the Stanford course should do it.

Third, the military government policy pursued by the Navy in the past two years in the Pacific islands has indicated a far greater concern for the improvement of the natives than did the pre-war governments of Guam and Samoa. For example, school enrollment in Guam in 1941 totaled slightly over 5,000, whereas within a year after the recovery of Guam from the Japanese there were over 7,500 Guamanians under instruction. Also, instead of the slight pre-nursing course in the high school offered by a local doctor before the war, the Navy has now established a full-fledged Native Medical Practitioner's School for eighty students in a four-year course, and a Nurse's School under the instruction of ten Navy nurses. These are striking comparisons, yet they could be duplicated in almost all phases of the local administration throughout the Pacific islands. The Navy is aware that it did not do a first-class job in Guam and Samoa before the war, and there is much evidence that this awareness will materially affect its administration in the post-war years.

These three major factors—type of personnel selected, training given to island administrators, and policy pursued in the field—might very well combine to make the Navy not only an acceptable choice for administering authority but actually the best choice. In view of the conditions existing in the islands, it is extremely doubtful that any other department could recruit island administrators of as high a caliber as the naval officers selected for the work. The islands are tropical;

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the life of the administrator will be hard and lonely; and the work will be small-scale, with 70,000 natives scattered over hundreds of square miles of ocean. It has frequently been pointed out in the past that one grave disability of the Navy in such administrative work is its policy of rotation of assignment, with officers and men transferred from island assignment after only a two-year tour of duty. In one very real sense, this is a definite advantage, since few people of competence and ability will be satisfied to stay in the islands permanently. While a naval officer can take occasional two-year tours of duty in the islands as part of his professional career, a civilian would have to abandon his professional career if he needed relief from island life or if he hoped to attain prominence in his profession.

Further, it is equally doubtful if a civilian department of government could so easily organize and provide the training in administration that is necessary if administrators in a strange culture are to serve with distinction. The general practice of civilian departments is to recruit good men after they have trained themselves. The Navy must necessarily operate on the basis of training officers anew for each new job to which they are assigned, and it has the funds and facilities for doing this. This is an important consideration in an area, such as colonial administration, where the supply of trained personnel is very limited.

Finally, judged on the Navy's war and post-war record, it is by no means certain that a civilian department would follow any more satisfactory policies of administration in the islands than would the Navy. It is true that, despite their special training, naval officers will tend to be somewhat more undemocratic and paternalistic in their dealings with natives than would a select group of enthusiastic sociologists. It is also likely, but not certain, that the Navy will tend to put health and sanitation and military security before political advancement, education, and cultural development. In dealing with Micronesian peoples, however, it is by no means certain that a super-democratic approach with primary emphasis on Jeffersonian political development is the best approach. If

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the Stanford School can alter the alleged " battleship mentality" of regular naval officers just as the Columbia and Princeton Schools of military government avoided developing it, this possible threat to the success of the Navy's administration should not materialize.

What has been said does not offer proof that the Navy will continue to do as well in the future as it has in the past few years. It will be easy for it to let island assignment again fall into low repute in the service; for the admirals to decide that all that is needed in an island administrator is patience and common sense and no special training; and for policy once again to be based only on what is necessary to avoid epidemics and unrest. There are some indications that precisely this attitude has tended to develop during the past six months, as trained military government officers were almost completely demobilized, leaving only untrained personnel in administrative positions in a military government responsible only to the fairly unrestrictive rules of international law. When, however, the Navy's trained administrators get to their posts and their activities are opened to public, Congressional and interdepartmental scrutiny (just as Interior's should likewise be opened), it is reasonably certain that the Navy will continue to be a satisfactory administering agency.

Perhaps a graver question is whether or not the United States should have one of the military services administer a territory that is held in trust status under the United Nations. There is no doubt that military administration of mandated territories in the inter-war period was considered inconsistent with the principles underlying the League's Mandates System. Even the Japanese replaced their military administration in the mandated islands with civilian personnel shortly after being designated the Mandatory Power. Would the United States face charges of militaristic colonialism if it governed the islands through the agency of the Navy? If so, we should avoid the charges, even if that meant a poorer, more expensive, and less satisfactory administration. Our continuing concern with the policies of other colonial Powers requires that we provide them with no obvious basis for counterattack.

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Under the League's Mandates System, these would be decisive arguments, but they seem to this writer to have little relevance to those territories under the United Nations that are designated "strategic trusteeships", as the Japanese mandated islands doubtless will be, in fact if not in name. We will take the islands for no other reason than their military importance; we will hold them under a strategic trusteeship for no other reason than their military importance; we will fortify them and maintain service personnel on all the important islands; and we will do all these things with the full knowledge and consent of the United Nations. This obviously is different from the mandate under the League of Nations that Japan had for the islands, a mandate that forbade fortification of the islands, that forbade recruitment of natives for military service, and that, in general, forbade any tinge of military influence. To argue that the world cannot see these differences is indeed to adopt a far-fetched position. A good administration of the islands will not embarrass the United States—even if most of the administrators are clothed in uniforms.

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THE MANDATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS

IN these days which mark the death of the League of Nations and the birth of the United Nations, it is interesting for the scholar, and it may not be wholly without profit for the statesman, to scan the international horizon from the observatory of experience in an endeavor both to understand the lessons of the past and to assess the possibilities of the future.

Of the various innovations introduced into the law and practice of international relations by the League, the Mandates System, set up under article 22 of the Covenant, was perhaps the most successful. It is therefore particularly fitting at this moment once more to subject that institution to a critical analysis and to compare it to that by which it is to be replaced under the Charter of the United Nations.

In this brief study I propose, first, to examine the Mandates System in its origins, that is, in the intentions of its authors, and to inquire by what means, in what circumstances, and to what extent these intentions were carried out. I shall then, secondly, compare it *as it was* to the International Trusteeship System *as it is to be*. Finally, I shall venture to present such general conclusions as this comparison may seem to suggest and to justify.

The Mandates System

The scheme of international supervision of the national administration of certain backward areas, as that system may be defined, was, it will be remembered, established under the peace settlement of 1919. It was to apply to the former African and Asiatic colonies of Germany and to the Arab provinces wrested from the Turks as a result of the Allied victories of the preceding years.

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These territories were first ceded by their defeated masters to their principal victors. Each of them was then retroceded, for purposes of administration, to the state whose armed forces had taken part, and usually the decisive part, in their conquest. The so-called Mandatories were Great Britain for Palestine, Iraq, British Cameroons, British Togoland and Tanganyika; France for Syria and Lebanon, French Cameroons and French Togoland; Belgium for Urundi-Ruanda; the Union of South Africa for Southwest Africa; Australia for New Guinea and the phosphate island of Nauru; New Zealand for Western Samoa; and Japan for the Pacific islands north of the Equator. While enjoying full powers of legislation and administration, the Mandatories were not, however, to become the sovereign masters of these territories. Their rights over the so-called mandated areas were defined and limited by mandatory charters or agreements entered into between themselves and the Council of the League of Nations; for it was as trustees on behalf of the League and in conformity with principles set forth in article 22 of its Covenant that the Mandatory Powers were to pursue their "sacred mission of civilization" of guiding their minor wards on the road leading toward self-government.

Such was the political and legal basis of the Mandates System.

How did this system originate? Although somewhat comparable schemes of international coöperation may be found in previous history, and although a somewhat similar plan with about the same vocabulary had been outlined in a pamphlet published by General Smuts on the eve of the Peace Conference, the true origin of the institution of mandates is to be found in the political compromise from which it sprang. It was born of the conflict between President Wilson and those who, after him and like him, opposed all annexations and who, in accordance with the American tradition, were hostile to the very term of colonies, on the one hand, and some of the nations, on the other, which, having conquered the territories, were bent on keeping them for themselves. The terms of the compromise were obvious: President Wilson succeeded in preventing annexation; the conquerors in retaining their conquests.

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The American victory was not purely verbal, however, as such a statement might be construed to imply. As the authors of the mandates intended and as the history of the next twenty years was to show, the institution became a reality and, except, perhaps, in the case of the Japanese territories, was not to be a mere cloak for annexation.

How and why was this result achieved, a result which the cynics had not anticipated and which certain Mandatory Powers had sought to elude? By what means and in what circumstances were the Mandatory Powers led to deserve their name and to carry out their duties as trustees of the League and as disinterested guardians of their wards?

The drafters of article 22 of the Covenant had laid down certain principles of administration. To assure their application, however, they had provided only that the Mandatory Powers were to render an annual account of their stewardship to the Council of the League, and that their reports were to be considered by a so-called Permanent Mandates Commission. It was upon this rudimentary but well-conceived foundation that the entire institution was built up. The sole link between the administering Mandatory Powers and the supervising Council of the League was thus the Permanent Mandates Commission. In so far as this body succeeded in its task, its success was essentially owing to two circumstances: its composition and its procedure.

The Council set up the Permanent Mandates Commission as a body of independent experts, the majority of whom were to be nationals of non-mandatory states, and none of whom was to be a governmental agent. Appointed by the Council for an indefinite period, they were to enjoy a quasi-judicial status. Fortunately most of the appointees were either experienced former colonial administrators or men whose past careers in other fields entitled them to the respect and confidence of the international community. As was to be expected of such public servants, they brought to their task a conscientious attention and a real zeal which still further enhanced the authority of their findings.

Meeting twice annually for periods of two to three weeks each, they considered in turn all the reports of the Mandatory Powers

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in the presence and with the active coöperation of representatives of the government responsible for their drafting. The so-called accredited representatives were either high officials of the colonial ministry of the Mandatory Powers or, with or without the assistance of the former, administrators of the respective territories.

Thus a truly active and almost intimate collaboration was established between the administering governments and the League on whose behalf they carried out their duties. In accordance with the wishes of the Commission, the reports became ever fuller and more detailed, and the information they contained was supplemented not only by the annual hearings of the accredited representatives but also by much other available documentary material—special studies published for and by the Mandatory governments, the results of anthropological and other technical inquiries, clippings from newspapers and other periodicals, accounts of debates in the local consultative bodies or in the parliaments of the administering states, petitions from or about the territories, etc. All this literature was carefully sifted by the Mandates Section of the Secretariat of the League, and each of its elements was thoughtfully considered by at least some of the members of the Commission. As a consequence, it can be admitted that no event of any importance taking place in any of the mandated territories escaped the attention of the supervisory organ. The only exception was that of the Pacific islands under Japanese mandate. Here everything—distance, language, official discretion, and undoubtedly also deliberate policy—conspired to maintain a veil of ignorance and misunderstanding between the Commission and the mandatory administration.

On the whole, however, Geneva was at least as well informed about the mandated territories as national governments usually are about their own colonies.

Having carefully considered each report in the light of all other available data, the Commission proceeded to draft its findings. These findings, as well as the much fuller and less diplomatically worded minutes of the meetings of the Commission, were addressed to the Council of the League, com-

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municated to all its members states, published and widely disseminated.

Thus the opinion of the public, of specialized students, of the press, and, last but not least, of parliaments everywhere was kept abreast of the administration of the mandated territories. As the Commission, thanks to the personal competence and generally recognized independence of its members, came to enjoy a real respect and, indeed, quite some prestige, an international or rather a super-national moral authority sprang up in striking contrast to the political impotence of the League as a whole. In its capacity as a purely advisory body to an overcautious and ever weaker Council, the Permanent Mandates Commission had no powers of coercion whatever. As a universally esteemed group of impartial and independent experts, however, its powers of persuasion were indisputably very effective. No Mandatory government, always excepting the Japanese, could afford to disregard its advice for fear of no other sanctions but those of public and parliamentary opinion.

The net result was a willing coöperation between the League and the Mandatory governments, and the enhancement of the standards of administration in the mandated territories and even, by a natural repercussion, in colonial administration everywhere.

I fully realize that this judgment may well be challenged as coming from one who has devoted an appreciable part of his active life to the working of the Mandates System. My part in this task, however, as a mere Swiss professor, was a very modest one compared with that of my experienced and distinguished British, Belgian, Dutch and French colleagues, all of whom had had varied practical experience in colonial administration, and several of whom have left or will leave a great name in history. It is to their endeavors and merits that my favorable judgment on the Mandates System may be taken as a tribute. But I venture to formulate it primarily as a tribute to truth itself.

The Old and the New

Between the Mandates and the International Trusteeship Systems there are, of course, some obvious similitudes. But there

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are also some striking contrasts, quite apart from the fact that the former *was* and can therefore be assessed as a reality, and that the latter *is yet to be* and can therefore be judged only as a plan.

The main analogies between the two institutions, between the photograph and the blueprint, are four in number.

First, as the Mandates System, so the Trusteeship also was born of a compromise between disinterested humanitarianism and acquisitive nationalism. But whereas in 1919 the two conflicting urges animated two rival sets of states, today it would seem as if they were fighting for the soul of the same nation. When it is suggested that certain territories wrested from a defeated foe are, under the name of strategic trust areas, to be administered both as military and naval bases, presumably in the sole or at least in the primary interest of the trustee, and as backward lands, presumably in the sole or at least in the primary interest of their native inhabitants, it would seem that the Anglo-Saxon love of and genius for compromise have gone a bit far. The future alone will show whether they have not gone all too far on this point.

The second analogy between the two institutions lies in the fact that both were devised as a means of improving and, to a certain degree, as a substitute for the traditional colonial administration of the past. This is more obvious still in the Charter than it was under the Covenant. Is not the "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories", which constitutes Chapter XI of the former document, to be read in close conjunction with the succeeding two chapters devoted to the International Trusteeship System, and are they not the twin children of the same parents?

Thirdly, does not "the principle that the interests of the inhabitants" of all non-self-governing territories "are paramount", the principle expressly formulated in article 73 of the Charter, dominate both the Mandates and the Trusteeship Systems? The inference which the Mandates Commission drew from the "sacred trust of civilization" idea mentioned in article 22 of the Covenant was that of the essentially disinterested character of the mandates. In this inference it was followed both by the Council of the League and, gradually, by the Man-

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datory Powers themselves. It is to be hoped that the same conception will prevail in the administration of the trust territories. But how is that conception to be reconciled with the idea underlying that of the strategic areas? Is the establishment of military, naval and air bases in trust areas to be financed exclusively by the taxpayers of the administering state? Or are the wards to be asked to contribute to the protection of the guardians for the reason or on the pretext that the first objective of the Trusteeship System is, in the terms of article 76 of the Charter, " to further international peace and security " ?

Fourthly and finally, the problem of sovereignty of both mandated and trust areas has been posited in similar terms in both the Covenant and the Charter. Nor in either document is the problem expressly solved. In both, however, it seems to be implied that sovereignty is not to be vested in the administering authority. This was so in the case of the mandated areas, as they were to be administered " on behalf of the League of Nations." Does not the very name of the new institution carry with it the same implication?

In spite of these and other minor similarities which might be mentioned—such as the nature of the benefits which the administering authority is to secure for its wards and the kind of abuses against which it is to protect them—the two systems differ on at least five rather significant points.

First, when compared to article 22 of the Covenant, the provisions of articles 73 to 91 of the Charter are much more elaborate and ambitious. This is a result not only of the general character of the two documents, the former counting only 26 articles as contrasted with the 111 of the latter, but also of an obvious desire to invest the United Nations with greater powers in the Trusteeship System than those enjoyed by the League over its predecessor.

In the second place, that System is to be applied not only to former mandated territories but also both to such territories as " may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" and to such as may be "voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration." Whether these vaster ambitions of the authors of the new system

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will be fulfilled or whether even some of the former mandated territories are to escape the supervision of the United Nations remains to be seen. It will depend on various unknown political circumstances—unknown, and all the less predictable, as there is much less agreement on fundamentals between the Great Powers of today than existed between their predecessors on the morrow of the First World War.

Thirdly, whereas under the Mandates System the administration of each area to which it applied was entrusted to a single Mandatory Power, with the negligible and even debatable exception of Nauru, it is provided, under article 81 of the Charter, that " the administering authority may be one or more states or the Organization itself." Here also we must be content with contrasting the certain past with a very uncertain future. Whether there will be any such joint and collective administering authorities as article 81 provides, or at least allows for, or not, no one can say with assurance today. Whether the possible establishment of such a joint and collective authority be inspired solely or even primarily by the desire to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the trust territories is still more uncertain. What one may fairly declare today is that it would in any case be a real international tragedy if, in the settlement of this delicate question, the interests of the wards were to be sacrificed to the jealousies of the guardians.

In the fourth place, the general militancy of the Charter as compared with the more pacific character of the Covenant is clearly reflected in the provisions concerning our subject. Whereas under the latter document the mandated territories were all to be demilitarized and the Mandatory Powers were debarred from deriving any direct or indirect military benefit from their administration, the former, as we have seen, on the contrary provides that all the trust territories play their part " in the maintenance of international peace and security " and that some of them even become " strategic areas " and that some be placed under the supervision of the Security Council.

Fifthly and finally, the powers of the Trusteeship Council under the authority of the General Assembly are to be far more extensive than were those of the Permanent Mandates Commis-

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sion, which was directly responsible only to the Council of the League. Whereas the Commission, as we have seen, was composed solely of individual, independent experts appointed by an international authority for an indefinite period, the Trusteeship Council is to be a body of states represented by officials, each of whom will naturally be responsible to his own national government. Whether the loss of international independence and impartiality which this change inevitably entails will be compensated, more than compensated or less than compensated by the enhanced political rights of inspection and even of direction conferred upon the Trusteeship Council is one last point upon which the future alone can enlighten us. What is certain today is that in the intentions of the drafters of the Charter, persuasion and the discreet political pressure of emulation, which were the main motive agents of the Mandates System, are to be supplemented and even, if need be, replaced by coercive and direct intervention.

In order fully to understand this, as so many other differences between the new and the old, one must constantly remind oneself of the characteristic origins of the United Nations Charter. That document was adopted on the proposal of the Great Powers by a conference of belligerents held before the end of a great war which the League of Nations had failed to prevent; hence the natural reaction against the methods and traditions of the past, hence also the distrust of mere persuasion and the greater reliance on coercion.

Covenant and Charter, Mandates and Trusteeship were both, to a very large extent, products of American creative genius. But whereas the Covenant and the Mandates bear the imprint of the pacific, fair-minded, and impartial statesman and scholar that was Woodrow Wilson, the Charter and the Trusteeship clearly reflect the realistic militancy of his former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who was to become his triumphant successor.

Conclusions

At the beginning of this commentary I boldly announced that it would end by such conclusions as the therein attempted comparisons between the tried old and the untried new would

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seem to justify. Now that I have reached the end of my presentation, I am somewhat appalled at the rashness of my opening promise. Conclusions can take the form either of hopes and fears or of predictions. For a variety of reasons, I prefer the former to the latter.

First, no one, and least of all those whom their professional calling especially dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, should ever indulge in dogmatic forecasts about the unknown and essentially unknowable future. I am further deterred therefrom by my close association with the past, which I should be equally loath to disavow against my convictions or to extol at the expense of those of others. And, finally, would it not be intolerably presumptuous if an old Swiss professor, surreptitiously and indiscreetly emerging from his neutral Alpine den in the heart of war-stricken Europe, were to take upon himself the task of attempting to enlighten American readers on the future of an institution which is so much more theirs than his?

These reasons, however, if they actually forbid me to prophesy what will be, should not and do not prevent me from confiding to you my hopes and fears as to what may be.

I sincerely hope, first, that the difficulties of the present political situation and, in particular, the misunderstandings and mutual suspicions arising out of the fundamental divergencies of historical antecedents and general outlook which oppose the two major Powers of today may not prove an obstacle to the realization of the ambitious plans outlined at San Francisco.

I no less ardently hope that in their future application the principles of Trusteeship under the Charter will not be stultified or distorted by any considerations alien to this main object: the betterment of the lot of undeveloped peoples all over the globe. Our advanced and so-called civilized nations have been led to inflict such untold misery upon each other in the course of our generation, that it would at least be some consolation if they could agree on methods for the salvation of others than themselves. When parents quarrel, their children are seldom happy. May the parents of our war-weary world succeed in making up their disputes or, should they fail, may their children at least be spared the consequences of their dissensions.

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I anxiously hope, moreover, that the confidence in each other's nations which the framers of the Trusteeship System displayed in providing for its possible extension to all backward areas and for the joint and collective stewardship of several of them may be justified by the course of future events. But should their expectations in this double respect meet with disappointment, I hope they will not therefore lose courage and, having failed to rise above the standards set them by their predecessors, allow themselves to fall below these standards.

The same earnest hope I would express, in conclusion, with respect to the element of compulsion and coercion which the Charter adds to, or even tends to substitute for, the methods of persuasion and emulation on which the Covenant exclusively relied to secure the control by the international community over the national administering authorities.

There is no doubt that without the possibilities of effective compulsion there can be no true government, nor is there any doubt that to establish true international government would be a distinct step forward from the present most unsatisfactory stage of international relations, based solely on the voluntary coöperation of fully sovereign national states. However, it should not be forgotten that if compulsion is more effective than persuasion as a method of securing coördinated action between nations as between men and women, it may far more readily provoke revolt; and if international coöperation, secured by ultimate compulsion, is superior to that based only on spontaneous coöperation, the latter certainly is far better than no coöperation at all. Now, to supplement persuasion by coercion may, if successful, be to coerce effectively. But if unsuccessful, it may be no less effectively to dissuade. There lies a real danger for schemes of international coöperation that prematurely rely for their smooth operation on methods and procedures of compulsion. Such reliance will prove premature as long as many states refuse, and as long as any powerful state refuses, to submit to such procedures. And it may well prove destructive of international confidence and concord if such procedures, unwelcome to the strong, are imposed only on the weak.

May the day soon dawn when true international government

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will triumph over international anarchy, when the principles of compulsion accepted by all will provoke the revolt of none, and when it will therefore be far easier and much less necessary to apply them than has been the case in the world as we have known it. No efforts tending toward the establishment of a well-ordered universe should be spared and none should be discouraged. No universe can be deemed well ordered unless it be built upon the only solid foundation of true law, that is, of of a system of generally respected and enforceable norms.

Pending the advent of such a régime—the only régime both worthy of, and safe in, our atomic age—may everything be done to enhance and develop, and nothing to impair, the mutual confidence and the voluntary coöperation between states. It was that confidence, and that coöperation, which alone made possible the limited but still real success of the Mandates experiment. May they not fail those whose merit it has been to conceive, and whose task it will be to carry out, the much more ambitious scheme of the International Trusteeship!

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LITERATURE OF THE LABOR CRISIS

CRISES of one sort or another are usually featured by an abundance of literature on the causes and cures. The present labor crisis is no exception, to judge by the number of pamphlets, books and articles which have been recently published. The six books reviewed here are among the more important contributions.[1]

Mr. Teller's Labor Court

Mr. Ludwig Teller, a prominent labor attorney and the author of a standard treatise on labor law, believes that important difficulties in national labor policy stem in large part from faulty, cross-purpose legislation, based on numerous statutes, administered in a variety of ways.

> As a consequence, for example, labor's right to form and join unions is protected in the Wagner Act by a vital and efficient administrative law, while management is obliged to seek remedies for labor's alleged misdeeds in statutes like the Sherman Law, which have been restricted if not in some cases repealed by the Courts, or which in any event have only a limited purpose as distinguished from one of formulating labor policy. Race discrimination is vindicated by one agency, anti-union discrimination by

[1] *A Labor Policy for America: A National Labor Code,* by Ludwig Teller. With a Foreword by Wayne Morse. New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., 1945. xx, 334 pp. $3.75.

National Collective Bargaining Policy by Bryce M. Stewart, Walter J. Couper and associates. New York, Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., 1945. Industrial Relations Monograph No. 9. 103 pp. $1.25.

Trends in Collective Bargaining: A Summary of Recent Experience, by S. T. Williamson and Herbert Harris, with *Report and Recommendations by the Labor Committee.* New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1945. ix, 254 pp. $2.00.

Labor Policy of the Federal Government, by Harold W. Metz. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1945. ix, 284 pp. $2.50.

Understanding Labor, by Bernard H. Fitzpatrick. New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1945. xiv, 179 pp. $2.00.

Labor, Today and Tomorrow, by Aaron Levenstein. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1945. xi, 255, xiv pp. $2.75.

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another. The practice of strike-breaking is dealt with by the Byrnes Act, a criminal law seldom used, and independently by the Wagner Act in the context of unfair labor practice cases (p. 16).

This lack of integration, according to Mr. Teller, "extends as well to legislation dealing with wages, hours, child labor and kindred employment conditions and standards." Moreover, these various statutes differ in scope so that "a course of conduct, concededly censurable, is held in connection with one of its aspects to be within the sweep of one law, but outside the scope of another because of niceties of definition" (p. 18).

Deploring "the present tendency to adopt dogmatic yes-no answers and rules" and "the lack of a labor relations point of view", Mr. Teller turns to "the preferable alternative. . .to provide an affirmative governmental policy which seeks to reconcile the larger conflicting interests in labor controversies, leaving the labor contract and legitimate concerted labor activity to a regime of free collective bargaining" (pp. 18-19). This preferable alternative is a comprehensive labor code which, he believes, would avoid the errors of present legislation.

Underlying the code are ten major premises. They include the encouragement of strong unions and collective bargaining; the protection of management's right to manage and of labor's right to strike; free collective bargaining assisted by private and governmental mediation and voluntary arbitration services; the recognition of the public interest in collective bargaining and of the social undesirability of race discrimination by employers or unions.

The code would abolish all labor and allied legislation and replace it with one comprehensive law administered by one labor court. The code would include present wage, hour, and labor-standard legislation. It would also include the unfair labor practices now found in the Wagner Act, but would provide for prohibitions on such practices as mass and private residence picketing; sit-down, "malicious" slowdown, and most jurisdictional strikes; interference with the introduction of mechanical devices (except in furthering reasonable severance pay plans to mitigate technological unemployment or to secure adjust-

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ment in piecework or incentive plans); and the closed (but not the union) shop. In addition to acting as bargaining agent, a union would have to be certified by the labor court, and, as a prerequisite of certification, it would have to adopt democratic election, administration and admission practices. Race discrimination by either employers or unions would be made an unfair labor practice.

The labor court would have five members, and would be divided into five divisions: labor standards, labor relations, hearing, review and enforcement. Each division would have wide authority, the court itself acting as a last administrative appeal body. Mr. Teller gives considerable space to problems of administration inherent in his program and makes specific recommendations for changes in present practices.

Mr. Teller's careful, concise analysis of present labor legislation is difficult to disagree with, and is worthy of the most thoughtful attention. Likewise his proposed remedies are the product of a thorough student and should be widely read. There are several questions, however, which are raised by the proposed remedies. For example, it may be seriously doubted whether any five-man court, however much its duties are delegated, would be able to administer both collective bargaining and labor-standard legislation. The court's backlog might soon be as great as was that of the National War Labor Board in 1943; for, as the experience of the WLB demonstrated, disputants and litigants will not be satisfied with decisions of subsidiary agencies so long as appeal to the main body is feasible.

It is also questionable whether a complete break with the past would be salutary. Such a complete reorganization as Mr. Teller's proposals entail might mean five years of litigation to redetermine issues now reasonably settled. The resultant uncertainty during this period could become an invitation to labor unrest.

Such specific proposals as the regulation of interferences with technological innovation and of jurisdictional disputes, and the ban on the closed but not the union shop, may be open to objection, but Mr. Teller is to be congratulated for courageously and intelligently grappling with problems which require a

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middle-of-the-road approach like his, and which cannot long be ignored. His book is definitely a contribution.

The Industrial Relations Counselors' Contribution

The Industrial Relations Counselors' little book has much in common with that of Mr. Teller. It finds serious discrepancies in national collective bargaining policy, and it doubts that a return to sound industrial relations is possible unless present legislation is amended so that rights are extended only in return for explicit responsibilities. Written by Dr. Bryce M. Stewart, Dr. Walter J. Couper and associates, it reflects long experience and sober thinking.

Unlike Mr. Teller, the Industrial Relations Counselors are concerned only with collective bargaining legislation and do not contemplate a sharp break with the past. On the basis of principles similar to those of Mr. Teller, they make specific recommendations for amending the Wagner and Railway Labor acts which would place prohibitions on unions as well as on employers. Many of the proposals resemble Mr. Teller's, such as the outlawing of cross picketing and sit-down strikes, the control of jurisdictional disputes, the requirement that unions conform to certain democratic practices as a condition of certification, and the preservation of management's right to manage.

A novel proposal would differentiate between " required bargaining " (i. e., questions which management must discuss with unions or violate the Wagner Act) and " permissible bargaining " (i. e., questions which management may or may not discuss with unions, but which would carry no " refusal to bargain" penalty should management refuse to discuss them). Included in the latter would be questions of union security, non-contributory employee benefit plans, and other matters not specifically within the meaning of " rates of pay, wages, hours and other conditions of employment ", which the National Labor Relations Board would be required to define after public hearings.

The practical application of this proposal raises many questions. There is, to be sure, much to be desired under the present rules when management does not know the limits (if any) of

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its rights to refuse to discuss matters only remotely related to wages and working conditions. On the other hand, conditions and practices vary so tremendously from one industry to another that it is perhaps impossible to lay down hard and fast rules concerning the proper extent of required collective bargaining. To eliminate union security and non-contributory employee benefit programs from the sphere of required bargaining would doubtless not lessen the heat in disputes over them. Nevertheless this suggestion is worth careful consideration as dealing with the critical problem of the extent of collective bargaining and union participation in management which is desirable from a social point of view.

Another interesting proposal of the Industrial Relations Counselors concerns the Railway Labor Act. Recognizing that law as defective in many aspects and as not having worked nearly so well in its own field as is popularly supposed, they nevertheless would amend it only in minor detail and would expand its coverage to public utility industries which demonstrate a lack of ability to avert strikes disastrous to the public by self-devised methods. Apparently this paradox is to be explained by the belief that the procedures of the Railway Labor Act, defective though they may be, are superior to compulsory arbitration and thus provide a practical means of averting more drastic action. There is considerable support for this belief, but, if the Railway Labor Act is as overrated as this reviewer believes,[2] it may well not maintain peace in other industries but, by failing, hasten the day when drastic methods of compulsion are adopted.

Above all, the Industrial Relations Counselors desire a return to as much free collective bargaining as possible. To accomplish this they would equalize the Wagner Act's restrictions on management with restrictions on labor. The belief is apparently that with rights and responsibilities clearly set forth, and with both sides thus subject to governmental regulation for unfair practices, labor and management will prefer to avoid the danger of bringing the government into the picture lest the seeker

[2] See Herbert R. Northrup, "The Railway Labor Act and Railway Labor Disputes in Wartime", *American Economic Review*, June 1946.

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of government aid open itself to charges. Something akin to this has allegedly worked out in Canada, where a wartime order amounting to an "equalized Wagner" law has been in effect since 1944. Whether similar results would obtain in the United States, or whether more governmental regulation, however equalized, will mean more governmental interference and less free collective bargaining cannot be predicted with certainty.

A short review cannot do justice to this succinct, thought-provoking book. It is recommended more strongly than any of the others reviewed here. No intelligent discussion of national labor policy can ignore it, nor can any of its recommendations be lightly dismissed.

The Twentieth Century Fund Study

The Twentieth Century Fund book is really two works: a summary of recent trends by two labor journalists, and a group of recommendations by a tripartite committee. The summary discusses questions of bargaining agencies, union recognition, wages, hours, job security, work rules and technological change, the administration of agreements, union-management coöperation, the impact of war, the rights of government employees, and the human side of collective bargaining. As a whole, problems are fairly analyzed, well written, and should be especially valuable to the lay reader who is interested in a general picture of these problems.

The conclusions of the summary are optimistic. For example, after looking at the "Impact of War", the authors declare:

> The war has enabled unionism to draw on collective bargaining to cover in a single stride many intermediate steps in its evolution from hired help to something akin to partnership in United States industry. Certainly unionism as a genus has more to say now in the conduct of a business than at any time preceding Pearl Harbor. A process that ordinarily might have taken decades has been compressed into four short years. That much of it has been synthetic—a forced rather than an organic growth—can hardly be denied. Much of it bears all the earmarks of precocity. Yet this whole development, even if a wartime adolescent, is more likely to grow up into adulthood in peace than to regress toward individualism (pp. 186-87).

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Then noting that the whole course of unionism has been aimed at " whittling away. . .management prerogative " and has been resisted as such, the authors state: " Yet business has survived, and even flourished, after these once sensational reforms had lost their novelty and become a habit " (p. 187).

Whether labor and management are moving toward "adulthood in peace " only time will tell. But the report and recommendations of the Twentieth Century Fund Labor Committee temper the optimism exuded in the previous section of the book. Indeed, the recommendations of the Labor Committee appear to have little relation to the " summary of recent experience ". These recommendations include the establishment of administrative courts where individual union members can appeal undemocratic decisions of union leaders, the extension of industry-wide collective bargaining, and the promotion of local mediation services of a tripartite character. Other recommendations are general and demonstrate the Committee's concern with the disregard of the public interest which is sometimes shown by labor, management and government officials.

For the most part, however, controversial issues are avoided, or, if discussed, feature dissents from various members of the tripartite committee. Despite the optimism of its summary authors, the Twentieth Century Fund had no better success in achieving unity of action and purpose among the leaders of labor and industry than did President Truman's ill-fated labor-management conference.

Dr. Metz on the Federal Government's Labor Policy

The Labor Policy of the Federal Government endeavors to cover broad territory in less than 300 pages, considering the following topics as indicated by the chapter heads: the development of national labor policy, the government and concerted action of employees, collective bargaining and the collective agreement, the government's policy toward union organization, government and the labor market, union preference, wages, hours, child labor and safety, labor adjustment machinery in war and peace.

To perform this difficult task, the Brookings Institution chose Dr. Harold W. Metz, a political scientist, who prior to 1936

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did research on problems such as federal grants-in-aid to states, public works, etc., for the New York State Planning Board and the National Resources Planning Board. Between 1936 and 1942, he was a member of the Research Division of the Republican National Committee. Since 1936, he has been a member of the Brookings staff.

The result of attempting so broad a study in so short a space is not very satisfactory. The book is little more than a selected compendium of decisions and policies which for the most part are already available in other publications. Dr. Metz endeavors to justify his method by repeated declarations that he is not passing judgment on federal policy, but is merely attempting to demonstrate what that policy is.[3] Yet by a careful selection of cases, by emphasis on certain phases of federal policy, and by reliance on controversial sources, Dr. Metz does in fact pass judgment on every aspect of federal labor policy which he considers. In consequence his book has relatively little value for the student of labor relations and is misleading to the uninitiated.

For example, in his discussion of the National Labor Relations Board, Dr. Metz repeatedly stresses that the NLRB favors bargaining units as large as possible, and that the "Globe" doctrine is a means to that end (pp. 92-100). Actually, of course, the "Globe" doctrine permits small craft unions to carve units out of larger units, and thus favors small units.[4] Moreover, the NLRB has been much more solicitous of smaller bargaining units than has the National (Railway) Mediation Board (concerning which Dr. Metz makes no similar charge), despite the fact that the Railway Labor Act, unlike the Wagner Act, confines bargaining units to a "craft or class".[5]

[3] On numerous occasions throughout the book, Dr. Metz passes judgment on federal labor policy without equivocation. One of his more amusing conclusions concerns the National Railroad Adjustment Board. After finding little good about this agency in a three-page discussion, Dr. Metz concludes (p. 246): "It appears that the Board has performed its function in a reasonably satisfactory manner"!

[4] Contrast Dr. Metz's conclusion on this point with that of the Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., *op. cit.*, p. 26: "On the whole, the policy of the National Labor Relations Board is considerate of the wishes of groups with a substantial community of interest."

[5] See Herbert R. Northrup, "The Appropriate Bargaining Unit Question under the Railway Labor Act", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LX (February 1946), 250-69.

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Throughout his discussion of the NLRB, Dr. Metz relies heavily upon the findings of the Special House of Representatives Committee, which was headed by Representative Howard W. Smith. This Committee uncovered valuable data about the NLRB and pointed out numerous questionable policies of the Board, many of which have since been rectified. Unfortunately, few Congressional committees have been more biased in their treatment of their subject.[6] As a result, impartial students do not accept the Committee's findings without qualification and without regard to changes in NLRB policies since the 1938-40 period on which the Committee based its findings.

Dr. Metz accepts Representative Smith's tortuous reasoning to the effect that the War Labor Disputes Act outlawed maintenance of membership awards by the War Labor Board (p. 156). No other authority can be found in support of this argument, which the WLB rejected. With great care (and rightly), Dr. Metz points out that the WLB often gave increases by one subterfuge or another beyond the limits prescribed by the "Little Steel" formula (p. 193). He might also have noted the less common, but important "Lever Brothers" formula, which prohibited wage increases up to the limits of the "Little Steel" formula under certain conditions.

On page 262, he states: "The general policy of the Board [WLB] of granting a wage increase retroactively to the employees' request indicates that the Board assumes that any delay in the bargaining process was due exclusively to the employer." The WLB's policy was in fact quite different and had no such implication.[7] It usually ordered retroactivity for first contracts on the date that the case was certified to it, for other cases, on

[6] Mr. Ludwig Teller has this to say about the various bills and the War Labor Disputes Act which Mr. Smith sponsored: "Singly or taken together, the various bills and the War Labor Disputes Act itself reveal serious miscalculations of attitude: hostility to organized labor, lack of understanding of labor problems, oversimplification of the causes of industrial unrest, lack of appreciation of the complications incident to the administrative process. . . .Their contribution to desirable labor policy is measurable in a negative sense only: they show how labor legislation should not be drawn. . . ." *Op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

[7] For an exhaustive study of this topic, see Emanuel L. Gordon, "Retroactivity of National War Labor Board Awards", *Columbia Law Review*, XLV (November 1945), 889-926.

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the date of the expiration of the previous contract. While this policy did at times favor the unions, it was evolved out of the need of (1) making up for the inevitable procedural delays involved in the WLB setup, and (2) of taking this hotly debated question out of controversy for the good of the war effort. As a compromise measure, it served its purpose and is not open to the type of carping in which Dr. Metz engages.

With so much that is open to adverse criticism in the federal government's labor policy, it is unfortunate that this book does not contain a more careful analysis or a more scholarly treatment of its subject.

Mr. Fitzpatrick's "Introverts" and "Extroverts"

Mr. Bernard Fitzpatrick, an attorney and the Industrial Relations Director of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc., has endeavored to explain union policies, in a book entitled *Understanding Labor*, on the basis of union types which are in turn explained by the industrial environment in which the union operates. He differentiates "casual" labor, where employment is intermittent, from "tenure" labor, where it is steady. In the former, he finds the "monopoly" craft union, for which the closed shop is an essential of union survival.

Another type of "monopoly" union, according to Mr. Fitzpatrick, is the "extrovert industrial union". It organizes on an industry-wide basis and participates in industry-wide collective bargaining, and wages and price fixing. Such unions are found in highly competitive industries and need the closed shop. Mr. Fitzpatrick believes that their logical outcome is "the corporate state", where all wages and prices are fixed, a development to which he believes the NRA would have driven the entire economy.

Finally, Mr. Fitzpatrick distinguishes the "introvert industrial union", a form which he believes was made possible by the Railway Labor and Wagner acts. It is the one plant union which, although usually affiliated with a national organization, bargains in terms of local conditions. Since an organization of this type is based on the free elective choice of the workers involved, it

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is incompatible with monopoly unions which entail complete control of the labor force by one organization. This fact Mr. Fitzpatrick quite correctly holds to be responsible for the American Federation of Labor's animosity toward the Wagner Act, and for many jurisdictional strikes.

Besides an explanation of these union forms, the book also discusses their relation to the Railway Labor Act, the Wagner Act, and other regulatory devices. An appendix contains a tabular analysis of unions and industries which appears to encompass a task greater in scope than Mr. Fitzpatrick realized. Persons with special knowledge of various industries and unions will find many of them classified in a manner which does not bear careful scrutiny. The appendix might better have been left out and an index substituted.

Mr. Fitzpatrick's book impresses one with (a) his original and keenly analytic thinking; (b) his apparent unawareness of the literature in the field of labor relations; and (c) the manner in which he abandons his carefully devised explanatory system in order to praise the Railway Labor Act, and does so without examining either the contents of the act or the experience under it, except in the most cursory manner.

In explaining union policy on the basis of the market environment in which the union operates, Mr. Fitzpatrick is on sound ground and reveals excellent insight. If, however, he had been familiar with the works of Sumner H. Slichter, C. Lawrence Christianson, Gladys Palmer and Royal Montgomery, to name only a very few, he would not have felt compelled to develop his elaborate, novel terminology, which, coupled with his abrupt style, is likely to confuse rather than to enlighten business men, the readers to whom the book is directed.

Mr. Fitzpatrick's discussion of the Railway Labor Act all but vitiates the good in the chapters which precede and follow it. He finds that the act is a model law, but not as most of its proponents believe, because of its elaborate mediation machinery. Rather he attributes its success to the closed-shop prohibition in the act. The practical results of this act, he declares, are (1) a reduction in strikes; (2) "improvement in the moral tone" of the railway unions; (3) "substitution of a business-

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like approach to the personnel problems of the roads for the intemperate emotional approach" of unions in other fields; and (4) an upswing in union membership far greater than that which has occurred in other industries as a result of the passage of the Wagner Act (pp. 66-67).

This reasoning is difficult to follow. In the first place, the closed shop was not outlawed by the 1926 Railway Labor Act, as Mr. Fitzpatrick apparently believes, but by the 1934 amendments to that law. It is correct that it was outlawed "simply because the framers recognized that union security was an invasion of the right which they were bent upon giving to employees —the right freely to select their representatives" (pp. 73-74). But the framers were the standard railway unions, and they were willing to outlaw the closed shop because (a) the non-operating unions felt it was necessary if the company unions were to be dislodged from the industry; and (b) the operating unions never have utilized the closed shop because it is not practical where firemen and engineers, conductors and trainmen are organized on a craft basis, but are constantly moving back and forth over union jurisdictional lines. In short, the closed shop has been an anti-union device, not a union device in the railway industry. This is true because of the peculiar industrial environment—a conclusion which Mr. Fitzpatrick would have reached if he had not deserted his thesis. Moveover, if he had examined the situation more closely he would have found that the National (Railway) Mediation Board defines bargaining units to fit the jurisdictional claims of the standard railway unions, thus creating a situation somewhat analogous to a closed shop.[8]

The practical results which Mr. Fitzpatrick states are inherent in the Railway Labor Act do not bear careful scrutiny. Strikes have been infrequent, to be sure, but this appears to be the result of union political power and ability to get what is desired, rather than any procedures or the absence of the closed shop.[9] Moreover, the railways feature industry-wide bargaining, wage

[8] See the reference cited in note 5, *supra*.

[9] For a discussion of this issue, see the article referred to in note 2, *supra*.

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and price fixing by government tribunals, both vestiges of the "corporate state" which Mr. Fitzpatrick abhors elsewhere.

Just what Mr. Fitzpatrick means by the "improvement of the moral tone" of the railway unions is never explained. It would seem that their policies in regard to Negroes do, however, come within the scope of morals as well as of economics. Mr. Fitzpatrick is apparently unaware that nearly all standard railway unions habitually discriminate against Negroes; that certain of them have for more than fifty years been attempting, with considerable success of late, to drive Negro workers out of long-held jobs; and that this discrimination has been materially aided by both the National Mediation Board and the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the agencies which administer the Railway Labor Act.

It is also difficult to understand what is meant by a "businesslike" rather than an "emotional" approach to personnel problems on the part of the railway unions. Emotional or not, the railway unions have demonstrated no great concern for the economic consequences of their demands on the industry.

Finally, it is not correct that the upswing in union membership (if that be an unmitigated blessing) has been greater proportionately on the railroads as a result of the Railway Labor Act than it has in industries affected by the Wagner Act. The railroad industry was highly organized during World War I, and, although many of these gains were lost as a result of the nationwide shopmen's strike in 1922, the railway industry was among the highest in degree of organization prior to the passage of the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act. Under the Wagner Act, previously unorganized industries have been completely organized. If some industries subject to the Wagner Act are less organized than are the railroads, the reasons are likely to be found in the more strategic position of the railway workers and not in differences between the two laws.

In sum, Mr. Fitzpatrick's explanations of labor problems demonstrate the advantages of an analytic approach and a carefully worked out thesis, and the disadvantages of deserting both to discuss a law and an industry without familiarizing oneself with the details of either.

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Mr. Levenstein's Popular Report

Aaron Levenstein, an attorney and member of the staff of the Research Institute of America, has written a popular, breezy book which discusses labor relations, the rôle of the government and the outlook for the future, with the Montgomery Ward-War Labor Board struggle as the point of departure for almost every topic. Although this tends to stress the unusual, it does dramatize the issue for the popular reader. The book is on the whole factual and should be enlightening to the lay public for which it was written. The discussion of such issues as government supervision of collective bargaining, union security, managerial rights, jurisdictional rights, the rôle of the Communists and that of the late President Roosevelt are all well done, although nothing especially new is said. Employers will be somewhat startled to find that Mr. Levenstein believes one of the outstanding developments has been increased government control of unions.

Mr. Levenstein is especially to be complimented on his section dealing with the future. Avoiding uncalled-for optimism, he points out that unions are heading for disaster if they persist in a jurisdictional war, which John L. Lewis' District 50 is spearheading, and which the American Federation of Labor has apparently endorsed. His chapter on the veteran-union split is very good, especially the discussion of the contributions to that unhealthy split which General Hershey and the Selective Service Administration have made by the "super-seniority" doctrine. By reiterating the all-too-little-understood fact that the Selective Service Administration had no statutory authority to interpret veterans' rehiring rights, and that by so doing it committed a bald usurpation of authority which had no standing in law, and which the Supreme Court has now formally rejected, Mr. Levenstein has committed a public service.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress. By HAROLD M. GROVES. New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1946.—xiv, 432 pp. $4.50.

This book is tenth in the series of Research Studies financed by the Committee for Economic Development (CED), and the second in that series to be written by Professor Groves. Like the other books in the series, it is part of the CED's effort to define what is the best national policy to encourage production and employment.

Full employment, or, in this book, "adequate employment opportunity", is given its accustomed priority; but Professor Groves is mainly concerned with long-run problems which may still persist after full employment is won. The employment objective is immediately generalized as production, not employment as such; and not the volume of production only, but its character and distribution. In other words, the over-all goal of the tax system is, as the layman might expect, to increase the community's economic welfare. Welfare for the community, like happiness for the individual, is best achieved by indirection. For Professor Groves's purposes, the attributes of welfare are two: equity and incentive; and these are the specific goals at which tax policy should aim in order to reach the greater goal of economic welfare.

In this book, equity is sometimes used in a broad sense to mean that taxes should reduce wide inequalities in wealth and income. This may also be defined as "fairness" in taxation, or taxation in accordance with "ability to pay". But once the end of greater equality is accepted, a rational tax system will be one which promotes that end and not some other.

Equity is also used in this book in a narrow sense to mean that taxpayers in the same circumstances should be treated alike. In other words, it is just as inequitable, in this sense, to tax two incomes of $100,000 at different rates, as it is to tax two incomes of $5,000 at different rates; and rich and poor alike may benefit from an equitable tax system.

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The incentive principle is essentially indifferent to equity considerations, except as these may themselves affect incentive. Thus a redistribution of income may increase incentive if it swells the consumption expenditure of the poor faster than it shrinks the investment expenditure of the rich. But, if the latter effect is greater, the incentive principle must conflict with the principle of equity. Similarly, the exemption of new investment expenditure from taxes over a period (which Professor Groves recommends) may result in an inequitable allocation of the tax burden among persons in the same income group. Again the equity principle may be compromised.

Finally, the equity and incentive principles may conflict with a third principle, "adequacy of revenue". Professor Groves's concept of what is "adequate revenue" clearly leaves room for a "cyclical budget" with deficits in depressions, and surpluses (for debt retirement) in periods of prosperity. What is "adequate revenue" year by year may depend upon short-run fiscal considerations; that is, in depression it might run considerably below current budget expenditures, in prosperity, considerably above them. Over a period, however, Professor Groves woud argue that revenue must equal government expenditures; and, since expenditures in the post-war period will remain at a high level, "adequate revenue" on the average will also be high. And this, Professor Groves believes, makes it especially important that equity and incentive be increased simultaneously if possible, or, where they conflict, that the necessary compromise be skillfully made.

According to Professor Groves, there is an area of essential harmony between equity and incentive. In this area are those tax reforms which insure that taxpayers in the same income group shall be treated alike. In this connection, Professor Groves would reduce the miscellaneous group of indirect taxes, substituting direct taxes on personal income and inheritance. All levies on consumption (sales taxes, excises and tariffs), as well as property, franchise and capital-stock taxes, are properly suspect. Indeed, the whole work of clarification and compromise, which Professor Groves has attempted, leads in pure logic to a "single tax"; not, it is true, to a single tax proposed by Henry George, but to an integrated personal tax on economic gain, including income as defined by statute, capital gains, inheritance, and gifts in contemplation of death. Unfortunately for logic, but not perhaps for practical purposes, Professor Groves would retain some indirect taxes: notably (at the federal level) on liquor and tobacco, and (at the state level) on tangible property and gasoline.

Once indirect taxes are removed, or reduced to a minimum, direct taxes can be used to achieve the maximum of equity and incentive; but

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direct taxes today fall far short of this goal. Professor Groves considers in detail the aberrations from right principle which would still persist if every indirect tax were abolished. The best known of these is perhaps the "double taxation of dividend income". His solution is to combine a credit for corporate taxes paid "at the source" with the taxation of capital gains at the full personal tax rate. The timing of the payment on profits undistributed by the corporation may be arranged to the taxpayer's advantage, but indefinite postponement would be prevented by a further provision making it mandatory to "realize" all capital gains at death. Another method, which Professor Groves would apply to certain corporations (as part of an incentive plan allowing tax-free reinvestment to all new small business), would be to abolish the corporate tax and apply the capital gains provisions as before. The theoretically perfect method would be to tax all capital gains due to undistributed profits in the year they accrue; that is, corporations would be taxed as partnerships, and if there were a separate corporation tax, this would be credited against dividends as before. Professor Groves would approve a limited application of this plan, to closely held corporations and personal holding companies, but he considers it too complicated for use where corporate stock is widely held.

Other inequitable tax advantages and disadvantages of the integrated corporate and personal income tax would be removed or decreased by more lenient provisions regarding depreciation, including the allowance of accelerated depreciation as an added incentive for new enterprises, together with stricter rules regarding depletion allowances, especially the excessively large percentage depletion now granted against income from oil and mining properties. Carry-over of losses would be extended (to at least six years), but for the lower brackets of personal income the concession would be limited to a carry-over of unused credits for losses and personal exemptions. Tax exemption now allowed to certain federal, state and local securities would be abolished. The homeowner's advantage over the tenant due to untaxed "imputed rent" would be reduced, at least to the extent of disallowing mortgage interest and real estate taxes as deductions from taxable income. Either compulsory joint returns or a simple division of income between husband and wife is favored over the present system, although neither is a perfectly equitable remedy; and favors to families in community-property states would be removed, provided the courts did not object. Finally, gifts would be taxed at the full rate for transfers at death, revocable trusts would be further inhibited, estate tax exemp-

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tions would be lowered, and rates would be affected by the time between successive transfers, in order to avoid an arbitrary penalty upon certain estates.

The general substitution of direct for indirect taxes, the removal of double taxation and other inequities, the more rigorous treatment of capital gains, and the closing of loopholes in the personal tax will, it is argued, not only restore equity in the narrow sense, but maintain a rational system of progression to reduce inequality, and create new production incentives even in the absence of special "incentive taxation". Similarly, it is argued that, with loopholes plugged, the present rates on estates and inheritances would be more equitable to heirs as a group, and more effective in preventing gross inequality in income and wealth.

In short-run fiscal policy, Professor Groves leans toward stable tax rates which balance the budget during good years, provide an automatic surplus for debt retirement in the best years, and an automatic deficit during the worst years. Stable rates would be counter-cycle because, with a progressive rate structure, tax revenue falls faster than incomes during depression, and rises faster than incomes during a boom, thereby tending to check deflation and inflation alike.

The reviewer would make some reservations where Professor Groves (reluctantly) compromises equity in order to further administrative convenience or economic incentive, especially in the treatment of corporate saving. But the general principles which shape Professor Groves's tax program and the general policy which emerges are in the liberal tradition of long-run tax reform; as such they deserve the serious attention of legislators. The chapter on fiscal policy is a less complete, though worthy, guide to short-run policy decisions; but, in the opinion of this reviewer, more rigorous short-term measures are needed to avoid instability, greatly extended government spending, or (a not unlikely possibility) both together.

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Beyond Supply and Demand: A Reappraisal of Institutional Economics. By JOHN S. GAMBS. New York, Columbia University Press, 1946.—105 pp. $1.60.

Readers of this little book are likely to find it a bit puzzling. Out of the many more or less empirical efforts of reform which recent years have seen, there has indeed come "a deeply-felt need . . . for a reappraisal of economic assumptions." But why this sense of need

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should have directed the author's thoughts toward Veblen is not clear. He seems to think that Veblen's position is somehow alternative to that of Keynes, or at all events that it "provides a background against which we can better assess the doctrines" of Keynesian economics. But the analysis of Veblen's "general principles", "psychology", and "methodology", which forms the substance of the book, reveals no clear or coherent set of principles and no definite position.

In one sense this seems to the reviewer quite inexcusable. Veblen was a technological determinist. He rejected price theory in toto because price theory assumes the primacy of fund accumulation in the process of economic development and ignores the "arts and crafts" which Veblen identified with the "life process" of mankind. Dr. Gambs is of course aware of Veblen's interest in technology and of his rejection of price theory. But in his verbally systematic catalogue of Veblen's "principles" he manages to separate the technology from the determinism, and the rejection of price theory from both, and to put these matters in unrelated subordinate positions in the classification so as to produce the impression that Veblen himself hardly knew what he was driving at, and his successors not at all.

There is another sense in which Dr. Gambs's impercipience is more or less justified. It is at least very widely shared. He is right in pointing out that there is no general agreement among those who honor Veblen as to just what his position was. Certainly there is no common body of principles on which any considerable group of "followers" agrees. It is the reviewer's opinion that everyone who acknowledges Veblen's influence at all therefore bears some relationship to the central point of Veblen's own position, and consequently that all such "followers" can be shown to be related to each other in different but nonetheless significant ways. In overlooking this possibility Dr. Gambs only reproduces the common impression.

That he should share that impression is understandable. The only puzzle is why he should write a book about it. In his conclusion the author offers two suggestions: that somebody should make Veblen understandable, and that somebody should write "a comprehensive treatise on money." These are excellent suggestions. But in contemplating them we ought to understand that what makes Veblen unintelligible is not the obscurity of his ideas but the resistance they arouse. Veblen did regard money as "a weapon of coercion", as Dr. Gambs says. But more important than that was his denial that it is the sufficient cause of economic development, or even an efficient cause. This arrays the whole of our money-makes-the-mare-go civilization against him. Dr. Gambs sees dimly that Veblen's thinking

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challenged the "values" of capitalism, and he therefore sees Veblen adrift on an ocean of value-agnosticism. But the record seems to show clearly that from the very first Veblen held undeviatingly to the "instrumental" (or technological) conception of value of which, in the field of general value theory, John Dewey has been the principal expositor. This means that Veblen was an "anti-Christ" to the same degree and for the same reasons that Dewey is supposed to be, and is therefore subject to the same determined misunderstanding and obfuscation.

These misunderstandings have got to be resolved, and the studies Dr. Gambs recommends would help. But this resolution will come, and Veblen will come into his own, as will Dewey also, only with the general resolution of the institutional and ideological confusion in which Western civilization itself now wallows.

C. E. AYRES

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Industrial Relations and the Social Order. By WILBERT E. MOORE. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946.—xii, 555 pp. $4.00.

The subject of industrial relations has assumed such vital proportions during the past decade that its various aspects have been repeatedly scrutinized by economists and other social scientists. Although the number of learned treatises dealing with the numerous labor problems under modern industrialism multiplied many times during the New Deal period, the appearance of the present study is adequate testimony to the fact that by no means all profitable avenues of approach were exhausted. Professor Moore's frame of reference is that of "applied sociology", and, as he tells us in the Preface, "The view that prompts this work is that the social aspects of modern industrial organization are of the most practical sort."

The chief merits of the volume under consideration lie not so much in the novelty of materials presented as in their manner of arrangement and treatment. A student of industrial sociology, Professor Moore stresses from the very outset of his work what he regards as the two major aspects of the social characteristics of industry: (1) the industrial plant as a complex social organization, and (2) the relationship of industry to society. To establish a proper historical setting for the discussion of his problem, Professor Moore traces sketchily the rise of modern industrialism from the handicraft to the modern factory system, through the several stages of capitalist develop-

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ment. Great emphasis is placed on science, the division of labor and the growth of technology as forces shaping the institutional structure of modern capitalism.

The growth of the modern giant corporation with its concomitant separation of ownership from management and the impersonalization of human relations in industry is presented with great clarity. The resulting labyrinth of industrial relations which is controlled structurally through "line" and "functional" organizations and by the use of technical specialists, middle management supervisors and executives brings into sharp relief all the difficulties implicit in the adequate handling of the human equation in industry today.

The position of labor in modern society is similarly treated in terms of its relation to the industrial organization. Starting with a discussion of the quantitative and qualitative attributes of the labor force, Professor Moore analyzes the waste of labor resources, problems of fatigue and monotony in their relation to productivity, the "instinct of workmanship" and the impact of technological innovations upon the worker. The question of motives guiding the behavior of labor as a social group is analyzed in terms of what Professor Moore regards as the goals that dominate the worker's orientation to his job—security, pleasant working relations, and status in a competitive society. Labor organizations thus become not only a means of achieving economic ends but also a method of expressing labor's aspirations for status and self-expression. The subjects of collective bargaining and industrial conflict with all their tools and tactics are presented in a similar vein. The study is concluded with a discussion of the interdependence of industry and society in a culture of capitalism and under the aegis of an open-class ideology.

Any comprehensive treatise such as the volume under consideration has its weak as well as its strong points. The very scope of the work, and the breadth of view it achieves, make it impossible to explore many topics with adequate and proper emphasis. For instance, in his discussion of the labor force, Professor Moore failed to make use of some of the best materials derived from the 1940 census on social-economic groups. Similarly, the criticism of the "felicific calculus" of classical economists should have been supplemented by the conclusions of more recent economists who recognize the complex nature of human motivation and who have long since proclaimed the end of *homo oeconomicus*. These minor shortcomings must not, however, detract from the excellent general character of the work.

Professor Moore's mastery of industrial sociology and his close

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acquaintance with the related social sciences made it possible for him to write a historico-sociological treatise on industrial relations with appropriate emphasis on economic and psychological factors. Such an integration in the field of industrial relations is a welcome novelty.

MURRAY ROSS

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National Interest and International Cartels. By CHARLES R. WHITTLESEY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946.—ix, 172 pp. $2.50.

After some *Wanderjahren* in the rocky field of finance (compare Aristotle on money), the author of this all too brief study has returned to the green meadows in which he first set his hand to the plow. His hand has not lost the skill it displayed in *Governmental Control of Crude Rubber*. But the task Professor Whittlesey sets for himself in this volume is very different from that he undertook in reviewing the operation of the Stevenson Plan. There he set forth as an explorer, grubbing for all the facts he could lay hold of concerning a virgin country. Here he plays the rôle of an agronomist, as it were, and he plays it expertly.

The author makes no attempt, indeed explicitly disavows any intention, to review the evidence of cartel activities, the concrete achievements and discrete shortcomings of specific control schemes. He has much to say of their strength and weakness, of their potential advantages and disadvantages. But the discussion deals with abstract ideas: tendencies, hypotheses, interpretations, principles. It is an exercise in logic, rather than an exploration of actual experience. The end in view here is policy: the determination of what should be done; not practice: the determination of what is being done.

This does not mean that the author is oblivious to experience. Rather he takes for granted knowledge of, and agreement on, cartel experience. In a broad way, he views it as offering little promise that cartels can contribute much toward the solution of the baffling problem of how to organize industrial control. He finds restrictionism an ingrained and irrepressible behavior pattern of cartelized producers.

A paragraph on page 159 epitomizes the author's viewpoint and indicates the drift of his analysis. "The fundamental objection to cartels is not simply that they represent a departure from free competition—except to those who prize freedom to compete as an end in itself. Rather it is that the effect of such a departure hinders attainment of major objectives of public policy. It is not that cartels may

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favor a particular group, the rich against the poor, large corporations against the small, producers against consumers. It is rather that, in its ultimate tendencies, cartelization is restrictive of much more than just the freedom to compete. By interfering with freedom of access and entry, cartelization at the same time interferes with expansionist influences in the determination of output, capacity, and survival of the fittest producers. It is this inclusive and far-reaching restrictionism which is so thoroughly inimical to the national interest."

Professor Whittlesey occasionally interprets particular details or aspects of cartel experience less critically and in a way less disconcerting to the apologists of self-government in industry than this paragraph might lead one to expect. Indeed, in some instances incomplete analysis or sketchy surveys may give rise to a misleading impression of how cartels actually operate. After recounting the exorbitant price exactions of the tungsten carbide cartel, the author comments, "Extreme examples . . . prove little or nothing" (p. 22). May not the price policy of a tight monopoly furnish some indication of that of a loose (relatively weak) monopoly, within the limitations of its market power?

The author reproduces (pp. 42-43) Standard Oil's version of the development of synthetic toluol, tracing it to the 1927 contract with I. G., but omits any mention of the 1929 "marriage compact" with its far-reaching ramifications and implications. Chapter III on the political and security aspects of cartel activities is the weakest section of the book. The author minimizes the connection between fascism and business concentration (pp. 48-50). He even suggests that if, contrary to his view of the relationship between Nazi totalitarianism and monopolistic trends in German industry, "cartels were certain to be a powerful political instrument, this fact would furnish grounds for . . . giving cartel agreements the encouragement and support of the government, in the hope that in the future they might serve the interests of this country as successfully as German business is said to have served the wishes of the Nazi government."

Again, it is rather inaccurate to state that "aluminum has never been shipped to the American market in significant amounts" (p. 64). In 1910, 1913, 1921 and 1926, when cartel controls were relatively weak, aluminum imports from Europe made up a substantial proportion of domestic consumption.

But these are minor blemishes in a work distinguished by unstrained objectivity, penetrating analysis and circumspect judgment.

MYRON W. WATKINS

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. By Frederick S. Dunn, Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, Percy E. Corbett, William T. R. Fox. Edited by Bernard Brodie. Institute of International Studies, Yale University. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.—214 pp. $2.00.

Has the atomic bomb outmoded the Charter of the United Nations? Are the present arrangements for peaceful settlement and enforcement action adequate? Can international action controlling atomic energy be best achieved within the framework of the United Nations? Should such control be assigned to one of the existing organs or should a new *ad hoc* agency be created? Workable answers to these questions must be found and time is of the essence.

The atomic bomb has upset the timetable. Before its discovery, statesmen assumed that they had another generation in which to underwrite international security; now it is clear that the time margin has shrunk to five years or less. The pressing need is for some immediate means by which the nations of the world can guarantee their mutual survival while they grope toward a long-term solution.

If ever there was a time when clear thinking was the price of survival, it is now. Neither myopic patriotism nor high-minded idealism—regardless of the sincerity of either—will serve the interests of America and the world unless they operate within the realm of hard inescapable fact. *The Absolute Weapon,* edited by Bernard Brodie and published by the Yale Institute of International Studies, is packed with many such facts. It also contains numerous interpretations of those facts and conclusions which may be drawn from them. There will be some who cannot accept these interpretations, but it can be safely asserted that no one can fail to profit—very materially—from a painstaking reading of this book.

Dr. Brodie and his associates are in search of a constructive and practicable policy for the United States now that the atomic bomb has been used. The soundness and acceptability of the policy they advocate will not meet with unanimous approval. Those who believe that world government alone can meet the threat which the atomic bomb has magnified so greatly will find these proposals disappointing, dangerous and defeatist because they seek to operate within the anarchistic world of national sovereignties and all that such " obsolete " concepts imply.

The Yale scholars are not unfriendly to world government. But, inasmuch as they are practical men as well as scholars, they seek the *possible* rather than the *ideal,* because they realize that, for the present

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and the immediate future, escape from chaos depends quite as fully upon *when* a workable formula is attained as upon *what* that formula is. As Professor Fox so cogently observes, "One may think of the present as the age of the Big Two or the Big Three or even the Big Five. It is not yet the age of the Big One, and no international agreement to control the use of the bomb will make it so." (p. 182)

Each of the authors examines the implications of the atomic bomb from his own particular point of emphasis. Each concludes that for the immediate future the principle of retaliation—organized and agreed to in advance so that it is elevated to the dignity of an international sanction—offers greater security against aggressors than any other form of presently attainable action.

In the introductory chapter Professor Dunn asserts that international control of the atomic bomb must be built upon the two principles: voluntary agreement and instantaneous retaliatory action in the event of aggression. In this connection he discusses the possibilities as well as the limitations of the treaty as an instrument of international agreement. Dr. Brodie considers the implications of the bomb for American military policy. What he has to say is informative and sobering. He lays down eight conclusions which seem inescapable. These chapters should become required reading for the military planners.

Professor Wolfers asks what the atomic bomb means in terms of American-Soviet relations, on the assumption that any proposal concerning the bomb must be based upon this factor. In the light of the existing American monopoly, he examines the various possible contingencies ranging from full-scale collaboration to actual war and attempts to indicate the probable outcome of each course of action. To Professor Corbett falls the task of assessing the effect of the new "absolute weapon" upon the United Nations. He analyzes the case for placing control outside the present organization and wisely rejects it because the Security Council would be prejudiced in its broader responsibility for maintaining peace.

In a trenchant closing chapter Professor Fox surveys the panorama of possible collective action, then draws upon the analyses of his colleagues supplemented by his own observations to delineate specific lines of action. He suggests provision for instantaneous and automatic retaliatory action against any nation which commits atomic aggression but urges pressure for limitation upon the level of atomic armament. No state should possess a supply sufficient to "reduce the earth to a smoldering ruin" but there should be adequate distribution throughout

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the world so as to make certain immediate and effective retaliation upon the aggressor.

This book is not a cheerful one because it refuses to be swept along in the contagious enthusiasm for superhuman and supranational solutions which fire the emotions by circumventing or ignoring stubborn facts. But if it is not cheerful, neither is it pessimistic because its authors suggest lines of action which are within the realm of the possible and which give promise of being effective. Those who condemn them as half-measures should not forget that half-measures achieved make possible further half-measures while whole measures lost may not permit a second attempt.

LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Peace, Security & the United Nations. Edited by HANS J. MORGENTHAU. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946.—134 pp. $1.50.

The Norman Wait Harris Institute lectures by Percy E. Corbett, Arthur Robert Burns, Malbone W. Graham, Frederick L. Schuman and Eugene Staley are an excellent sample of the current climate of opinion with its characteristic mixture of a limited "realism" and intellectual fatalism. True to the best tradition of objective scholarship, no words are minced about the weakness of the United Nations. All the authors express skepticism as to the adequacy of arrangements which respect the archaic idea of national sovereignty as thoroughly as the San Francisco Charter. Sometimes—like Staley in his excellent lecture on the economic aspect of the development of world community—there is strong stress on the "need to develop real instruments of government on the world level," but even here "objective scholarship" seems to require appropriate genuflections before the historic realism which appears to demand that we must not immediately work for the idea of world government although it is admitted to be the thing we must ultimately have.

Schuman's amusing and well-written chapter on "Spheres of Influence" will quite involuntarily provide rich and perverse citations for the student of the intellectual history of the interval between the second and third World Wars. Here we find an elaborate rationalization of the power politics thesis that dominated the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco discussions. In flat contradiction to the liberal idea that peace is not just the absence of war but the presence of

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justice, Schuman tells his audience that "war flows not from injustice but from anarchy", that there can be no justice without peace, and that the "only available basis of peace" lies "in the unity of the strong". But did Munich bring justice? Did the unity of the strong even bring peace when it flagrantly subverted the rights of a small Power that was not represented in accordance with a pattern of big-Power politics that has now become fashionable? Did Schuman himself think there was a promise of peace in such respect for the Nazi sphere of influence which he would have quite properly described as "appeasement"? Does not the history of the League prove rather conclusively that the presence and participation of the small Powers were at least as effective a curb on aggression as the sanctions provisions of Article XVI?

Graham's lecture on "Great Powers and Small Powers" is an argument to bolster the thesis that "the major task in international reconstruction, in the period between wars, was the institutionalization of power" and he describes the San Francisco Charter, in which "power itself has deliberately not been shackled", as "a working mechanism for the exercise of power" and "the greatest social achievement of our age." There is no glorification of the big Powers here, however, and Graham approvingly quotes the Australian delegate's definition of the security states as "those who could not, of themselves, afford security to the international community but without which security could not be had." Now it is certainly true that there can be no law without punishment for nonobservance, and that punishment calls for clear predominance of power, but power by itself cannot establish law which must be rooted in the shared values of the community. Have not these specialists in "government" overlooked the extent to which the law of the King's Court, with its unquestioned backing by the King's power, was rooted in a general acceptance of the values of medieval Christendom and a developing continental base for commerce?

Percy E. Corbett's lecture on "Power and Justice" is closer to true realism precisely because it is focused on the moral core of the question rather than on the surface "realities" of military power. Stressing the fact that the references to "justice" in the Charter were primarily due to the influence of the small Powers—and, the reviewer would add, the more idealistic and therefore more realistic associational pressure groups in American public life—he develops the thesis that "a uniform working concept of justice, as distinguished from a paper abstraction, exists only when there is a highly developed sense of community, and the equal application of the common standard implies

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a monopoly of judgment and a monopoly of force in the community as an entity." He therefore concludes that the ideas of international justice which will count most in the United Nations will be those shared and jointly endorsed by the United States, Britain and Russia. This places the emphasis where it belongs—*not* on the pooling of power, but on the sharing of values.

These Harris lectures illustrate a critical weakness of Western scholarship which can make a correct diagnosis as to the crucial significance of values but is nevertheless precluded by its traditions of "objectivity" and "realism" from prescribing a relevant therapy. The Burns and Staley chapters with their emphasis on the jointness of interest in the solution of the German and Japanese problems, as well as in the development of world economic and social institutions, offer a fruitful suggestion as to the direction of possible progress. If ideas and interests are not shared, the provisions for the pooling of "power" will not be worth the paper on which they have been elaborated. The weakened position of the small Powers and the generally antiparliamentary atmosphere of the clauses affecting the Assembly may prove to be decisive factors in determining the real usefulness of the San Francisco Charter, but there is small recognition of these vital moral factors in these Harris lectures.

In this field there may be more reason to have faith in the politician than in objective scholarship. Would Alexander Hamilton and James Madison have worked for an Annapolis and a Philadelphia Convention if their minds had been conventionally restricted to objective observation of contemporary realities? And can a student of the time overlook the inevitable precedence in time of "Committees of Correspondence"? Is it not a peculiar comment on the myopia of our intellectual life that a modern university can organize an institute on "peace and security" and completely overlook the field of intellectual and moral intercourse? What kind of advice would our modern political realists have given to Alexander Hamilton when he was scheming about the possible political consequences of an economic conference at Annapolis? Would Schuman have considered Paul's epistles as an effective campaign with which to influence Roman "realities"? Are we going to write another "treason of the intellectuals" when even the universities fail to stress the power of ideas in a field in which only human aspiration can lift us out of the mire of contemporary "realism"?

HARRY D. GIDEONSE

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The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought. By Edmund Silberner. Translated by Alexander H. Krappe. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946.—xiv, 332 pp. $3.00.

Until relatively recently there existed no satisfactory study of the problem of war in the economic thought of modern times. In 1939 Edmund Silberner, lecturer in economics at the University of Geneva, undertook to fill that gap with his *La guerre dans la pensée économique du XVI^e au XVIII^e siècle.* The present volume continues the earlier study by bringing it down to the end of the nineteenth century.

Here, Professor Silberner deals with the economic theories of the three great schools of the nineteenth century, the classical school of economic liberalism, the protectionists and the socialists. His treatment of the classical school is the most complete, for he discusses not only the English classics from Malthus to Mill but also such continental liberals as Say, Bastiat and Molinari. In discussing the protectionists, he restricts himself to a treatment of List and those members of the German historical school who wrote specifically of the problem of war. With regard to the socialists, the author includes not only the Saint-Simonians but also Utopian socialism and the scientific socialism of Marx and Engels.

This cursory outline of the contents of the volume cannot, however, convey an adequate impression of the depth of Professor Silberner's work and its relevance to modern thought on the question of war. The author has not presented here a mere collection of random reflections by nineteenth-century economists. As he points out in his Preface, underlying all economic thinking about war are fundamental questions which bear directly upon our own age, such problems as the economic causes of war, the influence of foreign commerce on international relations, the relationship between national defense and economic policy, and the possibility of advancing the cause of world peace by economic means. In assembling the views of the economists on these and related subjects, Professor Silberner has performed a scholarly task of major importance, and its value is enhanced by the searching critiques which he has appended to each of his sections.

As the author points out, war is a "problem" only for those who regard it as a harmful and partly or wholly eliminable phenomenon. With the exception of the German historical school, all of the schools treated in this work regard war in this light. From Roscher and Knies to Schäffle and Schmoller, the Germans accepted war as a natural occurrence, and, far from regretting its inevitability, they endeavored to see what economic and social advantages militarism might present.

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But the other schools, including such non-German followers of the historical method as Laveleye and Cliffe Leslie, had a belief in the ultimate disappearance of war which they had often to justify by faith rather than by arguments from economic theory. The liberals believed that free trade would not only spread economic prosperity but would effect a moral and cultural revolution which would make war an anachronism. The socialists believed that an introduction of socialism on a world scale "by doing away with the chief sufferings of human society would *ipso facto* annihilate war." And even Friedrich List regarded his protectionism as being justified only in so far as it was not opposed to "the higher goal of mankind, the future world federation." Professor Silberner casts some doubt, indeed, upon List's sincerity, pointing out that he was not averse to using pacifist arguments to make his ideas more attractive, and that there was a fundamental contradiction between his belief in German expansion and his attachment to the higher goal of mankind. But of the sincerity and evangelical spirit of the other thinkers as they analyze the problem of war, there is no doubt.

Aside from their moral fervor, however, have the nineteenth-century economists anything to offer to a modern society concerned with the problem of war? Professor Silberner believes they have. It was the virtue of the liberal thesis to prove conclusively that from the economic point of view nations do not need war to enrich themselves. The socialist theorists established equally firmly the essential interdependence between bellicism and the economic organization of society and showed that to establish peace it was necessary to suppress poverty or social misery. Professor Silberner is more doubtful about the contribution of the protectionists but he intimates that their theories served at least as a check upon the optimism of the liberals, and that, in a world in which lasting peace has not yet been established, economic theory must always take into account the element of national security.

GORDON A. CRAIG

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism. By HANS KOHN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946.—vii, 213 pp. $2.50.

The plan of Professor Kohn's book is excellent. By discussing the thought and activities of Mill, Michelet, Mazzini, Treitschke and Dostoevsky, the historian is not merely able to represent the five dominant nationalities of Europe in a century of nationalism, but is

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also compelled to touch upon most of the other figures and events that belong to his subject at large—from the French Revolution to the theorists of race supremacy.

The author's material, moreover, is anything but redundant. So much has been written vaguely and abstractly about romantic nationalism that it is refreshing to read something definite about the opinions held by Michelet and his friend Quinet at various times in their lives. Mill is so often used as a symbol of imperceptive liberalism that it is good to represent him as a competent critic of liberty and progress. Treitschke's name and influence have been so tediously rehearsed in our century as a self-evident charge against German national policy that it is useful to find an exposition of the problem he was dealing with. And there is certainly something instructive in seeing the contrast between the broad humanity of Dostoevsky's novels and the ferocious clannishness of his political writings. Mr. Kohn deserves our thanks for producing a handy volume which should help to fill out the hollow categories of the textbook.

In spite of these merits, *Prophets and Peoples* is not the book it could and should have been, given the nature of the subject and the undoubted capacities of its author. Its faults may be explained in part by its self-imposed and otherwise commendable brevity, yet this explanation is hardly an excuse—as the reader may come to feel if this reviewer lists his chief objections. First, there is no adequate statement of the way in which the cultural nationalism of the first half of the nineteenth century—the nationalism of Herder and Michelet and Mazzini—turned into the aggressive and intolerant nationalism of the second half. It is not enough to say that three of the five "prophets" were good Europeans and the other two were not. This leaves the distinction one of persons and temperaments, unconnected with historical events, and it also ignores the central fact of the century's destiny.

The second defect is a corollary of the first. The treatment of each figure is, in spite of excellent quotations and faithful paraphrase, still too conventional and label-ridden. The reviewer does not see why Machiavellianism (except in a popular and incorrect sense) implies hardness of character; why Michelet and Treitschke were not "objective historians" but "poets who appealed to the heart"; why Dostoevsky's absolutism in politics must be taken as more representative than his vision of freedom in the fable of the Grand Inquisitor, to which Professor Kohn makes no reference; or why one should contrast the great minds of the eighteenth century with certain lesser ones of the nineteenth to establish a sharp cultural difference.

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In short, there is in Professor Kohn's treatment an ultimate unreality, which comes from taking too many terms for granted—terms like "rational liberty", "patriotism", "objectivity", "bourgeois ideals", "Western radical democrat". It is even hard to understand what our author can mean when he writes that Mazzini "never achieved a social position or popular recognition". As to the political and ideological phrases, it is too generally believed that the fight, in any century, is exclusively among the proponents of the several formulas, whereas it is mainly among divergent interpreters of any single one. Except for a very few clear oppositions, the scrimmage is *within* the articulate mass, where each individual shouts, "*I* bear the true faith." Historians must necessarily group these claims for clear exposition, but they must not be deceived by their own or others' labels, lest captions become captious. This danger reminds us that a great deal of excellent historical research is reduced to naught by the availability of historian's jargon. Professor Kohn, whose English is otherwise remarkably lucid and agreeable to read, relies too much on our guild language. In so doing, he misses telling us what he knows so well—the motives for the actions he depicts. Though his book marks one encouraging step away from the slough of misplaced abstraction, it does not reach to that solid ground where ideas and persons which may look outdated or detestable nevertheless look alive and intelligible.

JACQUES BARZUN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Dictatorship and Political Police: The Technology of Control by Fear. By ERNST KOHN-BRAMSTEDT. (The International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.) London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1945.—ix, 275 pp. 15*s*.

This book by a German refugee sociologist is the first attempt to define, in sociological terms, the relationship between the political police and dictatorship. The author proceeds in the following manner. In the first part the "two test cases" of Napoleon I (Fouché) and Napoleon III are analyzed; the second part is devoted to a detailed description of the OVRA, the SS, the Gestapo, and the concentration camps; the third part discusses the techniques of terror (such as the methods of gathering information, of collective detention, intimidation, elimination and annihilation of political leaders), legalized lawlessness, and the relation between propaganda and terror. It then turns to a discussion of the reaction of the people inside and outside

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Germany to the secret police. The conclusion deals with neurosis as a consequence of total control, and discovers "two major lessons"—that force can go a long way, but that force cannot hold a nation down indefinitely. It examines social integration in war and peace, and also raises "the problem of Germany". There are a few appendices.

There is no doubt that the book is an extremely valuable contribution, but there is equally little doubt that it fails to answer the question of the relation between dictatorship and political police. The historical material is too thin: "For various reasons it has not been feasible" to discuss the Russian Secret Police, including the Okrana, the GPU, and the NKVD. The reasons for this omisson are not stated, and the reviewer will thus forego speculation. Yet it seems hardly possible to analyze the rôle of the secret police without discussing Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. This, however, is by no means the sole omission. No definitive statement of secret police systems can be made without an analysis of the Roman Empire, which under Augustus, and especially under Tiberius (the combination Tiberius-Sejanus), gave birth to a system very similar in its methods to that of modern dictatorship. Nor can the police system of the Inquisition be ignored. To compensate for these major omissions, the author supplies a detailed description about fifty pages in length of the structure of the SS and Gestapo which, however, adds but little either to our knowledge of these agencies or to the understanding of the rôle of political police systems.

The major weakness of the book lies, however, in its method. It is entirely sociological in the sense that Karl Mannheim has given it, in that it is overwhelmingly ideological. Nowhere is there any indication that the rise of secret police systems is somehow related to the social-economic system and the ends pursued by that system. The author, apparently, is thus forced to accept the view that the rôle of the police is to maintain the dictatorship, by whatever means appear convenient. This is, of course, self-evident but it does not get very far. Every political system seeks to perpetuate itself, and every dictatorship seeks to intimidate and exterminate its opposition. Yet Fouché, the OVRA, and the GPU are not and cannot be associated with the inhumanities committed by the Nazis. The repressions of the Napoleons, of the Tsars, of the Soviets, and of the OVRA are, though not defensible, at least rational. In each of these cases, the police weighed the relations between ends and means. Under the Nazi system we witnessed something quite different. We saw the deliberate training in and practice of terror for the sake of terror. The end no longer justified the means, but the means as such were justified provided they were terrifying enough. The measures adopted by the Reich Main

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Security Office against Jews, Poles, Russians, and other nationalities were by no means adopted in order to terrorize the population into submission, for they were carefully concealed, and the people had only a suspicion that such monstrosities were being committed. It is this terror that separated Nazism from all other forms of dictatorship. Its aim was the liquidation of whole nations—in order to create space for the master race—and the creation of an élite of terrorists bound together by the practice of terror. As Himmler said on September 16, 1942: "From all these people we have in front of us, from all this hodgepodge of Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, etc., we will take over every distilled pure blood drop and, if it cannot be taken over, it will be expunged." The primary task would be to explain in psychological as well as socio-economic terms the peculiar nature of the Nazi system.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Twentieth Century Political Thought. Edited by JOSEPH S. ROUCEK. New York, Philosophical Library, 1946.—xii, 657 pp. $6.00.

This book—28 papers written by 27 authors—shows the favorable and unfavorable features of symposia. Some chapters are masterly in their condensation and lucid in their presentation; others give the impression of a sightseeing tour through a library—"just time to look at some book titles"; a few are moody and aggressively disillusioned, which is in itself an index of the state of political theory of certain schools; still others express partisan viewpoints, for example, one making an altogether unscientific slur at one of our Allies (pp. 249-250) and another claiming for the United States "its position of pre-eminence among the world powers" (p. 286).

The first, and larger, part of the book is subdivided into chapters dealing with political doctrines and currents, with techniques of persuasion, with the relations between politics and other disciplines (sociology, religion, agrarian economics, jurisprudence), and with international law. The second part surveys, country by country or region by region, the "political thought" in almost all parts of the world.

The arrangement of the book makes repetitions and omissions inevitable, and regrettably, there are no cross references. Of course, opinions as to what should be included in a symposium always differ. This reader feels that a book on twentieth-century political thought should include coherent analyses of, for example, the political theories

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underlying the emergence of international agencies, the growth of the social welfare state, and the increasing emphasis on public administration, and should deal with the political philosophies of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, of isolationism, of the good neighbor policy, with the doctrines leading to the rise and fall of social democracy between the two World Wars, and to the emergence of the popular front concept. Neither Churchill's nor Willkie's political views are analyzed, but those of Ratzenhofer, Lawrence Dennis and Roberto Michels are. The Sinarquista movement and Italian Futurism are not mentioned, the Aprismo movement is only touched upon.

There is a brief, though penetrating, scrutiny of the Spanish Constitution of 1931, and a short reference to the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Yet, the past generation has, preëminently, been a constitution-making and constitution-destroying generation, and nothing mirrors better the gigantic struggle of political doctrines than does this fact. The question asked by Savigny one hundred years ago, about the avocation of making constitutions, has never been more pertinent than it is now.

Most of the papers were written before the end of the recent war. The chapter on French political thought (one of the best of the book, although strangely enough its discussion of socialism ends with the assassination of Juarès in 1914, and its bibliography omits Brogan's outstanding *France under the Republic*) was written at a time when the author felt that " the de Gaulle Committee " was " slowly showing signs of amalgamation with more conservative forces " (p. 463). The United Nations and the Labor Party victory of 1945 are not discussed. There is one footnote on the atomic bomb. Not being " up-to-date " does not diminish the value of a book of this sort; the stream of political development moves fast, and this makes it all the more urgent to ponder on what makes it move. Yet, a uniform chronological dead line would have increased the symmetry of the work.

The great number of typographical errors is irritating. On a single page (438) it is stated that Sir Oswald Moseley advocates a " comparative " system (should read " corporative "), that Fabian socialism began in 1853 (instead of 1883), that G. B. Shaw became a Fabian in 1854 (quite a feat even for G. B. since he was born in 1856).

Nevertheless, the volume should prove stimulating to the discerning student. It contains a great deal of information and erudition. As a whole, it is " adult "; it is " to the point "; and where it is biased, the bias is not concealed. Although several authors rightly stress the relativity of political thought, and its dependence on time, place and

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circumstance, the background information demanded by the sociology of knowledge is often not given when the views of scores of writers are summarized; this information will have to be supplemented by further reading to which *Twentieth Century Political Thought* might open the door.

JOHN H. E. FRIED

MONTREAL, CANADA

The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine. Edited by PHILIP S. FONER. With a biographical essay, and notes and introductions presenting the historical background of Paine's writings. New York, The Citadel Press, 1945.—2 Vols. lxiii, 632; xvi, 1520 pp. $6.00.

Tom Paine: America's Godfather, 1737-1809. By W. E. WOODWARD. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1945.—359 pp. $3.50.

Everyone hereafter who aspires to do serious work on Paine must make grateful use of Dr. Foner's edition, the harvest of an exhaustive search for new materials in a multitude of libraries and private collections. His first volume, limited to Paine's five major works, does not give quite adequate information as to the source of the texts used and the reasons, the differences between the various editions, etc., but it is especially valuable for a complete "Chronological Table of Thomas Paine's Writings" (pp. xlvii-lix). When the work goes into a second edition, it is to be hoped that he will prefix an asterisk opposite items which he has newly discovered, so that one can see at a glance what has been added. The thirty-seven page introduction quotes a good deal, but usually without page references, and is essentially a narrative rather than an attempt to systematize logically Paine's political, religious, humanitarian and economic theories. (Since Paine prided himself upon thinking in terms of a priori "principles", the latter approach would seem desirable.) Dr. Foner writes with the temper of an advocate rather than that of a dispassionate judge sifting evidence on both sides of given issues, but his deep sympathy and new materials help to right the balance of earlier hostile interpretations. A spot-check of the two indexes shows that Paine's references to a considerable number of proper names have been omitted, but the index in M. D. Conway's edition is even more faulty.

Dr. Foner's greatest contribution lies in his printing some 225 "pieces" which "have never appeared in any previous collection". Those emphasized especially are his six letters to Rhode Island (which the present reviewer printed in separate book form in 1939); new

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letters bearing on Paine's controversy with Deane; six letters on the Bank (which I mentioned in my *Paine*, 1944, saying that I hoped to print them); a piece on the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 (which leads Dr. Foner [II, 269] to withdraw his own assertion [I, xix] of Paine's influence on that Constitution as "erroneous"); and letters such as those from the New York Historical Society (II, 1226-42) in which he sums up his contribution to American independence along with his plans for writing its history. If the new materials do not appear to necessitate any *major* revision of the main outlines of Paine's ideas and activities, they ought to inspire a number of further studies. How, for example, can Paine's numerous contradictions, or at least the inconsistencies, in his political theories be explained? A new full-length biography, taking into account all the new evidence, is badly needed; and a study of the vast pamphlet literature attacking or defending his ideas up to the time of his death ought to be of great help in illuminating the history of ideological conflicts in England, France and America. But Dr. Foner's successful researches have provided the indispensable foundation from which future studies must rise.

Mr. Woodward's biography, which appeared before Dr. Foner's edition, is essentially that of an amateur popularizer whose very sketchy bibliography would suggest that he is imperfectly acquainted with much of what scholars have already done to illuminate Paine and the patterns of thought of his era. Essentially a panegyric, despite a disclaimer, Mr. Woodward's book emphasizes personal matters, such as extended defenses of Paine against charges of excessive drinking and uncleanness. Since the book differs from other pot-boilers chiefly in its wholesale use of quotations from Paine (the brief chapter on *The Age of Reason* has some eight pages of practically solid and undigested quotation), Mr. Woodward's work would seem to owe its considerable vogue not so much to his own "intimate and conversational style" or original insight as to Paine's own vitality. Incidentally, neither Dr. Foner nor Mr. Woodward seems interested in ascertaining the extent to which this phenomenal vitality of ideas, which were in part common to liberals of the age, is dependent upon Paine's own theory and practice of literary art, upon the *manner* of his expression. But Dr. Foner's work will long stand as a landmark in Paine scholarship, and his brief introductions to individual pieces and topics, with his numerous cross references and annotations, are especially useful.

HARRY HAYDEN CLARK

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

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The Germans in History. By PRINCE HUBERTUS ZU LOEWENSTEIN. New York, Columbia University Press, 1945.—xv, 584 pp. $5.00.

This latest work by Prince Loewenstein is a thoughtful contribution, beautifully printed and bound. With much scholarship and erudition —and unevenness—it traces the historical development of the Germans from the time of Tacitus' description to Hitler's assumption of the title Reichsfuehrer in 1934. The volume is especially interesting and informative on the intellectual and literary aspects of German development. Much of the rest of the book, however, is based on certain views which are axiomatic to the author, but which are not axiomatic to historians in general.

Thus, in a volume replete with emphasis on the necessity for a Christian basis underlying personal and national life, "Christian" is made virtually synonymous with Roman Catholic. The spirit of nationality is given unfriendly treatment, and heavy blame for its pernicious rise is placed on the Protestant Revolt. Birth control is berated and dismissed as a "scourge". It is stated that "the only sensible peace programs have come forth from the representatives of religion" and the programs mentioned are all declared to be based on Catholic pronouncements.

The book, besides being basically Roman Catholic, is also, and not unnaturally, basically German. Where the material touches on non-German developments or areas, these are considered only from the point of view of their impact on Germany. French demands on Germany, for example, are severely criticized—without any indication of the internal developments in France which led to the formulation of these demands. The resulting impression is misleading. Moreover, the failure of the Weimar system is blamed largely on the lack of wisdom of the Western Powers, rather than on German shortcomings. Though this may still be a matter of opinion, Prince Loewenstein gives more weight than seems warranted to the anti-Hitler activity of the clergy in Nazi Germany. (Incidentally, the discussion of the rise of Hitler is weak.) And the author advocates a future German Reich embracing "all regions that according to language, culture, and history are German and by their own free volition desire to belong to Germany. This clearly includes German Austria."

In a number of instances, the thought and language of the book are reminiscent of some of the more obscure passages of Francis Stuart Campbell's *The Menace of the Herd.* Thus one finds such statements as these: "To the philosopher of history, harsh as it may sound,

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National Socialism presents itself as the logical conclusion of the development of modern mass democracy in its secularized, finally de-Christianized form." Or, again: "In the racial doctrines we may recognize the rising of atavistic blood notions against the Spirit of the One Blood shed by the God-Man for the redemption of all, that One Blood through which the brotherhood of all men was realized, manifested in the Roman Empire."

The narrative is further obscured by the author's effort to carry the Guelf-Ghibelline controversy into current times. Thus Bruening's government is described as possessing no "Ghibelline spirit", and Ricarda Huch is classified as a "Ghibelline Christian, though by birth a Protestant."

In outlining his views for the governance of a future peaceable Germany, the author has the following to say with respect to his proposed "Head of the Reich":

> ... [He] is entrusted with the guardianship of Righteousness, that is the right relation of positive law to the moral law. Hence he shall have a veto power over all acts of the legislature, the right of legal initiative, and authority to call on the people for immediate popular legislation. He shall have the right to remove obscurities or contradictions in the law through authentic interpretation, which shall be binding upon himself as well as others. He may participate in the meetings of the High Court with all rights and duties of a judge. Before his own tribunal, all cases of legal or personal wrongs can be pleaded. The supreme right of mercy and clemency, which does not cover up but rather heals wrongs, will be in his hands, correlated with his office of implacable justice. The oath of office shall be administered in the name of the Trinity, from which all earthly power emanates. Whether at some later date it will be desired to restore the supreme office of the republic, the nondynastic Kaisertum in name must be left wholly to the people itself.

Where the appropriate superman who can properly wield these "total" powers is to be found is not made clear.

WAGNER COLLEGE WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM

Black Ships off Japan: The Story of Commodore Perry's Expedition. By ARTHUR WALWORTH. Introduction by Sir George Sansom. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.—xx, 278, viii pp. $3.00.

Almost every schoolboy is aware of the fact that Japan was opened to Western intercourse by Matthew C. Perry in 1854. Not so well known, however, is the technique by which the Commodore concocted his potpourri of diplomacy, doggedness and duplicity. The presenta-

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tion of that material in succinct form is the task to which Mr. Walworth addresses himself. Not only does he succeed, but he does it in a fashion that combines the best canons of scholarship and story-telling. No longer must we rely on Hawks's turgid and unreadable *Narrative* published ninety years ago; for here we have the benefit of the diaries of Interpreter Samuel Wells Williams, Lieutenant Preble, Acting-Master McCauley, and the book of Clerk Spalding—all written in violation of strict censorship regulations.

America's interest in Japan is at least as old as its concern for China. By the middle of the nineteenth century a number of Americans had endured (if not enjoyed!) brief sojourns in Nippon, but, in the main, the door remained as tightly barred as ever. Nevertheless, pressures were building up that were to jar that door open: the need for coaling and provisioning ports for merchant and whaling vessels, the march of Manifest Destiny, the expansion of missionary activity, and growing Pacific trade. Under the Whig aegis, President Fillmore, Daniel Webster and the archexpansionist William H. Seward organized an expedition in 1851 to be commanded by Commodore John Aulick. Aulick was recalled at the last moment in favor of the talented younger brother of the hero of Lake Erie.

Of undoubted ability, Calbraith Perry from his earliest days gave his best to every enterprise he undertook. His conduct of the Japan expedition was no exception. With great care he gathered all the available information on Japan and determined to avoid the mistakes of C. W. King, Commodore Biddle and Commander Glynn who earlier had attempted to force the door of Japan. It was to be a one-man show. "Old Matt", as his men referred to him, did the purchasing, selected the personnel, and became the general manager; shortly he would be a diplomat, in the bargain. He was resolute; and *Punch* did not exaggerate when it taunted, "Perry must open the Japanese ports even if he has to open his own."

On Okinawa, Perry's attention to his position and rank keynoted the expedition and played an important rôle in its success. If, upon arriving at Uraga Bay, the squadron would unwittingly deal with Kayama Yezaemon posing as the "Governor of Uraga", Perry's personal seclusion would save American face. On the other hand, "Commodore" was conveniently changed to "Admiral". That both sides were playing this game was of little consequence and probably unknown at the time. Certainly Perry was unaware the following year of "police officers masquerading as governors, provincial governors impersonating princes of the realm, or a Shogun posing as an Emperor" (p. 99). The leader of the expedition was also something of a

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martinet, and his display of gold braid is the most striking feature of the landing at Kurihama. In a real sense he was doing more than "opening" Japan; unconsciously he was setting the pattern for a later conquest by a later conqueror.

Mr. Walworth has drawn on all of the available sources and, while it is clear that he is interested in relating an epic adventure tale and not in a display of erudition, it is unfortunate that he has chosen to limit the footnotes to those indicating the sources of direct quotations only. That shortcoming will not detract, though, from the reader's pleasure of sailing for a few hours with Perry and the good seamen of his Japan expedition.

Henry F. Graff

Columbia University

France: A Short History. By Albert Guérard. New York. W. W. Norton & Co., 1946.—274 pp. $3.00.

Written history is of many kinds. It may be purely descriptive of the outward manifestations of mankind's past. It may take the form of an analysis of one or more human institutions. It may be an investigation of the interrelationship of economic, social, political and intellectual forces. It may be a synthesis of a large segment of the past—at once descriptive, analytical and interpretive. It may be *histoire à thèse* or *histoire sans thèse;* or it may be various combinations of these main types. Whatever its kind, it must throw some light on human behavior if it is to stand the test of usefulness in the formation of public and private policy.

France: A Short History was probably intended to be a synthesis of France's past, for economic, social, political and intellectual currents are at least referred to in describing the major political phases through which the country has passed. But this is a synthesis with a thesis. The thesis is expressed most succinctly in the last paragraph of the book: "I have endeavored to show that France was not to be identified with a race, a climate, or a set of institutions. The greatness of France is to transcend all these. France is a collective and age-old striving for human values. She is most French when she is most universal. For her, the world commonwealth can be based only, like France herself, on liberty, equality, and fraternity. Any attempt to establish world unity by force, through the might of superpowers, will find France an irreconcilable opponent. . . ."

In the reviewer's opinion the book fails to substantiate the thesis or to realize a satisfactory synthesis. Long-term institutional trends

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are not made clear because of the traditional insistence upon explaining the rise and fall of political régimes; and the thesis, that "France is a collective and age-long striving for human values", remains vague both because what these "human values" are is never made explicit and because the story is not focused upon them.

Yet the text does throw light upon human behavior as disclosed over time by people in one geographical area. In reading this account of French history, one gets the impression that as far as France's domestic past is concerned the real story lies in age-long struggles between those on top of the heap and those less favored who were striving to improve their lot—with the latter achieving a modicum of success. So far as France's foreign relations are concerned, there appears to have been an eternal effort to ward off enemies; and success has depended primarily on power. Foreign conquests are represented here as unhappy aberrations of the nation's history, with failure well deserved.

Furthermore the secondary thesis of the book seems open to question. Although this reviewer would be the last to minimize France's contributions to Western civilization, he can hardly subscribe to the doctrine that France has been a great exponent of world coöperation on principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. The *great design* of Henry IV was a scheme for establishing French hegemony. Louis XIV was the exponent of power politics. The French revolutionaries carried their messages abroad by the sword. And after World War I France, through the mouthpiece of Leon Bourgeois, was the leading protagonist for the maintenance of the peace by an international police force.

Although I favor most heartily historical synthesis, I am convinced that it has to be achieved on a broader framework than employed here; and generalizations have to be arrived at inductively. For this kind of treatment of France's past, I still prefer Charles Seignobos, *Histoire sincère de la nation française*, which is not even cited by Professor Guérard in his bibliography.

SHEPARD B. CLOUGH

Iran. By WILLIAM S. HAAS. New York, Columbia University Press, 1946.—xi, 273 pp. $3.50.

Recent happenings in Iran—Soviet Russian penetration into Azerbaijan province, through the establishment of a pro-Russian puppet government, and the discussions of the Iranian question by the United Nations Security Council—have directed considerable attention to

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this ancient land in the Middle East, which has played a significant rôle in the cultural and political history of the world. Therefore Professor Haas's *Iran*, a timely publication giving fundamentals of cultural, social, religious and political history with special emphasis on happenings in recent years and an outlook for its future, is a welcome addition to the not too plentiful literature on the subject.

The author's estimate of Iran from cultural and political points of view has been summed up in the following passage: "There are countries, such as Egypt, whose recorded history dates back farther than that of Iran. There are others, China and Japan, whose existence as nations was never interrupted, whereas Iran suffered on her way all the vicissitudes to which a nation may be exposed. However, none but Italy can pretend to have been so deeply interlaced with the fate of humanity as Iran" (p. 1).

The political greatness of ancient Iran during the sixth century B. C. was in no way inferior to that of the Roman Empire at the zenith of its power and glory. "Under Cambyses II (died 521 B. C.), who conquered Egypt, and Darius I, who pushed the frontier as far as the Danube, subdued Thrace and Macedonia, and in the east annexed parts of the Indian Panjab, the empire reached the peak of its power. It surpassed in size the empire which the Romans built up later" (p. 8).

In the light of modern historical researches, the struggle between the Greeks and Persians during the first half of the fifth century B. C. cannot be held as the victory of the superior civilization over the inferior. "The Greeks themselves never failed to recognize the high qualities of the Persians and to appreciate their civilization, as is amply testified by the Greek historians."

In the Roman Empire the secular idea of uniting the world into one order—that of the Roman Law—prevailed, while the Achaemenian kings were influenced by the ideal of "divine mission" of establishing a world-embracing empire guided by moral order. "This attitude is in harmony with and a direct outcome of their Zoroastrian creed, which imposed upon them the duty of uniting the good forces in the name of the Supreme God." Thus Persian political philosophy had the same foundation of "duty of the rulers" as that emphasized among the Hindus and the Chinese. Yet we find that the author possibly unguardedly uses the hackneyed and much abused phrase "oriental despotism" in pages 8, 95 and other places in the book. To be sure, there existed personal despotism in the Orient, as it existed and exists today in the Occident. In fact there is "legalised despot-

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ism" such as the most enlightened Western nations practised over subjugated peoples. The reviewer cannot agree, however, with the author and other Western historians that despotism is particularly oriental.

The author has given us concise statements regarding the Persian people, their society, religion and culture which are informative. Professor Haas's estimate of Riza Shah and of his reforms in modern Iran is rather stimulating and will give the reader the impression that he was a great patriot whose policies were based upon distrust of two imperialist Powers—Britain and Soviet Russia.

While discussing the future outlook for Iran, one may very well keep in mind the geopolitical significance of the country.

> In the area of the Near and Middle East, Iran occupies a distinguished place. It forms the bridgehead on the way to Central Asia, it bars the way to India, and seen from India it appears as a kind of glacis; in the south it dominates the waters of the Persian Gulf, which is itself an arm of the Indian Ocean. The mountain ranges constituting Iran's western and northwestern borders merge into those of Anatolia, Armenia and the Caucasus, while the lowlands of the southwest, interrupted only by the Shatt al Arab, form a continuum with southern Mesopotamia and so lead into Arabia proper. Iran has suffered and benefited from this privileged position. The great Achaemenian kings made Iran the center of a world-wide empire by pushing her borders across the Mediterranean in the west and deep into Central Asia even as far as the Indus River. But Alexander and the Arabs invaded Iran from the west, northwest and southwest, and from the northeastern gate came the Seljuq Turks and the Mongol conquerors. In modern times the British look at Iran as the bulwark protecting India, the Russians as a much-coveted outlet to the warm seas, and it is mainly for these reasons that Iran became in the nineteenth century one of the focal points of international interest (p. 12).

Today not only the strategic position of Iran but also her resources (oil, etc.) have become a source of international rivalry. She is a pawn in the game of power politics among the great Powers; and thus her future is uncertain. "So the future of Iran depends largely upon whether or not the country will be allowed to find its own way unhampered by foreign interference and with the international situation in general." The reviewer does not agree with Professor Haas's views regarding Soviet Russian policy about which he writes: "There is no doubt that for a long time to come Russia's only concern will be to reconstruct and to develop her own country. This means that they may well abandon the expansionist policy of the czars and leave the Communist world revolution to chance" (p. 240). It would seem

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that Soviet Russia is committed to the partition of Iran, and to the fomenting of a revolution in that country so that a pro-Soviet Russian government (a puppet government) may be installed at Teheran. Soviet Russia would then secure control over Iran as well as the Persian Gulf and the adjoining regions.

TARAKNATH DAS

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

America and Russia in the World Community. By HAROLD H. FISHER. Foreword by Frederick Hard. Claremont, California, Claremont College, 1946.—xii, 175 pp. $2.50.

American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914. By EDWARD H. ZABRISKIE. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1946.—vii, 226 pp. $3.50.

Prepared originally as lectures for the Associated Colleges at Claremont, *America and Russia in the World Community* stands out as one of the most illuminating discussions of the relations between the two great Powers of the post-war world which has yet appeared. Professor Fisher had ably summarized the past history of Russian-American diplomacy, carefully analyzed the present status of the two nations in the world community, and outlined with cogency and acumen what he considers to be the possibilities of future Russian-American collaboration in support of international peace. He writes with a sure sense of historical perspective in dealing with the past and reasoned objectivity in treating of the present. He has succeeded within the brief compass of some 175 pages in giving us as clear and comprehensive an account of Russian-American relations as might well be expected in a book many times this length.

Professor Fisher's starting point is the revolutionary background of our own times and the tremendous changes currently taking place in technology and science. He then succinctly reviews Russian-American relations as they have developed over the course of more than a century and a half. The four remaining chapters, constituting more than two thirds of the book, take up topically the Comintern and Communism, the enslavement and liberation of Europe, imperialism and emancipation in Asia, and Russia and America in the world community. His book ends in posing the vital problem with which every discussion of international affairs must cope—One World or None.

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The author is no apologist for either Russian or American foreign policy. He discusses the action of both countries with complete candor and particularly stresses the extent to which mutual fears and suspicions, for which there had been very real justification on either side, have both in the past and in the present blocked full collaboration. Without minimizing any of the difficulties, Professor Fisher nevertheless presents what seems to this reviewer to be convincing evidence that Russian and American ideas are not irreconcilable, and that the long-term objectives of the two nations are very much the same. As he points out, they both seek, however different their concepts of democracy, the well-being of the people rather than the supremacy of the state, and they both keenly desire—and are, in fact, wholly dependent upon—international peace for the realization of their national aspirations. In short, Professor Fisher believes that coöperation between the Soviet and non-Soviet world is possible along lines that will provide a basis for the peaceful evolution of a world culture and the integration of a world community.

In *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East*, Professor Zabriskie deals with a much more limited phase of the relations between the two countries but his book is nonetheless an interesting contribution to our understanding of present-day problems. It is a carefully documented and scholarly account of the years between 1895 and 1914 when Russia and America found themselves rivals in Manchuria. The story he tells is that of the clash between the Open Door policy and Russia's imperialistic ambitions to control North China, Theodore Roosevelt's policy of "balanced antagonisms" during the Russo-Japanese war, and the failure of dollar diplomacy as applied in Manchuria by President Taft and Secretary Knox.

The author has carefully examined all the diplomatic correspondence of this period, including Russian Foreign Office material found in Soviet official publications. His interpretation follows a generally familiar pattern. There is nothing here to dispute the conclusions drawn by earlier historians of the period, such as Tyler Dennett, A. Whitney Griswold or Thomas A. Bailey. The value of his book lies in its careful recapitulation of a period of American-Russian friction which might well be repeated today should statesmanship fail to solve the problem of our current differences over the status of Korea, Manchuria and North China generally.

Professor Zabriskie makes little attempt to relate the diplomacy of Russian-American rivalry to the underlying causes—economic or political—which were responsible for our conflicting policies. While

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it is hardly fair to criticize an author for something he has not tried to do, it remains true that diplomacy does not operate in a vacuum. This book would have been both more interesting and more valuable had it more fully taken into consideration the reasons that led to the clash of Russian-American interests in Asia.

FOSTER RHEA DULLES

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Great War for the Empire: The Years of Defeat, 1754-1757. By LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946.—xxxvii, 426, xxxviii pp. $7.50.

This volume, like its predecessors in "The British Empire Before the American Revolution" series, should be read by all serious students of the colonial period. Its merits are many, its defects few. One can and must concede the importance of the war, however, without accepting the conclusions which Professor Gipson draws as to "what might have been." Although it is true, as he argues, that British assistance to America was important and that there were mercantilist arguments why such help need not have been given, it does not follow that British aid was rendered unselfishly nor that without it France would have overrun America. Apart from other mercantilist considerations leading to that end, the sheer momentum of imperial rivalry would have dictated that Britain oppose French expansion. The balance of power depended upon what happened in America as well as in Europe. Even had the outcome of the war been reversed—with France victorious and the Thirteen Colonies confined east of the Appalachians—the denser population and greater rate of growth of the British possessions suggest that sooner or later their inhabitants would have burst through any barriers which the King of France might have attempted to impose.

Nonetheless, Professor Gipson gives "a well-rounded account of major developments during the early years of the war" from Washington's expedition to the forks of the Ohio until the fall of Oswego in America, the invasion of Saxony by Frederick II in Europe, and the resignation of Newcastle in Britain. He defers until a later volume discussion of institutional problems as well as consideration of wartime finance and commercial activities. On the topics he treats, Gipson does not hesitate to revise the views of his predecessors and to correct what he believes to be their misconceptions. He demonstrates that the professional armies of France were defeated not by colonial militia but by trained British forces. He gives Governor Glen of South

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Carolina, William Shirley of Massachusetts and even the Duke of Newcastle more praise than usual, whereas Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia, Lieutenant-Governor de Lancey of New York and Sir William Johnson, the superintendent of the Six Nations, are subjected to criticism. General Braddock obtains sympathetic treatment despite his rout at the Monongahela, as does Admiral Byng in his failure to relieve Minorca. Gipson properly calls attention to Washington's observation that the world seldom does justice to a commander who suffers defeat when the cowardly behavior or mistake of some underling ruins the execution of what may have been excellent plans.

Possibly most interesting and timely of all—when one considers the transplanting of peoples now taking place—is the story of the Acadians which Gipson relates in detail. Unlike armchair sentimentalists who have not lived through the grim realities of total war, Gipson defends the English action. Despite its seeming unimportance, Acadia was vital to the French defense of Canada. It was a necessary source of supply for Louisburg, and when that citadel fell, a way was open to the heart of New France. When the Acadians who inhabited this essential battleground were conquered by Britain, they did not change their allegiance. They sought to maintain a nominal neutrality but actually gave substantial aid to the French. Eventually English patience wore thin and the Acadians were forced to move. We, who live in a world which is going to see many ruthless changes, may do well to note that Gipson puts the blame for the Acadians' misfortunes not so much upon the British who acted in accordance with the dictates of military necessity as upon the Acadians. They refused to adjust themselves to their fate and placed their trust and their lives in the keeping of " paid emissaries of one who could use them for his purposes but was utterly unable to protect them from misfortune."

Any volume on this period tends to arouse comparison with that of Francis Parkman. Gipson centers his interest on the British colonies; Parkman on the French. Gipson has the advantage of being able to examine the result of sixty years more historical research than was available to Parkman, but suffers the real handicap of having more material to compress into a coherent narrative. Unlike Parkman, Gipson sometimes falls prey to the eighteenth-century vice of unduly prolonging a sentence. Nonetheless, Gipson's fundamental clarity of organization, his careful analysis of the major factors, and his sense of the dramatic enable him, like Parkman, to hold the reader's attention and frequently to fire his imagination.

LAWRENCE A. HARPER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

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The Last Trek of the Indians. By GRANT FOREMAN. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946.—382 pp. $4.00.

Grant Foreman has spent half a lifetime documenting the true story of Indian-white relationships, and his volumes will stand through the generations as reference material of incalculable value. Most recent, *The Last Trek of the Indians* tells the story of the cession of their lands by the Indians east of the Mississippi, and their "removal", under the Indian policies of Presidents Monroe and Jackson. The cessions began in 1818; and the first removals in 1820, and continued throughout that century. The material is too repetitious for recreational reading; for there is a sameness in the experiences of the several tribes, whose stories occupy 19 of the 21 chapters. For the reader with professional interest in Indians, however, the pattern of non-Indian bad faith is made distressingly clear.

It becomes evident that the basic trouble between Indians and non-Indians stemmed from the belief held by most white men that Indians were of an inferior or subhuman species. The most dishonorable and inhuman conduct by individual whites, or by groups of whites, repeatedly is rationalized by their contemporaries on the ground that the victims were Indians, and therefore not entitled to the same consideration accorded to civilized peoples. There were, of course, many white men, like the early traders or frontiersmen, who accepted the Indians, tried to understand them, and dealt with them honestly. Many Indian treaties were negotiated by representatives of the federal government who respected the Indian leaders, and who were sincere in their promises. Many well-meaning white men sought to bring to the Indians the consolations of Christianity, and to teach them the customs and the skills of the white man. On the other hand, many treaty-makers represented the more predatory portions of the population, and sought only to divest the Indians of their land rights. Westward moving land-hungry settlers seldom respected the Indians, or sought to understand them or their problems, and had no desire to "assimilate" them.

Page after page of Foreman's story reveals the efforts of the Indians to change their ways of life so as to get on with their white neighbors and, as their lands diminished, to make a living by adopting agriculture and stock raising as substitutes for hunting and fishing. Yet, regardless of how successful they were in making these changes, the westward wave of white immigration engulfed them, and eventually swept them from their homes. While good white men preached to

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them the virtues of the Decalogue, other white men stole their horses, sold them liquor and robbed them, raped their women, and allowed them to starve or die from exposure or neglect, while being driven from their old homes to newly promised reserves.

Brief quotations from one chapter will illustrate the nature of the story.

> [The Shawnee] ... settlements in the future Kansas were confined chiefly to fifteen square miles in the northeastern corner of the country ceded them by the treaty of 1825. They did not live in tents or villages, each family settling wherever it found a satisfactory site for a farm. Many of them had good houses, of hewn logs, and stables. They cultivated their land as whites did. They raised corn, potatoes, cabbages, beans, pumpkins and melons, some wheat and oats, and cut hay on the prairies. They usually raised a surplus of corn and potatoes, which they sold to the white citizens.... The condition of the Shawnee Indians in Kansas through the years continued to justify the faith and confidence of the federal government.... Their schools were well attended.... The Shawnee ... had to work hard for a living, and they became thrifty people—by far the most progressive of all the immigrant tribes in Kansas.

But, let us skip a few pages and a few years:

> The Shawnee reservation in Kansas was located near Kansas City and was valuable not only on account of its fertile soil, but because of its proximity to a growing town. White people, in defiance of law and with the acquiescence of local authority, moved in upon this fine land, dispossessing the Indian owners, to whom they paid no rent. These intruders cultivated the land, cut the timber, and in other ways profited by their illegal possession and aggression. White people also stole the horses and the mules belonging to the Indians, who were thereby incapacitated to cultivate the land. Being thus deprived of their property, and having received the last of their small annuities, they were compelled to resort to the chase, as they formerly did, in order to secure food for their families.

Through twenty chapters, the whole pitiful and sordid story of the uprooting of sixty tribes is set forth—often in the language of their contemporaries, and carefully documented. It is not a pretty picture of " the winning of the West ", but it is healthy reading for one who is interested in the Indians of today, or who is concerned with the survival of a minority group, which is classed as inferior in the thinking of an aggressive majority. Most disturbing of all, one is forced to admit that not a great deal of progress had been made in improving the attitudes of the Indians' non-Indian neighbors over the years.

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The Education of a Correspondent. By HERBERT L. MATTHEWS. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.—x, 550 pp. $4.00.

A newspaper correspondent, as Mr. Matthews readily acknowledges, is not an historian, but, like the chronicler of old, provides us with the raw material of history. This is perhaps a somewhat exaggerated claim, but there is no denying that, since the First World War, there has developed, especially in this country, a group of able, intelligent and conscientious men who have provided the American public with excellent information on the outside world. The information is at hand; would only that it had succeeded in creating an enlightened public opinion. The process of education of the American electorate to the responsibilities which fate has foisted upon it will take rather longer than it took Mr. Matthews.

Mr. Matthews, of the staff of *The New York Times,* has had excellent opportunities for observing the preparation and the enactment of the tragedy of the Second World War. His book covers the ten years beginning with Italy's Abyssinian adventure which, allowing for the unbroken continuity of cause and effect, may well be taken as the starting point of the tragedy. In this tragedy, Italy played a major rôle, for if, owing to the limitations of her own power, she could not ultimately play the sort of part that fell to Germany, she was nevertheless the agent that set in motion the forces of destruction. Moreover, being the original expounder of the Fascist doctrine gave her special importance; for fascism is not a peculiarly Italian product, but a much more widespread, hence dangerous, response of our time to certain of its problems.

This is what gives Mr. Matthews' book its significance. Of the five "courses" into which it is divided, four, the "Abyssinian", the "Spanish", the "Italian", and the "post-graduate Italian", deal with the developments in which Italy had a major share. Much of the book, a recital of the author's adventures, while interesting, will provide little that is new to those who have followed his despatches. Of greater interest is the account of the process of "education" through which he went as the result of his experiences. The outcome is the effect of these experiences on the author's personality. Mr. Matthews is a man of strong feelings, endowed with a sense of justice, and easily influenced by his environment. Also, he is nothing if not candid. As he himself acknowledges, "I admit being highly susceptible to personal contacts. . . . It makes me wonder how long it would have taken to convert me if *The Times* had sent me to the Franco

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side, instead of to Madrid" (p. 91). In keeping with this, having had pleasant contacts with the Italians, his account of the Abyssinian conquest was not unsympathetic to the conquerors. He became likewise thoroughly enthusiastic about the Spanish Loyalists and their cause. It was the Spanish war in fact that removed the scales from his eyes, for it tempered his fundamental liberalism and enabled him subsequently to eschew the aberrations of so many liberals, especially American liberals, who, by 1939, were unable to outgrow the sophomoric wisdom acquired from the disillusionment that was an aftermath of the First World War. When Mr. Matthews returned to Italy, he could still like the country and its people, but he understood fascism for what is was and he was also able to see in its true light the generally supine behavior of the Italian people.

The vicissitudes of a correspondent's career were responsible for Mr. Matthews going through another "course", the "Indian", an interlude between the enforced end of his Italian "course" and his return to Italy with the Allied armies. In some respects, this is perhaps the best part of his book, for, while he went to India with what might be described as the normal prejudices of the average American liberal in regard to that country, he had by this time progressed sufficiently in his education to be aware of his limitations. The result was a model of fair and fresh reporting, even though it did not go to enhance the author's stock among these liberal groups.

Following Mr. Matthews through his "education" is a process that many ought to find both interesting and valuable. If he has not lost the emotional quality that has always characterized some of his reporting, how much he has learned is perhaps best expressed in his own words: "One must become reconciled to the idea that this is a period of wars, violence and revolution which will long outlive us—and perhaps the best thing one can hope for is to go down fighting on the right side. This is not pessimism; it is a recognition of the fact that the history of humanity is nearer to tragedy than to happiness" (p. 532). In times that try men's souls, there is value in having learned such a lesson.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

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BOOK NOTES

One of the most encouraging aspects of recent progress toward international organization has been the steadily increasing acceptance —by statesmen and citizens alike—of a rôle of wider significance for the Economic and Social Council. Those whose instincts are usually accurate envisage the probability of the development of "bits of operating power" for this advisory group. It is therefore important to have an understanding of the new body. The basis for such an understanding is firmly laid in Herman Finer's *The United Nations Economic and Social Council* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1946; 121 pp. cloth 50 cents), which assesses the proper function of the Council. The author introduces his subject by a consideration of the economic and political thought behind proposals for world organization in the economic field and a brief survey of existing agencies. There follows an excellent analysis of Charter provisions concerning the Council. Among the general public—even among teachers and students—there will be a tendency either to overestimate or to underestimate its powers; this chapter ought to counterbalance both extremes. A cluster of administrative problems arises, and Professor Finer rightly stresses the nature of, and the necessity for, collaboration between functional agencies outside the UN, coördination between them and the Economic Council and the Assembly, and, finally, a working relationship between the latter. The Council's task of coördination—its special task, incidentally—is threefold: to prepare recommendations for the Assembly, to exercise surveillance over national policies, and to mold the above-mentioned agencies into an administrative whole. This highly useful guide concludes with some remarks on other possible activities of the Council. Interspersed with a clear analysis are interpretative comments which command respect because of the author's extensive knowledge and experience in international administration.—RICHARD CARLTON SNYDER, Princeton University.

Every historian, and particularly the textbook writers, should read carefully *Hungary—to Be or Not to Be* (New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1946; 208 pp. $2.50), Rustem Vambery's outburst against numerous myths and fictions of Hungary's historiography,

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most of which, in turn, have been readily repeated in our history texts. It is true that Vambery limits his treatment to his native country; but his treatment indicates the present radical need for a systematic revision and reinterpretation of the history of the individual countries of Europe, for he demonstrates what a capable specialist can do with the current historical ideologies, designed to influence the Anglo-Saxon mind in this world war of nationalistic claims. Vambery will be hated and condemned by that small but rather vocal group of American historians, either of Hungarian backgrounds or belonging to the faction influenced by Hungary's propaganda, who feel that Hungary's misfortunes have been due to the post-war treaties and the scheming of Hungary's neighbors. But the true scholar will consider this small book the most trustworthy introduction to Hungary's history in English. Vambery's interpretation is incorrect, however, in one respect. His suggestion that Regent Horthy, after Munich, "most submissively flew to Hitler to ask for a share in the Czechoslovak loot" (p. 24) needs to be corrected in terms of the revelations at the Nuremberg trials. As a matter of fact, Horthy had been offered this loot before Munich and asked to participate in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.—JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, Hofstra College, Hempstead, N. Y.

Arnold D. Margolin's *From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine, and America, 1905-1945* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1946; viii, 250 pp. $3.00) presents a plea for the application of the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, with particular reference to the Ukraine. The author was, among other things, a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Labor-People's Socialist Party, and a delegate from the Democratic Ukrainian Republic to the Peace Conference in 1919. His chapter on the Ukrainian independence movement does not, however, offer the insight into the tangled events of 1918-1919 which might be anticipated on the basis of Mr. Margolin's close contact with those developments. The two subsequent chapters, devoted to the unsuccessful efforts of the Ukrainian Delegation to the Paris Conference and of a later mission to London, are more rewarding. Mr. Margolin deals with Ukrainian aspirations to independence almost entirely on the basis of the people's right to self-determination. He hardly begins to treat of the fundamental strategic, economic, and political considerations which motivated Soviet policy toward an independent Ukraine. Nor does he meet adequately the question of how an independent Ukraine could survive in a world of power politics, except for a vague reference (p. 41) to

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" a commonwealth of nations of Eastern Europe and Siberia, or even a broader union." The period since 1922, during which Mr. Margolin resided in the United States as a private citizen, occupies two thirds of the text. Mr. Margolin, with his excellent background in Ukrainian affairs, might have performed a useful service if he had chosen to review the development of the Ukraine under Soviet rule. He chose instead to give an unimpressive summary of international events, particularly those concerning American-Soviet relations since 1933. Much of this part of the book describes the author's civic efforts, largely by correspondence, to advise Secretary Hull and other officers of the Department of State on the course of American-Soviet relations. Mr. Margolin's letters and memoranda to the Department, along with a few interesting documents on the Ukraine, constitute the bulk of the Appendix which comprises one fourth of the book.—ALEX INKELES, Cornell University.

It is always encouraging when an American newspaper correspondent returning from Moscow writes an intelligent book. When, in spite of the alleged iron curtain, he produces one that is penetrating and wise, it is an occasion for rejoicing, as in the present case—*Russia on the Way* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946; 425 pp. $3.50) by Harrison Salisbury. The atrocities committed in transliterating Russian phrases are clear evidence that the author must have depended on interpreters throughout his eight months' stay; nevertheless, he covered the country from the Leningrad theater of operations to Tashkent and Samarkand, and always his comments are marked by understanding and common sense. While he was not permitted to visit the fighting front, he saw enough of the Red Army to write an account of its functioning that agrees with much that has come from American military observers. He has also provided us with an illuminating account of that other fighting front, where the press department of the Foreign Office faced the embattled foreign correspondents. His reasons for the Soviet government's chronic poor relations with the press are very plausible. Mr. Salisbury also has included a number of comments on a variety of subjects: Soviet hospitals and surgery, a comparison of American and Soviet standards of public behavior, Moscow subway crowds, housing, stores and restaurants, and many more. His trip to Central Asia made a deep impression on him, and his observations, as well as his comparisons with the situation in Iran, are worth pondering. His discussion of the religious situation, in part based upon a visit to an Odessa church soon after that city's liberation from the Rumanians, is interesting as

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well as sound, while the fascinating story of his encounter with the pathetically naïve Father Orlemanski sheds light on a mysterious phase of Soviet-Polish relations. In general, it can be said that the author's views on Soviet foreign policy and objectives, and the methods used in pursuing them, are in substantial agreement with those of the reviewer. Likewise his statements regarding the functioning of the inner circle of the Soviet government, and the question of Stalin's eventual successor, appear reasonable and well informed. On the whole, in spite of occasional lapses, this is one of the most informative of the Russian war correspondent books, and, thanks to an easy style and numerous illustrations from his own experiences, very entertaining. How in the relatively brief period of his stay in the U.S.S.R. the author managed to acquire such an understanding of a vast and unusual country remains unexplained.—JOHN S. CURTISS, Duke University.

In the Preface to *The Durham Report: An Abridged Version with an Introduction and Notes* (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1945; New York, Oxford University Press, 1946; lxviii, 186 pp. $2.75) Sir Reginald Coupland suggests that the length of this "greatest state document in British imperial history" has stood in the way of its being more widely read. In preparing this abridgment he has emphasized the constitutional issue in the British North American colonies and French Canadian nationalism. Where passages have been cut out, summaries of their contents are given. The Introduction presents the historical setting of the *Report* and contains brief comment on some of its statements and recommendations. This little volume seems likely to find its principal use in academic courses in Canadian and British imperial history.—R. L. SCHUYLER.

Canadian Agricultural Policy: The Historical Pattern (Toronto, The University of Toronto Press, 1946; xii, 304 pp. $3.50) by Vernon C. Fowke is a history of governmental policy toward Canadian agriculture and colonization from the earliest settlement to 1930. The first half of the book, which is concerned with attempts to shape or foster agricultural development in the St. Lawrence Valley and the Maritime Provinces before Confederation, emphasizes the subsidization of grain growing and livestock husbandry in the Maritimes, the rôle of agricultural societies in the several provinces, the contests over local and imperial tariffs, and the futile endeavor to establish a farming population in the Ottawa-Huron region of Upper Canada. The second half, which deals with federal activities since Confederation, stresses the immigration program which peopled the Northwest, the promotion

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of the livestock and dairy industries, the contributions of the dominion experimental farms to prairie wheat growing, the regulation of the grain trade, and the evolution of the National Policy. The book is carefully organized and clearly written. The primary materials utilized are predominantly government documents. It is astonishing that there is not a single reference to a farm journal. Perhaps the worst fault of the study is, however, its adherence to the hypothesis that agriculture in Canada has throughout been auxiliary to commerce and territorial empire building. The author has considerable success in applying this theory to the history of New France, the Maritimes, and the Northwest, but he requires Procrustean technique to fit it to Lower Canada and Upper Canada in the early nineteenth century. Another fault, scarcely less serious, is that there is no real integration of Canadian agricultural development with that of the northern United States. The result of treating Canadian policy largely in a vacuum is a failure to recognize, or at least to comment on, some parallel features. The "bread-corn" subsidies of the Maritimes had their counterparts in wheat-growing subsidies in New England, and state legislatures aided agricultural societies just as did provincial ones. Some parts of the subject matter give an impression of scamping. Thus, British Columbian agriculture receives merely a few passing notices, and the functions and achievements of the provincial departments of agriculture after Confederation are summarized in two or three pages. Finally, the treatment of the tariff is inferior to that in Orville McDiarmid's *Commercial Policy in the Canadian Economy*. Despite the deficiencies indicated, the work commands respect for its scholarship, and indeed ranks among the outstanding contributions of the last decade to Canadian economic history.—ROBERT LESLIE JONES, Marietta College.

Jurgen Kuczynski in *Labour Conditions in Great Britain: 1750 to the Present* (New York, International Publishers, 1946; 191 pp. $2.50) endeavors to substantiate the Marxian hypothesis that industrial capitalism has brought about a steady and continuous worsening of labor conditions. The author contends that this process has not been checked by labor legislation. He asserts that the improvements in the laborers' health, food and housing are illusory and seeks to support this claim by an elaborate array of statistical data. Although it is not so indicated on the title page, this is apparently a second edition, because, in a lengthy statement labeled "Introduction to the Second Edition", Mr. Kuczynski defends himself vigorously against reviewers who have challenged his thesis, singling out Mr. Leonard Woolf for

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special attention. He reaffirms his belief that the conditions of labor have deteriorated, both absolutely and relatively, and makes the astounding statement that during and after World War I American capitalists developed "special exploitation facilities . . . in Europe and other American countries." This places the heavy American losses in foreign investments in an unfamiliar light. Later we learn (p. 117) that the increased employment of women is proof positive of the decline of labor. Inquisitive readers may wonder if this also applies to the Soviet Union. The naïveté of Mr. Kuczynski's dogmatisms is disarming, but sympathetic and thoughtful students of the history of labor will be hindered instead of helped by his tract.—PAUL KNAPLUND, University of Wisconsin.

During the Second World War the United States Navy made a commendable effort to acquaint its college trainees with the facts of international life. *The Foundations of National Power: Readings on World Politics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945; x, 774 pp. $4.25), which consists of readings used in the Navy's wartime courses and several other selections which have been added by editors Harold and Margaret Sprout, is a generally successful attempt to assess and explain the ability of various nations to wage war. The editors have drawn on the writings of scholars, statesmen and journalists for discussions of the relation of each nation's military potential to its topography, strategic location, population, natural resources, and the national spirit of its people. Despite the variety and scope of the many excellent essays in this volume, some omissions of approach and treatment can be noted. While considerable space is given to a discussion of the industrial assets of each nation, with the exception of the chapter on Russia little attention is paid to the effect of a nation's economic system on its military strength. Thus, the Zaibatsu's rôle in the Japanese war economy is slighted, and the relationship between German cartelization and militarism is ignored. Moreover, some of the historical sections are so sketchy that there is often a gap between the description of a nation's physical characteristics and the account of its recent diplomatic and military maneuvers. Like many books dealing with current events, this one was partially outdated before it reached its readers. Because the date of publication followed so soon after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the impact of the atomic bomb on international power relations is seldom mentioned and never discussed by the contributors to this volume.—HAROLD C. SYRETT, Columbia University.

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In many respects *Public Men: In and Out of Office,* edited by J. T. Salter (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1946; xx, 513 pp. $4.00), is a companion volume to *The American Politician,* published in 1938 by the same press under the same editorship. The newer book includes twenty-seven biographical sketches of shorter average length than the nineteen in the older. Fifteen of the biographies are devoted to men who are or have been in Congress; the others are divided equally between public figures "in the nation and in the foreign service" and "in city and in state." Professor Salter remarks in an Introduction: "The sketches are written by professors and newspaper men.... The authors attempt to describe the subject in the life process—in the political situation that is as much a part of the public man as is his foot or his necktie. The sketches are of varying value and importance. Some are examples of creative art and a few are a more literal statement of facts and events." The authors maintain exceptional readability, a tribute to them and to the editor. Most of them write in complimentary veins about their subjects, but the essay on John W. Bricker is a bitter attack by another Ohioan distinguished in politics. There are internal evidences that many of the biographies were prepared two years before publication; the sketch of Harry S. Truman has been brought up to date frankly by a brief postscript. The book is closed by an interpretive section, "The Voter's Politician", written realistically and thoughtfully by the editor. Like its companion this book will be immensely useful to students of public affairs. It will add to Professor Salter's stature—earned by his writing and editing—as one of the ablest of living expositors of American political processes.—FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, University of Maryland.

The distinguishing characteristic of *Profitable Labor Relations and How to Develop Them,* by Paul Mooney (New York and London, Harper & Bros., 1946; xi, 209 pp. $2.50), is that it is written by a management counsel with a long history of experience in the constructive handling of relations with workers on all personnel matters. Although the author makes a number of generalizations concerning management and union labor behavior, the book is very largely devoted to the recitation of the relevant facts in the story of how Mr. Mooney and his three associates improved personnel relations in a self-service grocery chain. By adopting a five-point scheme of (1) analyzing the problem, (2) planning solutions to the problem, (3) selling these solutions to the organization, (4) developing competent subordinates to carry out the solutions, and (5) following

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through to see that the solutions were put into practice, the company achieved a 95 per cent reduction in errors and a 25 per cent increase in production. The argument of the book is that if management paid greater attention to the labor problem, it would be more than repaid in dollars and cents. Specifically, the author advocates intensive methods of training workers, developing supervisors, interesting managers in supervisory development and following in the many footsteps of the Training Within Industry Committee during the war. Although Mr. Mooney's approach is essentially that of a practitioner, the book is strongly influenced by writings on industrial psychology and is replete with such terms as "*ego*", "*frustrations*", etc. The author's attempt to drive home the few simple points he develops is a good illustration of sales psychology. While this makes the book repetitious, management leaders should not hesitate to read it from cover to cover if they can learn sufficiently from it to achieve the same economies in their companies as Mr. Mooney claims he accomplished for the grocery chain.—MURRAY ROSS, Brooklyn College.

A more propitious time could not have been selected for the appearance of *California Government: Politics and Administration* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1945; 344 pp. $3.00), the new joint work by two political scientists at the University of California at Los Angeles, Winston W. Crouch and Dean E. McHenry. With the unprecedented nomination of Earl Warren for governor in both the Democratic and Republican primaries, not only California personalities but also California politics are becoming of greater interest to those outside the Far West. In fact some of the more vital passages of the book are devoted to one of the state's curiosities, cross-filing in primary elections; and, although the authors react unfavorably to the device, they explain its existence elsewhere themselves: "The general election campaign is conducted with the full knowledge that California voters are an independent lot. Given respectable candidates, a majority may follow traditional party prejudices, but an unusually large element of independent, insurgent voters exists, and may upset the best laid plans of those who count on narrow partisanship" (p. 50). The work is divided into two general sections, as the subtitle suggests. The political, though a good outline on these aspects of government, seems the weaker of the two parts. The theories and principles of such basic political issues as cross-filing, nonpartisanship, the rôle of political parties in states, relative values of direct legislation cannot be adequately considered in single paragraphs, though their results may thus be discussed. However another

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peculiarity in the state's politics, the north-south sectionalism which overshadows the more prevalent rural-urban in other states, is well presented. The remainder of the work (roughly two thirds), devoted largely to administrative machinery (the judiciary and local governments are also here discussed), is presented through a concise, intelligible orderliness not often found in such studies. Each major office is described in succinct form—its history, legal position, chief personnel, functions, special problems. Noteworthy are the discussions of other California experiments—county and city home rule, the government of the city and county of San Francisco, and the multitudinous special districts that have mushroomed within the state bounds. Although this work was completed in 1945, the Preface informs the reader that it was "planned and most of it written" before the war, and was brought to date and published when the authors were separated; the result is that statistics (including those basically unaffected by war) are not current and that text illustrations after 1941 are few. It is somewhat disappointing that the authors apparently felt that a short conclusion regarding trends, evaluations, comparisons with other states was unessential. Nevertheless as the first work of its kind in and on California it is highly commendable both as a textbook and as a reference item. The style is clear and readable, the book is instructive, and the major contributions of the state to politics and administration are ably presented. Of special value are the well-chosen "Select Bibliographies" at the end of each chapter, secondary entries of which are largely from the University of California's Bureau of Public Administration (Berkeley) and Bureau of Governmental Research (Los Angeles) and from unpublished masters' and doctors' theses from both.—Robert W. Binkley, Jr., New York City.

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